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NATURE, MAN, AND THE POLITICAL ORDER - An 
E x p o s i t i o n o f Thomas H'obbes's Philosophy o f Man 
and the S ta t e . 
A t h e s i s presented f o r the degree o f Master o f Arts 
i n the Department o f P o l i t i c s , U n i v e r s i t y o f Durham, 
by Robert W i l l i a m Dyson, o f Collingwood Col lege , i n 
the academic year 1977-1978. 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. 
No quotation from it should be published without 
his prior written consent and information derived 
from it should be acknowledged. 
N u l l a l e x s a t i s ooramoda omnibus es t , 
i d raodo q u a e r i t u r , s i m a i o r i p a r t i e t 
i n sumraam prodes t . - L i v y . 
Der Mensch mag s i o h wenden, wohin er w i l l , 
er mag untemehiaen, was es auch s e i , s t e t s 
w i r d e r auf jenen Weg wieder zurttckkehren, 
den ihm Natur einmal vorgezeichnet ha t . 
- Goethe. 
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NATURE, MAN, AND THE POLITICAL ORDER - An Expos i t ion o f 
Thomas Hobbes's Philosophy o f Man and the Sta te . 
ABSTRACT. 
This t h e s i s i s in tended as a p repara t ion f o r more advanced and 
s o p h i s t i c a t e d research. I t s concept ion, t h e r e f o r e , i s not p a r t -
i c u l a r l y ambi t ious , and the f u r r o w which I have ploughed has been 
ploughed very o f t e n b e f o r e . My aim has been t o present a s t r a i g h t -
fo rward account o f Hobbes's s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l doc t r ines which 
i s both complete and compact. W r i t i n g p r i m a r i l y as an h i s t o r i a n 
o f ideas , I have devoted much space t o the s t rangely-neglec ted 
t a sk o f p l a c i n g Hbbbes i n a broader h i s t o r i c a l and i n t e l l e c t u a l 
con t ex t . I have also p a i d p a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n t o methodological 
cons idera t ions (an area i n which there i s apt t o be great con-
f u s i o n ) and t o the sys temat ic , organic character o f Hobbes's 
o v e r a l l p h i l o s o p h i c a l e n t e r p r i s e . I have taken care t o avoid 
the excessive r e l i ance on the Leviathan which has o f t e n charac-
t e r i s e d previous approaches t o Hbbbes; and I have t r i e d t o 
make i n t e l l i g e n t use o f i n s i g h t s a r i s i n g f rom the extensive 
l i t e r a t u r e which has emerged around Hbbbes du r ing the past 
twenty-odd years . Given the canons d i c t a t e d by l i m i t e d scope 
and l e n g t h , my purpose has i n e v i t a b l y been c h i e f l y expos i to ry ; 
but I have inc luded as much c r i t i c a l m a t e r i a l as has seemed 
necessary t o a proper ly-ba lanced account. 
R.W. Dyson, 
Coll ingwood Col lege , 
Durham. 
1978. 
PREP AGE. 
I have used S i r W i l l i a m Molesworth's e d i t i o n o f Hobbes's 
works th roughout , and I have f o l l o w e d the now-standard p r a c t i c e 
o f r e f e r r i n g t o these works by means o f the volume and page 
numbers o f the Molesworth e d i t i o n . A l l t r a n s l a t i o n s appearing 
i n the t e x t are my own, except where the con t ra ry i s i n d i c a t e d ; 
and, t a k i n g due precaut ions against m u t i l a t i n g the sense, I 
have brought the s p e l l i n g and punctuat ion o f quoted passages 
i n t o c o n f o r m i t y w i t h modern conventions. Where more than one 
poss ib le q u o t a t i o n would have served a p a r t i c u l a r purpose equal ly 
w e l l , I have, as a r u l e , chosen the sho r t e s t . Where i t has 
been poss ib le t o do so w i thou t damage t o the meaning, I have 
abridged what would otherwise have been inconven ien t ly l ong 
q u o t a t i o n s . 
I wish p a r t i c u l a r l y t o thank ( i n a lphabe t i ca l order) 
Dr Wolfgang von Leyden, Professor A.J .M. Mi lne and M.F. Murch-
i s o n , Esq . , f o r t h e i r endless he lp and endurance o f nuisance -
p a r t i c u l a r l y Professor M i l n e , who has supervised my work th rough-
ou t . My thanks go also t o the s t a f f o f the Durham U n i v e r s i t y 
L i b r a r y , and t o my w i f e , V a l e r i e Dyson, t o whom t h i s t he s i s 
owes more than she probably r e a l i s e s . More gene ra l l y , I wish 
t o thank Henry Tudor, Esq . , whose teaching f i r s t s t imula ted 
my i n t e r e s t i n p o l i t i c a l phi losophy. 
i i 
A Note P r e f i x e d t o Professor M i l n e ' s tape-recorded copy. 
The t h e s i s as i t stands on these tapes i s the same i n every 
m a t e r i a l respect as the t y p e w r i t t e n copies . But I have, as i t 
were, ' t r a n s l a t e d ' c e r t a i n typograph ica l conventions which cannot 
conven ien t ly be expressed by reading a loud . Thus, f o r example, 
when on the tapes I in t roduce a quota t ion w i t h the words 'as 
Hobbes puts i t ' o r 'and I q u o t e ' , or something o f the k i n d , 
these words are u s u a l l y on ly a ' t r a n s l a t i o n ' o f what, i n the 
examiners ' copies , s imply appears as a colon or a comma. Also, 
where a word appears i n i n v e r t e d commas t o i n d i c a t e t h a t i t i s 
used i n some p e c u l i a r sense, I ' t r a n s l a t e ' the i n v e r t e d commas 
by some such f o r m u l a as 'so t o speak' or 'as i t were ' ; and these 
formulae do no t neces sa r i l y appear i n the t e x t i t s e l f . Moreover, 
a l l s tandard abbrev ia t ions used i n the t e x t , such as e .g . or i . e . , 
are g iven i n f u l l on the tapes . 
The foo tno t e s are brought toge ther onto a s ing le tape , arranged 
i n chapter o rde r . When I come t o the p o i n t i n the t e x t at which 
a foo tno te appears, I s imply read the number o f the foo tno te 
w i thou t f u r t h e r d i g r e s s i o n ; and t h i s number can then be marr ied 
up t o the corresponding number on the separate foo tno tes tape . For 
the sake o f convenience, I have completely avoided such con-
ven t ions as o p . c i t or i b i d . , and have given each separate reference 
i n f u l l . 
The endpaper quota t ions f rom L i v y and Goethe which are read 
i n t r a n s l a t i o n on the tape appear i n the t y p e s c r i p t i n t h e i r 
o r i g i n a l languages. 
A copy o f t h i s note w i l l be bound w i t h each copy o f the t he s i s 
f o r the i n f o r m a t i o n o f the examiners. 
1 . 
INTRODUCTION. 
Thomas Hbbbes came unexpectedly i n t o the wor ld on Good Fr iday 
( 5 t h A p r i l ) , 1588 - unexpectedly, because the shock o f hear ing 
o f the impending approach o f the Spanish Armada apparent ly caused 
h i s mother t o go prematurely i n t o labour . This somewhat unprom-
i s i n g beginning l a t e r prompted Hobbes's own r u e f u l explana t ion 
o f the abnormal degree o f anx ie ty which t r o u b l e d him f o r the r e s t 
o f h i s l i f e : 
And such f e a r then took h o l d o f my mother 
That she gave b i r t h t o tw ins - me and Fear, both at once. 
He l i v e d l ong enough t o be able t o wear an unusual ly v a r i e d 
s e l e c t i o n o f personae: t a l e n t e d c l a s s i c a l schola r , poet and 
t r a n s l a t o r ; t u t o r t o a r i s t o c r a c y , and even r o y a l t y ; amateur 
geomet r i c i an , c o n t r o v e r s i a l i s t and crank; n a t u r a l s c i e n t i s t , 
p o l i t i c a l t h e o r i s t and suspected p o l i t i c a l subversive; and at 
l a s t , a f t e r the r e t u r n o f Charles I I i n 1660, pensioner and 
i n t i m a t e o f the k i n g , renowned f o r h i s smart and ready answers 
t o the s a l l i e s o f the Court w i t s - the Grand Old Man o f the 
Res to ra t i on Cour t . 
To say the l e a s t o f i t , Hobbes was by way of being a psycholog-
i c a l paradox. The congen i t a l t i m i d i t y which he blamed on the 
Spanish Armada grew on him t o an almost absurd degree. He was (or 
so h i s de t r ac to r s a l leged) a f r a i d o f the dark , a f r a i d o f h e i g h t s , 
a f r a i d o f t h i e v e s , a f r a i d o f death; and h i s worr ies l e d him i n t o 
some comical p r a c t i c e s . He used t o s i ng l u s t i l y i n bed before going 
o f f t o s leep , take v i o l e n t exercise (even at an advanced o l d 
age) i n h i s employer 's gardens, and pay the servants t o give him 
a rub-down af te rwards - a l l because he thought t h a t he might thus 
p ro long h i s l i f e by two o r three years . On a more ser ious no te , 
he responded t o contemporary events w i t h an exaggerated and f e a r -
f u l sense o f h i s own prominence and v u l n e r a b i l i t y . He was always 
ready t o cast an anxious eye at current a f f a i r s and see i n them 
t h r e a t s d i r e c t e d towards h i m s e l f . When the Long Parliament 
met i n November I64.O, i t proceeded at once t o the impeachment 
o f Thomas Wentworth, f i r s t E a r l o f S t r a f f o r d , one o f the most 
dedicated and unscrupulous o f a l l the supporters o f Charles I . 
At t h i s j u n c t u r e , H'obbes began s e r i o u s l y t o suppose t h a t h i s 
own l i f e now hung i n the balance, because o f the a b s o l u t i s t 
p o l i t i c a l opinions e labora ted i n h i s t r e a t i s e The Elements o f 
Law. N a t u r a l and P o l i t i c . He promptly departed post-haste f o r 
P a r i s , where he was t o remain i n sel f - imposed e x i l e f o r the 
next eleven yea r s . L a t e r , he was able t o congratula te h i m s e l f 
on having been ' t h e f i r s t o f a l l t h a t f l e d ' . As John Plam-
enatz has put i t , Hobbes 'seems t o have p r i d e d h imse l f on h i s 
t i m i d i t y as o ther men do on t h e i r courage ' .^ I t i s indeed 
' v e r y p rod ig ious t h a t . . . t h e timorousness o f h i s nature f rom 
h i s i n f a n c y . . . s h o u l d not have c h i l l e d the b r i s k f e r v o u r and 
v i g o u r o f h i s mind, which d i d wonde r fu l ly continue t o him t o 
h i s l a s t ' . - ' For , no twi ths t and ing a l l t h i s anx ie ty , he was able 
t o seize upon the most advanced and c o n t r o v e r s i a l speculat ions 
o f an advanced and c o n t r o v e r s i a l age, and t o u t i l i s e them f o r 
h i s own p e c u l i a r purposes w i t h a t r u l y remarkable degree o f 
conceptual pene t r a t i on and d a r i n g . Cautious conservatism and 
3. 
s c h o l a r l y ambitions o f the most r a d i c a l co lour are s t range ly 
y e t comprehensibly mingled i n Hbbbes's commodious mind. Again 
and again, w i t h no l i t t l e arrogance, but w i t h a l o g i c a l implac-
a b i l i t y which seldom shows signs o f f a l t e r i n g , he d e l i v e r e d 
h i m s e l f o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l and p o l i t i c a l opinions - ma te r i a l i sm, 
E ra s t i an i sm,^ p o l i t i c a l absolut ism, psycho log ica l egoism and 
e t h i c a l r e l a t i v i s m - which brought upon him extremes o f oppro-
br ium and pe r secu t ion . He even achieved the rare d i s t i n c t i o n 
o f being suspected o f having brought down the wrath o f God upon 
h i s f e l l o w countrymen. A f t e r the Great Plague o f 1665 and the 
Great F i r e o f the f o l l o w i n g year , a B i l l against atheism and 
p r o f a n i t y was in t roduced i n t o the House o f Commons. A Committee 
o f the House was i n s t r u c t e d (on the 17th October, 1666) t o 
rece ive i n f o r m a t i o n touch ing such books as tend t o 
atheism, blasphemy and profaneness, or against the 
essence and a t t r i b u t e s o f God, and i n p a r t i c u l a r . . . 
the book o f Mr Hobbes c a l l e d the ' L e v i a t h a n , ' and t o 
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r e p o r t the mat ter w i t h t h e i r opin ion t o the House. 
As i t happens, no th ing came o f t h i s - probably because o f 
Hobbes '3 i n t i m a c y w i t h King Charles and prominent members o f 
the a r i s t o c r a c y . But at about t h i s t ime he was expressly 
fo rb idden by the k i n g h i m s e l f t o pub l i sh anything o f a con t ro -
v e r s i a l nature i n E n g l i s h . Even h i s c o l l e c t e d works i n L a t i n -
which were h a r d l y l i k e l y t o foment d i s a f f e c t i o n amongst the 
common people - were not al lowed t o be p r i n t e d at home: they 
had t o be pub l i shed ( i n 1668) i n t h a t most accommodating c i t y , 
Amsterdam. Indeed, bo th du r ing h i s l i f e and a f t e r h i s death, 
Hobbes was most b i t t e r l y v i l i f i e d as an a t h e i s t , a h e r e t i c , a 
l i b e r t i n e , a p o l i t i c a l l i a b i l i t y and a p o t e n t i a l co r rup te r o f 
the c o u n t r y ' s y o u t h . One Danie l S c a r g i l l was s t r i p p e d o f h i s 
degree and removed f rom h i s Fel lowship o f Corpus G h r i s t i Col lege , 
Cambridge, f o r a l leged p rofess ions o f 'Hobbism'; and not even the 
personal i n t e r v e n t i o n o f the Archbishop o f Canterbury s u f f i c e d 
t o rescue him.** No other ph i losopher , perhaps, has over been 
so e x t e n s i v e l y inveighed against as Hobbes was wi thou t a c t u a l l y 
being c a l l e d upon t o s u f f e r martyrdom - al though Hobbes 
seems t o have come f a i r l y close even t o t h i s at one p o i n t . 
According t o Aubrey, on one occasion s h o r t l y a f t e r the Rest-
o r a t i o n - p o s s i b l y the occasion t o which I have already r e f e r r e d -
Hobbes thought i t prudent t o burn some o f h i s w r i t i n g s because 
'some o f the Bishops made a motion t o have the good o l d gentleman 
Q 
b u r n t f o r a h e r e t i c ' ; and White Kennet t e l l s us t h a t he became 
conspicuously more r egu l a r i n h i s attendance at church a f t e r the 
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Par l iamentary Committee had got onto h i s t r a c k . Over one 
hundred books and pamphlets e i t h e r denouncing him e x p l i c i t l y or 
r e f e r r i n g t o him w i t h the utmost h o s t i l i t y appeared i n p r i n t 
between 1650 and 1700 - and t h i s i s not count ing the copious 
l i t e r a t u r e generated by Hbbbes's acrimonious controvers ies w i t h 
Bramhal l and W a l l i s over t e c h n i c a l mat ters . Some o f these 
essays i n denuncia t ion are q u i t e ex t r ao rd ina ry , as much f o r 
t h e i r i n e p t i t u d e as f o r t h e i r v i t u p e r a t i o n . Unfo r tuna t e ly f o r 
h im , i f no t f o r us , Hobbes's development o f seemingly a t h e i s t i c a l 
and subversive doc t r ines was 'so l u c i d t h a t on many issues i t 
was obvious ly wrong and so readable t h a t even minor clergymen 
11 
occupied themselves w i t h t r y i n g t o r e f u t e i t . ' 
The whole sub jec t o f the r ecep t ion given t o Hobbes's ideas 
and the poss ib le motives ac tua t i ng those who gave i t has been 
f u l l y documented by Samuel I . Min tz i n the work already c i t e d . 
I content myself w i t h a s i n g l e i r r e s i s t i b l e quo ta t ion - f rom 
one Charles Robotham, an Angl ican d i v i n e o f N o r f o l k , who r e f e r s 
t o the 
Malmesburian Hydra, the enormous Levia than , the 
g i g a n t i c dragon, the hideous monstros i ty and B r i t i s h 
beast , the Propagator o f execrable d o c t r i n e s , the 
Promulgator o f mad wisdom, the Herald and P u g i l i s t 
o f impious death , the I n s i p i d Venerator o f a M a t e r i a l 
God, the renowned f a b r i c a t o r o f a monocondyte Symbol, 
the Depraved Renewer o f o l d heresies t o the f a i t h , the 
Nonsensical roguish vendor o f f a l s i f i c a t i o n s , a 
strenuous hoer o f weeds and producer o f d e c e i t s . . . 
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and so on and so on - a l l f o r t i m i d o l d Mr Hbbbes. This 
excerpt f rom one o f the more sumptuous and absurd examples 
o f the anti-Hobbes l i t e r a t u r e i s perhaps enough t o convey 
something o f the f l a v o u r o f contemporary responses t o the good 
o l d gentleman. I quote i t here simply because no t e s t i m o n i a l 
t o h i s o r i g i n a l i t y and imagina t ive power could p o s s i b l y be so 
v i v i d as the n e a r - h y s t e r i c a l f u l m i n a t i o n s which h i s ideas were 
capable o f provoking amongst h i s compatr io ts . 
Needless t o say, p o s t e r i t y has been a good deal k inder t o 
Hobbes than was contemporaneity. To be sure , h i s work i n the 
f i e l d s o f o p t i c s , dynamics and geometry i s now o f i n t e r e s t 
on ly i n s o f a r as i t sheds l i g h t upon h i s theor ies o f man and the 
S ta te ; wh i l e h i s l ong and tendentious h i s t o r i c a l essay, Behemoth. 
has been evaluated by Professor Trevor-Roper i n two p r a c i s e l y -
1A 
se lec ted words - ' i n c o r r i g i b l y erroneous. ' Moreover, by con-
sent which I take t o be common, h i s general phi losophy, f o r a l l 
i t s i n s i g h t s i n t o , say, the uses and abuses o f language, i s r e -
garded as inadequate t o ' r a i s e Hobbes t o the l e v e l o f the 
c l a s s i c a l t r i u m v i r a t e o f B r i t i s h philosophy - Locke, Berkeley, 
and Hume.• 3 Never theless , a l l these caveats apar t , i t i s now 
h a r d l y open t o quest ion t h a t he i s the we igh t i e s t Engl i sh con-
t r i b u t o r t o the extensive corpus o f p o l i t i c a l ideas generated by 
a p o l i t i c a l l y dynamic cen tu ry , w i t h the poss ib le s ing le exception 
o f John Locke. H i s Levia than i s one o f the great masterpieces o f 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l synthes is and r a t i o c i n a t i o n , and h i s own greates t 
achievement. To quote A.G.N. Flew again, ' t he r e s t o f h i s w r i t -
ings serve only as i n t r o d u c t i o n s , footnotes and appendices t o 
16 
Lev ia than ' - a l though, as I have already i n d i c a t e d , these 
i n t r o d u c t i o n s foo tno te s and appendices probably deserve c lose r 
a t t e n t i o n than they are o f t e n given by students o f t h e i r author . 
I n c h r o n o l o g i c a l o rde r , the c h i e f sources o f what Hobbes c a l l e d 
h i s ' c i v i l ph i losophy ' are The Elements o f Law. Na tu ra l and P o l -
17 18 
i t i c , the De Give and the Lev ia than . I t might seem danger-
ously specu la t ive at a d is tance o f three cen tur ies t o t r y t o 
penetra te too deeply i n t o the pu re ly sub jec t ive questions o f 
m o t i v a t i o n and purpose. I n Hobbes's case, however, i t i s no t 
i n f a c t necessary t o do more than r e s o r t t o the obvious t r u i s m 
t h a t ph i losophies are always t o some extent the progenies o f 
t h e i r t ime and circumstances. More s p e c i f i c a l l y , Hobbes's own 
remarks r e v e a l , w i t h o u t our having t o hazard con jec tu res , t h a t 
7. 
t h i s ' c i v i l ph i lo sophy ' i s i n some sense the product o f a con-
f r o n t a t i o n between h i s own insecure and r e t i r i n g p e r s o n a l i t y and 
the events th rough which he l i v e d , A l l p o l i t i c a l discourse occurs 
at the i n t e r f a c e between thought and f a c t , between the sub j ec t i ve 
and the o b j e c t i v e ; and. nowhere-is t h i s more c l e a r l y e x e m p l i f i e d 
than i n the case o f H'obbes. When he was born , the r e ign o f 
Queen E l i z a b e t h I s t i l l had f i f t e e n more years t o r u n . He died 
on ly n ine years be fo re the Whig Revolu t ion o f 1688 es tabl i shed a 
p a i r o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l monarchs upon the throne o f England. I t 
was thus h i s f o r t u n e (or mi s fo r tune ) t o have coincided w i t h some 
o f the most seminal events o f modern Engl i sh h i s t o r y . He saw 
the attempts of. the House o f S tua r t t o form Eng l i sh government 
i n t o an absolute monarchy grounded upon the ideology o f Jure 
D i v i n o . He experienced the moral earnestness and passionate 
bourgeois i n d i v i d u a l i s m o f the P u r i t a n r e v o l u t i o n ; the C i v i l 
War; the innova t ions i n e c c l e s i a s t i c a l and p o l i t i c a l o rgan i s -
a t i o n engineered by the Long Parl iament and the P ro tec to ra te ; 
and, by way o f c u l m i n a t i o n , the execut ion o f King Charles I on 
the 30th January, 16^9. Hobbes was i n Europe f o r much o f t h i s 
t i m e . But he watched and t rembled f rom a f a r ; and i n I64.6 he 
became t u t o r t o the e x i l e d Prince of Wales. By temperament and 
circumstance, he was f o r the most pa r t disposed t o be a supporter 
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o f the R o y a l i s t causej and exposure t o the i m p l i c a t i o n s o f 
such a p e r i o d o f ga the r ing asp i ra t ions t o grea ter p o l i t i c a l and 
r e l i g i o u s l i b e r t y must have been a t r u l y appa l l i ng experience 
f o r a man who, f o r a l l h i s i n t e l l e c t u a l boldness, was a p h y s i c a l 
coward. I t was p r e c i s e l y because he so acute ly f e l t ' t he d i s -
orders o f the present t i m e ' i n which so many o f h i s R o y a l i s t 
f r i e n d s and associates were imp l i ca t ed t h a t he determined ' t o set 
8. 
before men's eyes the mutual r e l a t i o n between p r o t e c t i o n and 
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obedience. ' He chose t o do so by f o r m u l a t i n g a p u r e l y n a t -
u r a l i s t i c moral phi losophy and an a b s o l u t i s t theory o f the State 
grounded (as he supposed) so securely upon s t r i c t s c i e n t i f i c and 
l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e s t h a t reasonable men could no more doubt i t s 
v a l i d i t y than they could doubt t h a t o f the laws o f phys ics . 
Never theless , al though we must take these contemporary in f luences 
s e r i o u s l y , i t i s at the same t ime obviously impossible t o make 
an adequate study o f Hobbes's p o l i t i c a l theory i n i s o l a t i o n f rom 
h i s o ther spheres o f i n t e r e s t . This i s so s imply because these 
spheres o f i n t e r e s t a l l empty i n t o one another w i t h such ingen-
ious complex i ty . Hobbes was pre-eminent ly an e c l e c t i c , a syn-
t h e s i s e r - a polymath on a scale and i n a way fundamental ly 
a l i e n t o modern modes o f t h i n k i n g . Working at the very t ime 
when the modern c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f knowledge began t o get under 
way, he was s t i l l h i m s e l f ambitious enough - and c o n f i d e n t enough -
t o suppose t h a t he could accommodate the whole gamut o f s c i e n t i f i c 
knowledge w i t h i n a coherent and comprehensive system. The mod-
ern d i s t i n c t i o n between p h i l o s o p h i c a l and s c i e n t i f i c i n v e s t i g -
a t ions - the n o t i o n o f d i v i d i n g our knowledge o f the e x t e r n a l 
w o r l d o f f f rom our i n t e r n a l or sub jec t ive concern w i t h the nature 
o f knowledge i t s e l f - does no t appear i n h i s work: Hobbes 
i n v a r i a b l y uses the two terms ' sc ience ' and ' ph i losophy ' as 
synonyms (a p o i n t , i n c i d e n t a l l y , t o be borne i n mind throughout 
the f o l l o w i n g chap te r s ) . H i s anx ie ty - r idden concern w i t h events 
i n the p o l i t i c a l w o r l d repea tedly d i s t r a c t e d him f rom the excur-
sions i n t o the worlds o f physics and geometry which were h i s 
9. 
g rea tes t l o v e . Thus, h i s system o f phi losophy appeared before 
the p u b l i c out o f i t s l o g i c a l o rder . Nevertheless , h i s own 
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declared i n t e n t i o n - f o r m u l a t e d , perhaps, as e a r l y as 1637 -
was t o ex t r apo la t e n a t u r a l - s c i e n t i f i c explanat ions t o the 
f i e l d o f what we should now c a l l the ' s o c i a l sc i ences ' . He 
wished t o produce a sys temat ica l ly-developed account o f phys ics , 
phys io logy , psychology, e t h i c s , sociology and p o l i t i c s . A l l 
these branches o f knowledge were t o be brought toge ther and 
r e l a t e d according t o what Hobbes took t o be the proper method 
o f s c i e n t i f i c enqui ry ; and, apparent ly , the whole en te rp r i se 
o r i g i n a l l y had no p a r t i c u l a r p o l i t i c a l tendency. As Hobbes 
h i m s e l f puts i t , 
I was s tudy ing phi losophy f o r my mind sake, and I 
had gathered toge ther i t s f i r s t elements i n a l l k inds ; 
and having d iges ted them by degrees, I thought t o have 
w r i t t e n them, so as i n the f i r s t I would have t r e a t e d o f 
body and i t s general p r o p e r t i e s ; i n the second o f man 
and h i s s p e c i a l f a c u l t i e s and a f f e c t i o n s ; i n the t h i r d , 
o f c i v i l governments and the dut ies o f s u b j e c t s . . . . W h i l s t 
I c o n t r i v e , o rder , pens ive ly and s lowly compose these 
m a t t e r s . . . i t so happened i n the i n t e r i m t h a t my count ry , 
some few years before the c i v i l wars d i d rage, was 
b o i l i n g ho t w i t h questions concerning the r i g h t s o f 
dominion and the obedience due from sub jec t s , the t r u e 
fore runners o f an approaching war; and was the cause 
which , a l l those o ther matters d e f e r r e d , r ipened and 
2? 
plucked f rom me t h i s t h i r d p a r t . " 
Hobbes i s now c h i e f l y (and deservedly) remembered as a p o l i t -
E 
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23 i c a l t h e o r i s t - as an exponent o f 'possessive i n d i v i d u a l i s m ' 
and a met iculous ly-developed doc t r ine o f undiv ided sovere ignty . 
I t i s h i s p o l i t i c a l recommendations which have s t imula ted the 
overwhelming preponderance o f the l i t e r a t u r e which has gathered 
around him i n recent t i m e s . Nevertheless, i t would obvious ly be 
an e r r o r - e s p e c i a l l y i n view of h i s own dec la ra t ions - t o 
attempt to , do j u s t i c e t o h i s c o n t r i b u t i o n i n t h i s f i e l d wi thou t 
cons ider ing i t as p a r t o f an i n t eg ra t ed system spanning na ture , 
man and the p o l i t i c a l o rder . And i t i s also e s s e n t i a l t o bear 
i n mind t h a t t h i s system e x i s t s no t only against a w e l l - d e f i n e d 
background o f p o l i t i c a l t u r m o i l and c o n f l i c t i n g i deo log i e s , but 
also i n the context o f a major s c i e n t i f i c r e v o l u t i o n . We cannot 
t r u l y understand Hobbes's phi losophy other than as an organic 
whole. We cannot understand h i s s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l p h i l o s -
ophy unless we f i r s t understand h i s m a t e r i a l i s t i c and de t e r -
m i n i s t i c psychology. We cannot understand h i s psychology unless 
we understand h i s n a t u r a l phi losophy. And we cannot understand 
h i s n a t u r a l phi losophy wi thou t examining h i s ideas i n the l i g h t 
o f contemporary s c i e n t i f i c developments, and wi thou t grasping 
at l e a s t something o f h i s view o f epistemology and the nature 
and method o f phi losophy i t s e l f . These considerat ions have 
l a r g e l y determined the p a t t e r n o f t h i s t h e s i s . 
n. 
NOTES. 
(i n preparing the notes, I have deliberately avoided using the 
conventional shorthand devices - op.cit., i b i d . , and so on. 
This has made for a v i s u a l l y rather cumbersome system of r e f -
erencing; but I could not see how else to avoid multiplying 
the already acute d i f f i c u l t i e s involved i n recording the foot-
notes onto tape.) 
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rel a t i o n to the religious thought of his time, as to which 
see Mintz, The Hunting of Leviathan; F.G.Hood, The Divine 
P o l i t i c s of Thomas Hobbes; and Ralph Ross, Herbert W. 
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A separate discussion of t h i s important f i e l d would, I 
think, have been clearly beside the point of t h i s thesis. 
But, since the earliest and most b i t t e r controversies about 
Hobbes centred upon essentially religious issues, I do not 
wish my omission to be construed as a b e l i t t l i n g of t h i s 
aspect of Hobbes studies. 
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OH AFTER ONE - THE INTELLECTUAL CONTEXT. 
This chapter i s by way of being a general and discursive 
introduction to Hobbes i n his i n t e l l e c t u a l milieu, to serve 
9 3 a viaticum f o r more technical matters. At the same time, 
pure biography i s an important key to understanding, and has -
at least i n much recent scholarship - rather tended to be lost 
i n the penumbra of exclusively philosophical matters. Since 
one of the presuppositions of t h i s thesis i s that, i n the study 
of Hobbes, there are very few exclusively philosophical matters 
capable of being understood i n abstraction from t h e i r broader 
context, I regard t h i s chapter as being rather more than mere 
ground-cle aring. 
One has heard i t said, with some appositeness, that Thomas 
Hobbas was the Bertrand Russell of the seventeenth century. 
Not only did he l i v e almost twice as long as the t y p i c a l 
Englishman of the period might reasonably expect5 his l i f e 
was also distinguished by the most remarkable v e r s a t i l i t y , 
energy and good health. Indeed, though he was rather a puny 
specimen as a young man, he seems actually to.have become 
healthier as he grew older: 
From f o r t y or better, he grew healthier, and then he 
had a fresh, ruddy complexion. He was sanguineo-
mslancholious, which the physiologers say i s the most 
ingenious complexion....In his old age he was very 
bald.. .yet within door he used to study and s i t bare-
16. 
headed, and he said he never took cold i n his head, 
but that the greatest trouble was to keep o f f the f l i e s 
- i 
from pitching on the baldness. 
He was s t i l l playing tennis two or three times a year when 
he was seventy-five. Although he suffered from the ago of 
about sixty from 'the shaking palsy i n his hands' which 
eventually increased into a paralysis so severe that he could 
hardly write his own name, his vigour of mind remained undim-
inished to the end of his l i f e . In 1672, when he was eighty-
four years old, he wrote an autobiography i n Latin verse, 
and i n 1673 he brought out a verse translation of Books IX-
X I I of the Odyssey. This was so well received that i n the 
following year he published a translation of the whole of the 
Odyssey and the I l i a d , prefacing the completed work with an 
introductory essay 'Concerning the Virtues of an Heroic Poem.'^ 
Of t h i s e f f o r t , with the same old mixture of fearfulness and 
arrogance, he said: 
Why...did I write i t ? Because I had nothing else to do. 
Why publish i t ? Because I thought i t might take off my 
adversaries from showing t h e i r f o l l y upon my more serious 
writings, and set them upon my verses to show t h e i r wis-
dom. 
I t has to be admitted that the translations are not very scin-
t i l l a t i n g ones - there i s no room for examples, although there 
are some amusing p o s s i b i l i t i e s . The more successful translator 
of Homer, Alexander Pope, declines to say more about Hobbes's 
e f f o r t than that i t i s 'too mean for c r i t i c i s m ' . But the whole 
undertaking i s not at a l l bad f o r a man i n his l a t e r eighties. 
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Indeed, i n August, 1679, no more than four months before his 
death, he was 'writing somewhat1 for his publisher, William 
Grooke, 'to p r i n t i n English'.^ Unfortunately, we do not 
know what t h i s 'somewhat1 was. 
Even apart from the Spanish Armada which hurried him in t o 
the world, Hbbbes's ear l i e s t years were rather unpromising, 
and augured l i t t l e of the remarkable developments to come. 
His father, also called Thomas, was the vicar of Westport, 
near Malmesbury i n Wiltshire; but the family evidently did not 
enjoy a very lavish standard of l i v i n g . Aubrey t e l l s us that 
the parish was worth less than seven pounds a year. Hobbes 
the elder 'was one of the clergy of Queen Elizabeth's time -
a l i t t l e learning went a great way with him and many other 
ignorant Sir Johns i n those days; could only read the prayers 
of the Church and the homilies, and disesteemed learning... 
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as not knowing the sweetness of i t . 1 One Sunday morning, 
having dropped o f f to sleep i n church after a Saturday-night 
Bridge-session, he woke up to t e l l the congregation that clubs 
were trumps. But he l e t the side down most spectacularly, and 
fo r the l a s t recorded time, when he got into a f i g h t with a 
neighbouring parson at the church-door. Even the ignorant Sir 
Johns of those days could only go so f a r and no farther; and 
Parson Hobbes l e f t the d i s t r i c t under a cloud and died i n red-
uced circumstances 'beyond London.'^ The care of Thomas junior 
- who was not yet four years old - and his brother and sister 
passed to t h e i r father's elder brother, Francis, a well-to-do 
glover and local dignitary, who thus unknowingly assumed a mom-
entous responsibility. 
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After an elementary education under clergymen at Westport 
and Malmesbury, Hobbes was very fortunate to come under the 
care of an excellent schoolmaster, one Robert Latimer, 'a 
young man of about nineteen or twenty, newly come from the 
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university, who then kept a private school i n Westport.1 
This Robert Latimer was apparently a more than competent Greek 
scholar; and he took to Hobbes at once. He was quick to spot 
promise i n his new p u p i l , and would instruct him and other 
g i f t e d boys of the school u n t i l nine o' clock i n the evening. 
Whether or not they were grateful for t h i s extra devotion i s 
not recorded; but Hobbes rewarded his master's dedication by 
presenting him with a translation of Euripides's Medea, int o 
Latin iambics before he was fourteen years old. By t h i s time, 
he had evidently absorbed a l l that Mr Latimer had to offer; 
because, at the age of fourteen, he went up to Magdalen Ha l l , 
Oxford (absorbed in t o Hertford College i n 1874). 
When Hobbes became an undergraduate, the University of Oxford 
was s t i l l , t o a l l intents and purposes, a medieval i n s t i t u t i o n . 
The course of study for the Bachelor of Arts degree did now 
include courses i n classical l i t e r a t u r e - Renaissance humanism 
had at least penetrated to that extent. But the method and 
s p i r i t of the place nevertheless remained essentially scholastic, 
and a series of disputations and exercises i n the schools s t i l l 
lay between the undergraduate and his degree. The i n t e l l e c t u a l 
vigour which, i n the fourteenth century, had enabled Oxford to 
occupy a place of eminence i n the world of scholarship second only 
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to that of the University of Paris seems, however, largely to 
have dried up. Degree regulations were often only very cur-
s o r i l y enforced - when, that i s , they were enforced at a l l . 
Discipline was bad. Canon law and scholastic theology had come 
to be neglected to the point of atrophy. Philosophy was now 
dished up raw from the works of Aristotle - chiefly the Rhetoric. 
^ e Dialectics and the Nicomachean Ethics - and the great 
medieval commentaries of Duns Scotus and Peter Lombard were more 
or less ignored. The declamations and disputations given i n 
the Faculty of Arts i n the late sixteenth and early seventeenth 
centuries were predominantly abstract and sophistical. They 
were often plagiarised d i r e c t l y from Aristotle's own works, 
frequently t r i v i a l and f l i p p a n t , and more often than not display-
ing l i t t l e or no awareness of current events. Candidates for 
degrees debated such burning questions as whether mothers love 
t h e i r children more than fathers do, or whether kindness or 
severity i s the best method of keeping a wife i n order. The 
dominant impression i s that l o g i c a l adroitness and verbal s k i l l 
are more highly prized than either quality or quantity of know-
ledge. Hobbes's own comments, frequently and trenchantly delivered, 
leave us i n no doubt that discipline and standards of behaviour 
- amongst academic s t a f f as well as students - could run at a 
pret t y low ebb even in a college such as Magdalen Hall, where 
the Puritan ethos was very strongly established. 
Placed i n the lowest class of lo g i c , and obviously rather out 
of his depth, the fourteen-year-old Hobbes did not take at a l l 
wall to t h i s academic curriculum. He seems to have enjoyed 
rh e t o r i c , and thought himself a good rhetorician; but Aristot-
20. 
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elian logic and metaphysics l e f t him both cold and uninformed. 
I t i s clear enough from his writings that he never did quite 
manage to understand the temper of scholasticism; and Oxford 
l e f t him with a mistrust of and distaste f o r i t which never l e f t 
him. Here i s a sample of his short way with the giants of 
medieval philosophy: 
The f i r s t Rector of the University of Paris, as I have 
read somewhere, was Peter Lombard, who f i r s t brought i n 
them the learning called school-divinity; and was second-
ed by John Scot of Duns, who l i v e d i n or near the same 
time; whom any ingenious reader...would judge to have 
been two of the most egregious blockheads i n the world, 
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so obscure and senseless are t h e i r writings. 
To be sure, i t i s probable that Hobbes; l i k e Descartes, liked 
t o pretend to be more id l e than he was. His boast was that, i f 
he had read as much as other men, he would have known no more than 
13 
they ^ - the boast being both an avowal of rationalism and an 
expression of distaste for the musty past. Even so, i t i s plain 
that the university curriculum of the early sixteen-hundreds was 
not such as to stimulate heroic feats of industry. According to 
Aubrey, Hobbes spent much of his undergraduate career trapping 
jackdaws i n the early summer mornings and browsing through maps 
in the Oxford bookshops. As Richard Peters has put i t , 'at t h i s 
time i t was the new and strange worlds charted by Drake and 
Magellan that f i r e d his imagination rather than the i n t e l l e c t u a l 
voyages of Kepler and Galileo out of the snug, earth-centred 
security of the Aristotelian cosmology.' *• Hobbes was to dis-
cover Kepler and Galileo l a t e r , and the whole of his subsequent 
21. 
career was to become a revolt against the t r a d i t i o n a l syllabus 
which he had experienced as a young man. Throughout his l i f e , 
he was convinced that the universities, as wall as being useless 
for any worthy p r a c t i c a l purpose, ware hotbeds of p o l i t i c a l 
sedition, introducing the dangerous notions of Greek democracy 
into the pliable minds of the young. He held that, i n o r i g i n , 
they were cunning front-organisations for the intrigues of the 
Roman Catholic Church, which they disguised by the cul t i v a t i o n 
of incomprehensible and bewildering subtleties. Those who 
succeeded the 'egregious blockheads' mentioned earl i e r learnt 
from them 
the t r i c k of imposing what they l i s t upon t h e i r 
readers, and declining the force of true reason by 
verbal forks; I mean distinctions that signify nothing, 
but serve only t o astonish the multitude of ignorant 
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men.%' 
Jackdaw-trapping notwithstanding, Hobbes took his Bachelor of 
Arts degree i n 1608, when he was twenty years old. He seems 
to have acquired nothing at the university i n the way of pre-
paration f o r his subsequent l i f e ' s work - beyond, perhaps, a 
great d i s l i k e of the past and the seeds of a desire to become 
an innovator. At the time of his graduation, by a piece of great 
good fortune, William Cavendish, Baron Hardwick (who was to be 
created f i r s t Earl of Devonshire i n 1618) was looking for a 
t u t o r for his eldest son, also called William. The Principal 
of Magdalen Ha l l , James Hussey ('a great encourager of towardly 
youths' ) recommended Hobbes for the job. The family was 
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looking for a young man of mora or less the same age as the 
future second Earl - then seventeen, and married to a twelve-
year-old Scottish heiress who, as Mintz demurely puts i t , 'was 
allowed to mature some years more before assuming her wifely 
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duties'. Hobbes was accepted; and so began an association 
with the Cavendish family which was to continue, i n spite of 
interruptions, for mora than seventy years. Hobbes, who never 
married, l i v e d for much of his l i f e as part of the household; 
and, indeed, his death - on the 4.th December, I679, at the age 
of ninety-one - occurred at Hardwick, one of the two Derbyshire 
1ft 
seats of the family. 
Hbbbes seems actually to have been more of a Jeeves than a 
t u t o r to his new charge, who was, by a l l accounts, a young man 
of colourful habits. They want out hawking and hunting together, 
and Hobbes often caught cold through stsnding about i n the rain 
t r y i n g to borrow money for his pupil. While he was l i v i n g i n 
t h i s way, he worried so much about forgetting his Latin that he 
bought a pocket edition of selections from the classics to carry 
about and read i n his odd moments. But i n spite of the drawbacks, 
Hobbes t e l l s us that the years between 1608 and 1628 , when the 
second Earl died (having succeeded to the t i t l e only two years 
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previously) were the happiest of his l i f e . 
The Cavendishes departed from the usual practice of treating 
the family t u t o r as one of the lass important of the domestic 
servants. They allowed him to mix socially with them, and they 
seem genuinely to have accepted him as a friend. Indeed, i n view 
of the length of his service with the family, ha no doubt even-
23. 
t u a l l y became something of a household i n s t i t u t i o n . His assoc-
i a t i o n with the family i s especially important from our point of 
view. I t conferred upon him advantages which a person of his 
station, the parvenu nephew of a glove-maker, could hardly other-
wise have hoped to enjoy, and without which the breadth and 
ambition of his career would never have been able even to have 
been conceived. He now had constant and ready access to f i r s t -
class l i b r a r i e s and to the conversation of eminent and i n f l u e n t i a l 
men. He enjoyed the society of Edward Herbert, Baron Cherbury, 
the philosopher, historian and exponent of 'natural r e l i g i o n ' -
against whom Locke's cr i t i q u e of innate ideas was l a t e r to be 
directed. He also knew Lucius Carey, second Viscount Falkland, 
the Royalist hist o r i a n whose home at Great Tew near Burford was 
a meeting place f o r some of England's most cultivated i n t e l l e c t s ; 
William Cavendish and his brother Charles, nephews of the f i r s t 
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Earl of Devonshire, who had established, at Welbeck Abbey i n 
Nottinghamshire, a t h r i v i n g nucleus of o p t i c a l , geometrical, 
chemical and mathematical study; and Ben Jonson, the poet and 
Court favourite, whose advice he took on points of l i t e r a r y style. 
Of his employer, through whose offices he was introduced to a l l 
these luminaries, he was moved to say that 
there was not any who more really and less for glory's 
sake favoured those that studied the l i b e r a l arts 
l i b e r a l l y than my Lord...did; nor i n whose house a 
21 
man should less need the university than i n h i s . ' 
Evidently, art and nature were more accessible to the curious 
mind within the aristocratic c i r c l e of the day than they were at 
the University of Oxford where ffobbes had spent his five tedious 
2U. 
undergraduate years. 
For some time during t h i s happiest period of his l i f e , Hobbes 
acted as part-time amanuensis to the most eminent Royalist of 
a l l , Francis Bacon, Baron Varulam and Viscount St Albans. This 
association presumably began after 1621, when Bacon was removed 
from the Lord Chancellorship, banished into the country (after 
four uncomfortable days i n the Tower) and barred from office for 
taking bribes. I t may have lasted u n t i l Bacon's death i n 1626. 
I t i s , i n f a c t , impossible to establish an .accurate chronology 
from the evidence available; but Hobbes i s apparently the source 
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of the famous story r e t a i l e d by Aubrey, " that Bacon caught cold 
and died after experimenting with refrigeration by st u f f i n g a 
chicken f u l l of snow. In any case, we know that Hobbes assisted 
the ex-Lord Chancellor i n translating several of his essays into 
Latin; and they would s t r o l l together i n Bacon's 'delicious 
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walks at Gorhambury', Hobbes with pen and paper waiting to j o t 
down the philosophical pearls as they dropped from the great 
man's l i p s . According t o Aubrey, Bacon thought very highly of 
Hobbes's services, Hobbes being the only one of his secretaries 
who could understand what he said. The question of Bacon's 
possible 'influence' on Hobbes has been widely discussed, i n 
spite of the complete lack of pertinent evidence. As we shall 
see presently, not a great deal of the Baconian s c i e n t i f i c s p i r i t 
seems to have rubbed o f f on Hobbes; but at least we might reason-
ably suggest that Bacon's vehement h o s t i l i t y towards Aristotle 
reinforced notions which had already come into Hobbes's mind at 
Oxford. And we might also conjecture that Bacon's conviction that 
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the resources of the natural world might be understood and 
mastered by science must have been impressive and inspiring 
to a younger man with a fixed direction of his own s t i l l to 
f i n d . 2 4 " 
Unquestionably the greatest single advantage which Hobbes 
derived from his employment in the Cavendish household was the 
opportunity to t r a v e l abroad and to become accustomed to the 
i n t e l l e c t u a l ambience of seventeenth-century Europe. His f i r s t 
chance came when he and his pup i l set out to make the inevitable 
European grand tour i n 1610. They v i s i t e d France, Germany and 
I t a l y . The young Lord spent a great deal of money, and Hobbes 
picked up the rudiments of French and I t a l i a n , at the same time 
greatly improving his rusty Latin. He returned to England burst-
ing with ambition to become a classical scholar. Thereafter, 
for about f i f t e e n years, while employed as private secretary to 
his former pu p i l , he devoted his ample free time to the study 
of classical l i t e r a t u r e , concentrating p a r t i c u l a r l y upon poetry 
and history. Significantly enough, the Blackbourne biography 
t e l l s us that he embarked upon these studies i n order to t r y to 
f i n d an i n t e l l e c t u a l system which satisfied him; , He wished t o 
escape from the sophistical and contentious logic of the school-
men, t h e i r ethics, grounded less upon t r u t h than upon prejudice, 
and the ingenious but pedantic and unreal physics of A r i s t o t l e . ^ 
I t was at t h i s time that he began to work upon his translation 
of Thucydides's History of the Peloponnesian War, the f i r s t of 
his works to see the l i g h t of day. Although i t 'lay long by 
him',2^1 t h i s was eventually published i n 1629, with an introduc-
tory essay and a d e l i g h t f u l dedication to the f i r s t Earl, 'by 
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whose indulgence I had both the time and ammunition to perform 
27 
i t . 1 " Towards the end of his l i f e , Hobbes was to explain that 
t h i s work had a didactic as well as a purely l i t e r a r y purpose -
namely, to warn his countrymen that one man i s wiser than a 
28 
number by refe r r i n g them to the example of Athenian democracy. 
I t i s often suggested that t h i s i s merely an ex post facto 
explanation, and that there i s no reason to suppose that Hobbes's 
p o l i t i c a l ideas were so f i r m l y set by t h i s time. But, then ag/sLn, 
there i s equally no reason t o suppose that they were not. In 
default of decisive evidence t o the contrary, we might as well 
take Hobbes at his word and conclude th a t , by the time he was 
contemplating publishing the translation, his f a i t h i n absolute, 
and preferably monarchical, government was c r y s t a l l i s i n g . 
Associating as he did with the kind of company habitually to be 
encountered i n the Cavendish household, why should i t not do 
so at the age of forty? 
Altogether, Hobbes made four expeditions into Europe: the 
f i r s t grand tour already mentioned; a second grand tour, made 
between 1629 and 1631, t h i s time with the son of Sir Gervase 
C l i f t o n , a gentleman of Nottinghamshire;^ a t h i r d grand tour 
with the t h i r d Earl of Devonshire from 1634. to 1637; and the 
long voluntary exile i n Paris, from 1640 to 1651. Of these 
journeys, the t h i r d i s certainly the most significant from the 
point of view of Hobbes's i n t e l l e c t u a l development. 
These European excursions amounted, in sum, to a period of 
s l i g h t l y less than twenty years. In the course of them, Hobbes 
was drawn into the most eclectic and sophisticated circles of 
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h i s age. As a r e s u l t , h i s career as a philosopher got under way. 
At some time during the second grand t o u r he made a discovery which 
marked one of the great t u r n i n g points of h i s l i f e : 
B'eing i n a gentleman's l i b r a r y , Euclid's Elements l a y 
open, and 'twas the Iff E l . l i b r i I . He read the p r o p o s i t i o n . 
'By G—,' said he,(he would now and then swear an emph-
a t i c a l oath by way o f emphasis), 'This i s impossible!' So 
he reads the demonstration of i t , which r e f e r r e d him back 
t o such a p r o p o s i t i o n ; which p r o p o s i t i o n he read. That 
r e f e r r e d him back t o another, which he also read. Et s i c 
deinceps. t h a t at l a s t he was demonstratively convinced 
of t h a t t r u t h . 3 0 
Thereafter, as Aubrey puts i t , he was ' i n love w i t h geometry', 
although the t r u t h of the matter i s t h a t he never became more 
than a second-rate geometer himself, i n s p i t e of an exuberant 
f a i t h i n h i s own competence. Before very long, he managed t o 
convince himself t h a t he had found out how t o solve the immem-
o r i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n a l problems o f squaring the c i r c l e , d u p l i c a t i n g 
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the cube and cubing the sphere. Eventually, he was unwise enough 
t o embark upon a long, b i t t e r and quite f u t i l e pamphlet war on 
these and other subjects w i t h John W a l l i s , Savilean Professor 
of Geometry at Oxford. Not unreasonably i r r i t a t e d by Hobbes's 
unpleasant animadversions on English U n i v e r s i t y l i f e , W allis and 
Seth Ward, the Savilean Professor of Astronomy, had determined t o 
teach the o l d boy a lesson; and W a l l i s u n m e r c i f u l l y made Hobbes 
loo k very s t u p i d . I n no time at a l l , the controversy had become 
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no more than an exchange o f i n s u l t i n g remarks; but Hobbes had 
gone overboard f o r geometry, and was not by any means t o be d i v e r -
28. 
t e d . I t was t o form one of the fundamental parts of h i s p h i l o s -
ophical method, f o r the technique of proceeding by clear steps 
from r i g o r o u s l y - s t a t e d f i r s t premisses t o ind u b i t a b l e deductive 
conclusions seemed t o him t o o f f e r e x c i t i n g p o s s i b i l i t i e s t o 
the s c i e n t i f i c i n v e s t i g a t o r . Thus f a r , he resembles. Spinoza and 
Descartes; but there are dangers here, t o which we s h a l l 
p r e s e n t l y r e t u r n . 
I n Paris on h i s t h i r d grand t o u r , Hobbes was introduced (poss-
i b l y by S i r Kenelm Digby) t o the Franciscan F r i a r , Marin Mersenne, 
the fpfend and schoolfellow of Descartes, who was, as Groom 
Robertson puts i t , ' i n the r e p u b l i c of i n t e l l e c t l i k e the heart 
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i n the body.' .An i n d e f a t i g a b l e encourager of s c i e n t i f i c en-
q u i r y , w i t h i n t e r e s t s of h i s own ranging from mathematics t o 
accoustics and musicology, Mersenne c u l t i v a t e d a wide and advan-
ced i n t e l l e c t u a l c i r c l e . His c e l l operated as a kind of minia-
t u r e u n i v e r s i t y where, by correspondence and personal meetings, 
some of the foremost exponents of s c i e n t i f i c i n v e s t i g a t i o n 
exchanged ideas. Mersenne and Hobbes became f i r m f r i e n d s . I t 
was t o Mersenne t h a t Hobbes communicated h i s own e a r l i e s t en-
q u i r i e s i n t o the f i e l d s o f sensation and o p t i c s , which Mersenne 
published i n summary form i n the Preface t o h i s B a l l i s t i c a . I t 
was also through the agency of Mersenne t h a t Hobbes wrote the set 
o f sixteen c r i t i c i s m s o f Descartes's Meditations which now appear 
3/ 
as the ' t h i r d o b j e c t i o n s ' . At the same time, Hobbes pre-
pared a c r i t i q u e of Descartes's Dioptrique, i n which he compared 
and contrasted h i s own o p t i c a l theories and some of those propoun-
ded by Descartes. This was published by Mersenne i n h i s Optique 
i n 1644.. Possibly f o r no reason more obscure than jealousy, 
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Descartes did not take at a l l kindly to Hobbas's c r i t i c a l remarks 
- which were, to be f a i r , expressed i n a perfectly amicable tone.' 
Descartes accused Hobbes of plagiarism; Hobbes replied that he 
had been saying the same things for years and could prove i t ; and 
when the two eventually met i n Paris i n 1648 they f e l l out almost 
at once. They seem never to have entertained more than a some-
what f r i g i d respect for one another - as witness the backhanded 
compliment recorded by Aubrey: 
He jHobbesJ would say that had he [_Descartesj kept 
himself to geometry he had been the best geometer i n 
the world, but that his head did not l i e for philos-
ophy.^ 
Also through the mediation of Mersenne, Hobbes formed the warmest 
of friendships with the neo-Epicurean philosopher Pierre Gassendi, 
who came to Paris i n I645 as Professor of Mathematics in the 
College Royal. This friendship lasted u n t i l Gassendi's death 
i n 1655« In view of the direction of his own philosophical 
development, Hobbes must have found the atomism and materialism 
of Gassendi's philosophy congenial. Most important of a l l , 
however, Hobbes now came to be acquainted with the seminal scien-
t i f i c work of Galileo and Kepler; and i n 1635 or 1636 he 
journeyed to Florence where he met the aged Galileo. According 
to the inexhaustible Aubrey, the two became friends; although 
the friendship cannot have lasted long, since Galileo died i n 
164.2. Nevertheless, throughout his l i f e , Hobbes maintained the 
most profound respect for Galileo, who 'was the f i r s t that opened 
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to us the gate of natural philosophy universal. 1 
A glance at Hobbes's early development furnishes a clear 
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p i c t u r e of a precocious young man, longing f o r n o v e l t y , bored 
w i t h the conventional orthodoxies, and searching f o r an i n t e l l e c -
t u a l grounding more secure than t h a t y i e l d e d by the academic 
curr i c u l u m then available i n England. Extensive f o r e i g n t r a v e l 
was obviously the best possible antidote f o r such ennui. Having 
chafed so much against the t r a d i t i o n a l A r i s t o t e l i a n pabulum dished 
up by the beardless young t u t o r s of Magdalen H a l l , Hobbes found 
him s e l f completely i n harmony w i t h the i n t e l l e c t u a l aspirations 
of seventeenth-century Europe. Here, a f t e r a l l , the imminent 
collapse of the s c h o l a s t i c e d i f i c e was accepted as i n e v i t a b l e . 
The most impressive and forward-looking i n t e l l e c t s were daring 
t o be heedless of the s a n c t i t y o f A r i s t o t l e . The past was almost 
d a i l y being undermined by epochal new steps i n the n a t u r a l s c i -
ences. Men were ven t u r i n g f o r the f i r s t time t o seek p e r f e c t 
mastery over the p h y s i c a l world and i t s resources. Here was the 
beginning of the modern s c i e n t i f i c experience - the age of the 
v i n d i c a t i o n of Copernicus's h e l i o c e n t r i c planetary theory and 
the f i n a l displacement of man from the centre of c r e a t i o n . I t 
was the age of Galileo's work i n astronomy and dynamics and 
Kepler's form u l a t i o n of the laws of planetary motion; and Hobbes 
found h i m s e l f p e r f e c t l y at home i n i t . I t i s small wonder t h a t , 
a f t e r h i s r e t u r n from h i s f i r s t European journey, he was already 
the only one of Bacon's amanuenses who could understand the 
master's s c i e n t i f i c musings. He had had h i s baptism, and he was 
t o become more and more deeply involved w i t h European science. 
31. 
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CHAPTER TWO - HOBBES AND THE RISE OF SCIENCE. 
Given the i n t e l l e c t u a l and s o c i a l m i l i e u i n which we f i n d him 
moving, i t i s not d i f f i c u l t t o see why the s t r u c t u r e of Hobbes's 
mature thought i s as i t i s . Indeed, h i s eventual r e t u r n from 
the s c i e n t i f i c haven of France i n 1651 coincided w i t h (and, as 
we have seen, was occasioned by) the appearance of the English 
version of h i s masterpiece, the Leviathan. I n order t o under-
stand the growth of h i s ideas, t h e r e f o r e , i t i s obviously impor-
t a n t t o consider the nature and si g n i f i c a n c e of the c h i e f ideas 
which Hobbes encountered during h i s long formative period as a 
philosopher. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , i t would take us too f a r a f i e l d t o 
embark on even the shortest h i s t o r y of seventeenth-century science 
here; and, as i t happens, pure d e s c r i p t i o n would not serve our 
purposes very w e l l i n any case. I t i s more appropriate t o p o i n t 
out t h a t s c i e n t i f i c thought at t h i s time had begun t o centre 
c h i e f l y upon three concepts - concepts which were also t o become 
fundamentals of Hobbes's own thought. These concepts are matter, 
motion, and law. To i l l u s t r a t e t h e i r importance, we need only 
glance at the v i v i d contrast between seventeenth-century dynam-
i c s and the t r a d i t i o n a l Greek mode of conceiving the phenomenon 
of motion. 
From the e a r l i e s t times - w i t h tha odd exception such as 
Anaxagoras o f Clazomenae or Damocritus of Abdera, both of whom 
were accounted impious - Greek s c i e n t i s t s had held e i t h e r t h a t 
the planets are gods or t h a t they are moved by gods. A more 
s o p h i s t i c a t e d v e r s i o n of exactly the same kind of b e l i e f had 
passed down through the Middle Ages from A r i s t o t l e . To A r i s -
t o t l e ' s mind, one of the functions of the soul i s t o impart 
movement t o the body whose soul i t tst 
The s o u l i s the cause and f i r s t p r i n c i p l e of the 
l i v i n g body....It i s the cause i n the sense of being 
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t h a t from which motion i s derived. 
Indeed, on A r i s t o t l e ' s account, every object i n motion requires 
an actual moving cause. I t fo l l o w s from t h i s t h a t not only do 
i n d i v i d u a l bodies require a cause t o move them, but the e n t i r e 
universe must have a F i r s t , t h a t i s t o say a Supreme, Mover. 
The term ' f i r s t ' i n t h i s context i s not t o be understood as 
f i r s t i n time. A r i s t o t l e regards time as e t e r n a l since, i f we 
were t o speak of the cre a t i o n of time, we should, i n e f f e c t , be 
speaking of the time when time was created, or of the time during 
which time was not , which p l a i n l y would not do. Also, change and 
motion are connected w i t h time i n s o f a r as they are temporal 
phenomena - t o borrow Gollingwood's expression, every change and 
every motion requires a c e r t a i n 'minimum time' i n which t o occur." 
Therefore, change and motion must be e t e r n a l as w e l l * Further-
more, since motion and change are necessarily e t e r n a l , the cause 
of motion, the F i r s t Mover, must i t s e l f be incapable of being 
changed. I f t h i s were not so, we should have t o admit the poss-
i b i l i t y of the F i r s t Mover being changed i n such a way as t o cause 
i t t o cease from causing motion; i n which case motion and change 
would not, a f t e r a l l , be necessarily eternal.. The F i r s t Mover 
must t h e r e f o r e be non-material, since being m a t e r i a l involves the 
p o s s i b i l i t y o f being acted upon and changed. The F i r s t Mover i s 
pure energeia - energy or f o r c e . J 
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To the extent t h a t A r i s t o t l e was the genius l o o i of medieval 
science, the underlying presuppositions of h i s explanation of 
motion are of great importance. They may b r i e f l y be state d as 
f o l l o w s . F i r s t , the n a t u r a l s t a t e of m a t e r i a l bodies i s r e s t . 
Second, our experience confirms our r a t i o n a l c e r t a i n t y of the 
e t e r n a l i t y of motion, since we see t h a t , although t h e i r n a t u r a l 
s t a t e i s motionlessness, there are some bodies i n motion (e.g. 
the planets) which do not j u s t run down and stop. T h i r d , there 
must t h e r e f o r e be an e x t e r n a l force operating continuously upon 
such bodies. Moreover, as we have seen, t h i s motive force must 
issue from a source which i s i t s e l f non-material and thus 
unmoved and immovable. 
Seventeenth-century dynamics, as enunciated i n Galileo's law 
of i n e r t i a , and as s h o r t l y t o be brought t o p e r f e c t i o n i n Newton's 
laws of motion, completely exploded t h i s t r a d i t i o n a l view of the 
world. k I t suggested, and demonstrated the p l a u s i b i l i t y o f the 
suggestion, t h a t a body i n motion w i l l continue t o move i n the 
same d i r e c t i o n f o r ever, unless some e x t r i n s i c cause arrest i t s 
movement or cause i t t o a l t e r i t s d i r e c t i o n . And such e x t r i n s i c 
causes as w i l l produce these e f f e c t s were held t o be explicable 
i n p u rely mechanical terms. The planets continue t o describe 
t h e i r o r b i t s simply under t h e i r own momentum, and i n accordance 
w i t h ascertainable laws of the k i n d formulated by G a l i l e o and 
Kepler; and i f one were suddenly t o stop or a l t e r course, t h i s 
would be due not t o the f a c t t h a t a 'mover' had stopped moving i t , 
but t o the a p p l i c a t i o n of another force of discoverable i n t e n s i t y . 
I n s h o r t , i t had now become possible t o formulate an e n t i r e l y 
s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t explanation of the universe as a system of matter 
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i n motion according t o discoverable laws of mechanics. Appeals 
t o an unseen, metaphysical a u t h o r i t y or mover or sustainer were 
no longer necessary t o s c i e n t i f i c explanation. To be sure, i t 
was s t i l l necessary, or at l e a s t prudent, t o leave a place f o r 
God i n the explanation: God was the c r e a t o r , the Deus ex machina, 
who had b u i l t the mechanical universe and set i t going. Even 
Newton hel d t h i s view, although A r i s t o t l e himself was w e l l aware 
t h a t there i s no need t o suppose th a t the universe had a begin-
n i n g i n time. The important p o i n t , however, i s t h a t i t was no 
longer necessary t o assume t h a t God took any f u r t h e r i n t e r e s t i n 
the machine which he had created. Unless impeded, i t would run 
on f o r e v e r , according t o laws which the i n t e l l i g e n t observer might 
formulate and understand - or, t o be more exact, i n regular ways 
capable of being formulated i n t o s c i e n t i f i c g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s . 
Of greater s i g n i f i c a n c e s t i l l was the excision of t e l e o l o g i c a l 
or purposive assumptions from the study of n a t u r a l phenomena. 
For as long as observant men believed t h a t some outside i n t e l l i g e n c e , 
some motive force 'out t h e r e ' , continuously imparts t o objects 
tho motions which they are seen t o make, i t was both n a t u r a l and 
deeply i n h i b i t i n g also t o believe t h a t the i n t e l l i g e n c e i n quest-
ion does so f o r some reason. I n other words, i t was easy t o 
assume t h a t there must be some cosmic purpose underlying the f a c t 
t h a t the universe i s as i t i s , and so t o seek f o r explanations 
of why r a t h e r than how n a t u r a l phenomena are the way they are. 
This view i s , of course, not q u i t e dead t o t h i s day; and as i t s 
a l t e r n a t i v e has such a n t i - t h e o l o g i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s , there w i l l , 
I suppose, always be those whose i n t e r e s t i s t o keep i t a l i v e . 
But, given the p o s s i b i l i t y of a purely mechanistic explanation 
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of the universe, t e l e o l o g y ceased t o seem necessary t o s c i e n t i f -
i c understanding. Whatever the o r i g i n a l motive behind the creation 
may have been (assuming i t t o have had any motive at a l l ) n a t u r a l 
phenomena as we observe them j u s t are.^" Man could thus seek, 
not merely t o understand them, but also t o c o n t r o l them t o h i s 
own ends. Never before had the secrets of nature been so p l a s t i c ; 
never before had man been able, by s c i e n t i f i c discovery and 
understanding, t o seek t o i n j e c t h i s own purposes i n t o the n a t u r a l 
world. Indeed, men of the past had t r i e d t o ward o f f nature t o 
some degree, malting s h i f t w i t h i l l - e q u i p p e d expeditions i n t o 
medicine, astronomy, astrology, and so f o r t h . But now the 
s c i e n t i f i c i n v e s t i g a t o r began t o conceive the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
comprehending the universe and, p o t e n t i a l l y , a l l i t contains, 
by operating w i t h the three methodological concepts of matter, 
motion and law. He began, i n other words, t o formulate a comp-
rehensive, nomological, mechanistic and useable explanation of 
nature, independent of a u t h o r i t y or r e v e l a t i o n . Natural science 
had achieved a wholly new i n t e l l e c t u a l independence. Just as, 
i n the emergent 'possessive i n d i v i d u a l i s m ' of seventeenth-century 
England, the i n d i v i d u a l was at l a s t completing h i s emancipation 
from the h i e r o c r a t i c medieval community, so too, on the i n t e l l -
e c t u a l f r o n t i e r s o f Europe, physics was f i n a l l y l i b e r a t i n g i t s e l f 
from theology. And t h i s emergence of the imago o f n a t u r a l 
science from the c h r y s a l i s of theology may be regarded as the 
f i r s t step towards the modern compartmentalisation of knowledge. 
This whole s c i e n t i f i c e n t e r p r i s e was not t o reach i t s seventeenth-
century culmination u n t i l 1687 - the year of the p u b l i c a t i o n of 
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S i r Isaac Newton's P r i n c i p i a . By t h i s time, Hobbes had been 
dead f o r e i g h t years. But from the moment of h i s acceptance, 
i n the 1630s, i n t o the European i n t e l l e c t u a l world, the fascinated 
Hobbes was drawn i n e l u c t a b l y i n t o a new world of dazzling e x p l i c -
a t i v e p o s s i b i l i t i e s ~ i n t o a conceptual voyage which was indeed 
no less daring i n i t s way than the t e r r e s t r i a l conquests of Drake 
and Magellan which had so absorbed the bored undergraduate 'gaping 
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on maps' i n the bookshops. 
Hobbes himself gives a suggestive account of how he f i r s t came 
f u l l y t o see the p o s s i b i l i t i e s l a t e n t i n an explanation of the 
universe as a system of matter i n motion.^ At some time a f t e r 
he had completed h i s studies i n c l a s s i c a l l i t e r a t u r e , he happened 
t o be present at a gathering of learned men. Someone brought up 
the subject of the cause of sensation. This moved one of the 
company t o ask, as though t o dismiss the subject as i n s i g n i f i c a n t , 
'What i s sense?' To Hobbes's amazement, no-one present at the 
gathering could come up w i t h an answer; and he himself f e l l t o 
t h i n k i n g deeply on the matter. Eventually, he stumbled upon a 
s o l u t i o n which was t o provide him with the keystone of h i s system. 
I f , he reasoned, bodies and the i n t e r n a l p a r t s of bodies were 
always at r e s t , or i f they a l l always moved i n the same way, 
we should have no means o f d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between any one t h i n g 
and any other. We should not, i n other words, be able t o exper-
ience the changing conjunctions of phenomena which we c a l l sen-
s a t i o n . Thus, the cause of everything, i n c l u d i n g sensation, 
must reside i n the d i v e r s i t y of motion. Not only must Galileo's 
suggestion t h a t the whole of the physical world consists i n the 
d i v e r s i t y of motions of homogeneous p a r t i c l e s be t r u e . I t must 
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also be t r u e t h a t our awareness of t h i s physical world i t s e l f 
arises out of motions w i t h i n ourselves, answering t o motions i n 
the e x t e r n a l world. 
Hobbes, l i k e Bentham, was something of a man of fads. Just 
as he f e l l head over heels i n love with geometry, so he now 
seems immediately t o have become obsessed w i t h the p o s s i b i l i t i e s 
of t h i s new theory. The t h i r d E a r l of Devonshire must have found 
him a tedious t r a v e l l i n g companion; f o r Hobbes t e l l s us t h a t , 
throughout h i s t h i r d European journey, whether s a i l i n g , d r i v i n g 
or r i d i n g a horse, he was constantly preoccupied by the idea of 
motion. Ha also t a i l s us t h a t , when i n Paris on the same j o u r -
ney, he was busy enquiring i n t o the kinds of motion which might 
e f f e c t sensation, i n t e l l e c t , a p p a r i t i o n and other animal p r o p e r t i e s . 
Here was the obsessive student, who was 'wont t o draw l i n e s on 
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h i s t h i g h and on tha sheets, abed, and also m u l t i p l y and d i v i d e 1 , 
o f f on a new tack. He had h i t upon the idea of applying the gen-
e r a l theory o f motion, by means of which G a l i l e o sought t o ex-
p l a i n the p h y s i c a l world, t o an explanation of sensation and 
t h e r e f o r e of human behaviour. At some time between 1630 and 1637 
- i t i s impossible t o say p r e c i s e l y when - h i s f i r s t t e n t a t i v e 
e x p l o r a t i o n of t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y of a new philosophy of man 
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appeared i n A Short Tract on F i r s t P r i n c i p l e s . This work, 
more commonly known as the L i t t l e T r e a t i s e , i s s i m i l a r i n i t s 
s t r u c t u r e t o the De Corpora, only, of course, much smaller: I t 
i s a f i r s t d r a f t of ideas l a t e r t o be developed mora f u l l y . The 
b e l i e f t h a t the sensations, and therefore tha behaviour, of men 
are capable of explanation i n tha same mechanistic and assent-
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i a l l y n o n - t e l e o l o g i o a l terms as the movements of n a t u r a l bodies 
l i e s at the very centre of Hobbes's philosophy of man. More 
p a r t i c u l a r l y , i t l i e s at the centre of h i s moral and p o l i t i c a l 
recommendations. For, having a r r i v e d at t h i s b e l i e f , he now set 
out t o discover a f i n a l s o l u t i o n t o a l l p o l i t i c a l disputes, i n 
the form o f a c l e a r and i n d u b i t a b l e s c i e n t i f i c account of the 
form and f u n c t i o n s of the commonwealth, capable of being express-
ed i n the same nomological terms as the propositions of n a t u r a l 
science. This undertaking, odd and misguided as i t may now seem 
t o us, was t o provide the main d i r e c t i o n a l t h r u s t of h i s l i f e ' s 
work. 
Hobbes's step from n a t u r a l t o p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l philosophy 
i s c e r t a i n l y an e n t e r p r i s i n g one. Whether or not i t i s also an 
o r i g i n a l one i s a question which remains open. In one sense, 
of course, i t i s obviously not o r i g i n a l . Plato's Republic i s 
j u s t such an attempt as Hobbes's t o construct a u n i v e r s a l i n t e l l -
e c t u a l scheme culminating i n a theory of the State. But Plato's 
system i s , of course, of a very d i f f e r e n t order from t h a t of 
Hobbes, and c e r t a i n l y does not r e s t upon e x t r a p o l a t i o n from crude 
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mechanical explanation. Hobbes c e r t a i n l y thought, and claimed, 
t h a t he was the f i r s t t o t r a n s p l a n t a method of n a t u r a l - s c i e n t i f i c 
enquiry i n t o the realms of s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n . 
I t may be, however, t h a t he i s indebted t o Bacon or t o c l a s s i c a l 
atomism, t o which he c e r t a i n l y had ample access through h i s 
f r i e n d Gassendi. Also, TSnnies has conjectured (although only 
upon the basis of very slender evidence) t h a t the idea of reason-
i n g about morals by means of the method of geometry was f i r s t 
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12 suggested to Hobbes by Galileo. There may be some element of 
t r u t h i n a l l these guesses; but there i s no way in which we can 
re a l l y substantiate any one of them. 
As we have already suggested, the abolition of teleology from 
natural science, although never completed, encouraged the 
seventeenth-century men of science to take a very d e f i n i t e l y 
instrumental view of knowledge and i t s pursuit. This view, 
recurrent i n the history of science, is i n essence the same as 
that of the Sophists of the f i f t h cantury B.C., or of the 
Enlightenment, and i t implies the same kind of f a i t h i n human 
r a t i o n a l i t y . Galileo's work on pro j e c t i l e s , for instance, was 
of more than purely academic interest: Once we know the correct 
method of calculating the trajectories of pr o j e c t i l e s , we are i n 
a position accurately t o work out the range of guns. The seven-
teenth century was, i n i t s i n t e l l e c t u a l vanguard, unambiguously 
an age of applied science: The proper relation between theory 
and practice was conceived as being very close. I t s guiding 
principle may be expressed thus: Given the r i g h t i n t e l l e c t u a l 
equipment, the appropriate method, men of imagination can, by the 
power of t h e i r own intelligence, make public the secrets of 
nature and impart purpose to them, forming them i n such a way as 
to create conditions of l i f e t o order. Whatever practical 
obstacles there might be, theoretically there were no l i m i t s t o 
what p r a c t i c a l wisdom might accomplish, given only the proper 
method. .And men l i k e Bacon and Descartes believed themselves to 
have discovered t h i s method. Thay published t h e i r findings i n 
treatises which were written precisely to serve as handbooks for 
i n t e l l i g e n t men who wished to achieve practical wisdom. Such 
phronesis or know-how was to be achieved, not by monkish researches 
into the past and appeals to the authority of Aristotelian meta-
physics, but by bold and r a t i o n a l forward enquiry. Aid because 
such enquiry amounted to prying into the very secrets of God's 
creation, i t i s hardly surprising that i t met with repeated 
suspicion, condemnation and sacptieism. H. A.L. Fisher has a 
story which neatly i l l u s t r a t e s the kind of u p h i l l battle which 
the new natural scientists found themselves f i g h t i n g : 
When at the beginning of the seventeenth century Kircher 
inv i t e d a brother Jesuit to look through his telescope 
at the newly-discovered spots on the sun, the professor 
replied, 'My son, i t i s useless. I have read Aristotle 
through twice, and have not found anything about spots 
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on the sun. There are no spots on the sun.' 
The problem of reconciling reason with revelation was as intrac-
table then as i t i s now f o r enquirers who are also believers. 
But a s t i l l more intractable problem at t h i s time was that 
presented by the absence of consensus over the question of what 
the proper method of s c i e n t i f i c investigation might be. One 
might be forgiven for supposing that such pragmatically-minded 
men were a l l uncompromising empiricists; but t h i s was far from 
being the case. To put i t simply, there was, on the one hand, 
the purely deductive method of continental rationalism, as 
expounded i n Descartes's Discourse on Method. This rationalism 
stressed the power of a p r i o r i reason to grasp substantial truths 
about the world, and so tended to regard the pursuit of science 
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as an essentially non-empirical exercise. ^ I t s essential feat-
ure i s the f a i t h which i t places i n reason as over against sensory 
experience. Descartes did not, s t r i c t l y speaking, believe i n the 
sufficiency of human reason to solve a l l philosophical problems, 
because he was at least prepared to admit God and innate ideas 
as l o g i c a l l y p r i o r to any process of reasoning. But the continental 
r a t i o n a l i s t sought to found a whole comprehensive system of 
knowledge upon l o g i c a l inferences drawn from luminously-clear 
f i r s t principles or innate ideas rather than from experience of or 
encounters with 'the world'. But, on the other hand, there was 
the experimental method advocated by Bacon i n the Novum Organum 
and practised with such zeal by the Royal Society, which was 
incorporated i n 1662,* Here, the emphasis was upon the building 
of knowledge brick by brick, by observation and generalisation, 
and by the careful arrangement of observational data. But however 
much they might disagree over methodological issues, no-one at 
the heart of contemporary s c i e n t i f i c circles doubted the cardinal 
importance to true knowledge of relying upon an effective method. 
System and method ware to be preferred to appeals to conventional 
wisdom sanctified only by i t s antiquity. Moreover, no~one 
doubted the importance of accurate knowledge as giving i t s poss~ 
essor mastery over nature. Bacon's famous dictum, nam et ipsa 
soientia potestas est - knowledge i t s e l f i s power - was the watch-
word of the best seventeenth-century s c i e n t i f i c minds. 
Hobbes entered f u l l y i n t o the conviction of his quondam emp-
loyer that knowledge i s power - even to the extent of quoting 
him without acknowledgement. To his mind, philosophy, properly 
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conceived, has purely pra c t i c a l goals: 
The end or scope of philosophy is that we may make use 
to our benefit of effects formerly seen; or that, by 
application of bodies to one another, we may produce the l i k e 
effects of those we conceive i n our mind, as far f o r t h 
as matter, strength and industry w i l l permit, for the 
commodity of human l i f e . For the inv/ard glory and 
triumph of mind that a man may have for the mastering 
of some d i f f i c u l t and doubtful matter, or for the disc-
overy of some hidden t r u t h , i s not worth so much pains 
as the study of philosophy requires; nor need any man 
care much to teach another what he knows himself i f he 
think that w i l l be the only benefit of his labour. The 
end of knowledge i s power; and the use of theorems... 
is f o r the construction of problems; and l a s t l y , the 
scope of a l l speculation i s the performance of some action 
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or thing to be done. 
That a man who expended so much energy during his l i f e t i m e 
t r y i n g to square the cir c l e and duplicate the cube should have 
written the second sentence of t h i s passage may seem curious; 
but there i t i s . 
The usefulness of natural philosophy and geometry i s , of 
course, clearly to be seen by considering what they enable 
men to do ~ measurement of matter and motion; moving heavy 
objects; designing and constructing buildings; navigation; 
making instruments for every use; astronomy and the calculation 
of time; the making of maps; and so on. The fact that these 
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things can be done by almost everyone i n Europe, most people 
in Asia, some people i n Africa and nobody i n America or the 
polar regions i s due not to any i n t r i n s i c differences between 
men who l i v e on d i f f e r e n t parts of the earth's surface. I t i s 
due simply to the fact that the American and Polar peoples 
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do not understand philosophy. But Hobbes, as we have seen, 
believes that the usefulness of philosophy extends beyond the 
world of nature, in t o the world of man, where i t i s capable of 
conferring insights into human behaviour of the same kind as 
those which i t gives in t o that of inanimate objects. When so 
extended, natural science becomes moral and c i v i l science. And 
moral and c i v i l science are also capable of bestowing great bene-
f i t s , even though these are measured rather d i f f e r e n t l y from those 
arising out of natural science: 
But the u t i l i t y of moral and c i v i l philosophy i s to be 
estimated not so much by the commodities we have by 
knowing these sciences as by the calamities we receive 
from not knowing them. Now, a l l such calamities as may 
be avoided by human industry arise from war, but chiefly 
from c i v i l war; for from these things proceed slaughter, 
solitude and the want of a l l things. But the cause of war 
i s not that men are w i l l i n g to have i t ; for the w i l l 
hath nothing f o r object but good, at least that which 
seemeth good. Nor i s i t from t h i s , that men know not 
that the effects of war are e v i l ; for who i s there that 
thinks not poverty and loss of l i f e to be great evils? 
The cause, therefore, of c i v i l war i s that men know not 
the causes neither of war nor peace, there being but few 
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In the world that have learned those duties which 
unite and keep men i n peace, that i s to say, that 
have learned the rules of c i v i l l i f e s u f f i c i e n t l y . 
17 Now, the knowledge of these rules i s moral philosophy. 
In other words, from certain assumptions about human psychology, 
which he invariably makes, and which he takes to be obviously 
true i n the l i g h t of our experience, Hobbes draws the inference 
that i t i s i n the interests of a l l men to master 'moral philos-
ophy1 or 'the rules of c i v i l l i f e 1 . More correctly, Hobbes 
holds that i t i s i n the interests of a l l that some men, or even 
only one man, master these rules, since he recognises that not 
a l l w i l l wish to take the trouble necessary to become a philos-
opher. In t h i s respect, H'obbes's view of the relation between 
practical p o l i t i c s and philosophy is reminiscent of Plato's; 
although, as we shall see presently, Hobbes's view of the ends 
of c i v i l association and of the meaning of the terms 'good' and 
' e v i l ' are decidedly un~Platonic. 
Since i t i s so clearly i n the interests of men to acquaint 
themselves with moral or c i v i l philosophy, why i s i t equally so 
clear from our experience that they have not done so? Why are 
there s t i l l c i v i l wars when, f i r s t , i t i s obvious that men would 
rather not suffer the 'poverty and loss of l i f e ' which they 
e n t a i l and, second, i t i s i n principle so easy to avoid them? 
The answer i s simply t h i s : 
Now that which i s chiefly wanting i n them jjthe philosoph-
i c a l works of the past] i s a true and certain rule of 
our actions, by which we might know whether that we 
undertake be jus t or unjust. For i t i s to no purpose to be 
A9. 
bidden i n every thing to do ri g h t before there be a 
certain rule and measure of right established, which 
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no man hitherto hath established. 
When Hbbbes says that there i s no point i n bidding men to do 
ri g h t before 'a certain rule and measure of r i g h t 1 i s established, 
he obviously does not mean that i t is pointless to exhort men 
to do r i g h t before there i s positive law. I t i s p l a i n l y not 
true that 'no man hitherto hath established' codas of positive 
law; but i t i s true that such codes have not, on the whole, 
been very successful prophylactics against c i v i l , wars. What 
Hobbes means by 'a certain rule and measure of r i g h t 1 i s not law 
i n i t s e l f , but knowledge of what laws to make, of how to see that 
they are obeyed, and of how to avoid laws which are bad i n the 
sense that they conduce t o , or do not prevent, breaches of the 
peace. In other words, we are back t o method again. Hobbes, 
l i k e A r i s t o t l e , longs for an unchanging and secure State - he 
fears change, and seeks a degree of certainty which w i l l be 
s u f f i c i e n t t o eliminate i t . Such certainty, he holds, can be 
provided only by an effective method of moral and c i v i l science 
answering i n kind to the methodology of the natural sciences. 
His task, as he sees i t , i s to become the Galileo of the p o l i t -
i c a l world - to apply to the world of morals and p o l i t i c s a 
universal and comprehensive method furnishing principles of 
organisation and behaviour as necessary and universal i n t h e i r 
v a l i d i t y as s c i e n t i f i c laws. But however much of Bacon's 
enthusiasm for pra c t i c a l science and h o s t i l i t y to Aristotle 
Hobbes may have imbibed i n the 'delicious walks at Gorhambury', 
he had no time for the Baconian method of empirical, experimental 
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science. Characteristically, he minced no words when i t came 
to saying so. Of those who share Bacon's delight i n experiment, 
he has t h i s to say: 
Every man that hath spare money can get furnaces and buy 
coals. Every man that hath spare money can be at the 
charge of making great moulds and h i r i n g workmen to grind 
t h e i r glasses, and so may have the best and greatest 
telescopes. They can get engines made, and apply them 
to the stars; recipients made, and t r y conclusions; but 
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they are never the more philosophers for a l l t h i s . 
I t i s worth noting that when, i n the Epistle Dedicatory to the 
English translation of the De Corpore, Hobbes celebrates the 
founders of modern science, he mentions Copernicus, Galileo, 
Harvey, Kepler, Gassendi, and Mersenne; but of Bacon there i s 
?0 
not a word.~ So far as I know, Hobbes mentions the writings 
of Bacon only twice i n his entire works - and both allusions are 
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no more than passing references i n out-of-the way works. 
Hobbes and Bacon shared a common mistrust of t r a d i t i o n and a 
mutual conviction that knowledge i s power; and i f anyone wishes 
to conclude that t h i s i s evidence of Bacon's 'influence' on 
Hobbes, then I suppose he might as well do so. But that they 
d i f f e r e d when i t came to the method by which such power-giving 
knowledge i s to be acquired i s not open to doubt. 
Hobbes's criticisms of experimentation in science amount, 
in a nutshell, to a mistrust of observation without reason. 
Whether criticisms based upon t h i s mistrust are altogether f a i r 
t o Baconian scientists or not i s a moot point - they would hard-
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l y hold water against Boyle or Newton, for instance. But such, 
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f o r better or worse, i s Hobbes's position. ' ' Anyone with more 
money than sense can watch liq u i d s bubbling i n 'recipients' 
or peer into the heavens through an expansive telescope; but 
t h i s , i n i t s e l f , i s not enough to constitute philosophy. I t 
i s to an attempt to render i n t e l l i g i b l e Hobbes's answer to the 
question of what does constitute philosophy that I now come. 
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CHAPTER THREE ~ THE THEORY AMD METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY. 
No attempted exposition of Hobbes's philosophy of man and the 
State can be complete without some c l a r i f i c a t i o n of a substra-
tum i n respect of which much confusion has tended to prevail* 
I refer to his methodology - a topic which I shall understand 
as encompassing two related and inseparable issues J On the 
one hand, his theory of philosophy, or his account of what i t 
i s to undertake a philosophical or s c i e n t i f i c enquiry; and, on 
the other, his view of how such an enquiry ought to be conduc-
t e d . T h e nature of the problems with which I s hall t r y to 
deal i n t h i s chapter may be I l l u s t r a t e d by reference to two re-
current commonplaces of Hobbes cr i t i c i s m . In t y p i c a l form, 
these may be formulated as follows. On the one hand, we hear 
the complaint that Hobbes set out to construct a purely ded-
uctive or r a t i o n a l i s t i c system, and then f a i l e d to be consistent 
within i t s terms of reference by introducing empirical material 
int o i t . On the other, Hobbes i s c r i t i c i s e d for having f a i l e d 
to grasp the importance of fact-collection and the careful 
arrangement of empirical data which characterise the inductive 
procedure of s c i e n t i f i c investigation. Certainly, i t i s largely 
Hobbes's own f a u l t that the study of his methodology turns out 
to be such a recondite a f f a i r . To begin with, his various a l l -
usions to methodological considerations i n different contexts 
often appear amply to j u s t i f y the kinds of c r i t i c i s m which I 
have j u s t mentioned. On the one hand, as we saw a l i t t l e while 
ago, there are places where he has nothing but scorn for the 
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Baconian method of inductive science. On the other, there i s 
his infatuation with the deductive science of geometry, i n 
which he professed such boundless f a i t h and demonstrated such 
sublime incompetence. Hobbes used up a great deal of ink 
during the unfortunate episode with Wallis, and sometimes he does 
indeed speak as though he believed that the method of geometrical 
1 
reasoning i s the key to a l l mysteries. Moreover, even Hobbes's 
warmest admirer cannot overlook those areas i n his work which 
convey the clear impression that the philosopher himself i s 
not e n t i r e l y sure of what i t i s that he i s t r y i n g t o do - I am 
thinking p a r t i c u l a r l y of the famous and disastrous twentieth 
chapter of the De Gorpore. Nevertheless, the d i f f i c u l t i e s and 
ambiguities which confront the student of Hobbes's methodology 
are, i n my view, more apparent than real.. This i s what I hope 
to show i n the present chapter; and, i n any case, Hobbes's 
account of the proper method and subject-matter of philosophy 
w i l l certainly be none the worse for a b r i e f attempt to expound 
i t i n as i n t e l l i g i b l e anflcoherant a manner as may be possible. 
I . 
I t comes as no surprise to f i n d that the i n i t i a l assumption 
underlying Hobbes's conception of s c i e n t i f i c or philosophical 
method i s the time-honoured one that man i s by nature a rational 
creature. Hobbes accepts t h i s as a truism ~ he does not question 
that ' r a t i o n a l i t y ' i s part of the meaning of the term 'man'. 
This philosophical commonplace does not need to be v e r i f i e d by 
experience - i t s only c r i t e r i o n i s the law of contradiction. 
And, for Hobbes, i t i s an i n i t i a l premiss which has generously 
democratic implications. From i t , he proceeds to i n f e r that, 
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i n p r i n c i p l e , every man i s capable of becoming a philosopher: 
Every man brought philosophy, that i s , natural reason 
into the world with him; f o r a l l men can reason to 
some degree and concerning some things; but where there 
i s need of a long series of reasons, there most men 
wander out of the way and f a l l into error for want of 
method, as i t were for want of sowing and planting, 
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that i s , of improving t h e i r reason. 
Philosophy, therefore, i s an a c t i v i t y which i s natural to man. 
Since i t i s i t s e l f a process of rational explanation, i t i s 
ipso facto available to the capacity for ra t i o n a l explanation 
which every man has 'brought...into the world with him'. Never-
theless, a foolproof method of philosophising i s necessary i f a 
man i s to do more than perform the most elementary operations 
of reason. Without such a method, he w i l l soon become l o s t i n 
the maze of his own arguments, and unwittingly stumble in t o 
mistakes. The development of such a method i s , of course, 
a tedious business, requiring much patient application. Not 
everyone w i l l wish to take the trouble necessary to become a 
philosopher; but, for those who do, Hobbes offers a couple of 
essential d e f i n i t i o n s . The f i r s t is that 
Philosophy i s such knowledge of effects or appearances 
as we acquire by true ratiocination from the knowledge 
we have f i r s t of t h e i r causes or generation; and, again, 
of such causes or generations as may be from knowing 
f i r s t t h e i r e f f e c t s . ^ 
'Ratiocination' or reasoning, he t e l l s us, i s nothing more 
than computation - that i s , addition and subtraction (and mult-
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i p l i c a t i o n and d i v i s i o n also, since m u l t i p l i c a t i o n i s only a 
form of a d d i t i o n and d i v i s i o n only a form of s u b t r a c t i o n ) . In 
other words, i n reasoning, we are i n f a c t engaging i n a process 
which f o r m a l l y m i r r o r s the processes of mathematics. • Obviously, 
however, t h i s need not be a process confined simply t o the 
manipulation of abstract numbers, because 
magnitude, body, motion, time, degrees of q u a l i t y , 
a c t i o n , conception, p r o p o r t i o n , speech and names ( i n 
which a l l the kinds of philosophy consist) are capable 
of a d d i t i o n and s u b s t r a c t i o n . 
Even i n our day-to-day sensory experience of the world, when 
we would not o r d i n a r i l y be i n c l i n e d t o suppose t h a t we were 
reasoning at a l l , we add and 'substract'; f o r whenever we see 
an object approaching or receding we are e i t h e r t a k i n g account 
of more and more of i t ( i . e . adding) or less and less of i t 
( i . e . s u b t r a c t i n g ) . I t i s by t h i s process t h a t we become able 
t o formulate d e f i n i t i o n s , e i t h e r p o s i t i v e or negative, of what 
we pereceive. 
So f a r , a l l t h i s may seem t o have something of a r i n g of 
quaintness t o i t . But Hobbes l a t e r reformulates his d e f i n i t i o n 
of reason, g i v i n g i t a d i f f e r e n t s l a n t and saying the same t h i n g 
i n a r a t h e r more suggestive way: 
JllatiocinationJ c o n s i s t s . . . i n composition and d i v i s i o n 
or r e s o l u t i o n . There i s therefore no method by which 
we f i n d out the causes of things but i s e i t h e r compositive 
or r e s o l u t i v e , or p a r t l y compositive and p a r t l y r e s o l u t i v e . 
And the r e s o l u t i v e i s commonly c a l l e d a n a l y t i c a l method, 
as the compositive i s c a l l e d s y n t h e t i c a l . ^ 
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This way of putting i t brings us at once to the heart of ITobbes's 
methodology. We begin to perceive that he i s grounding his method 
of philosophical investigation upon a procedure which i s , i n fact, 
of great antiquity. I t makes an appearance in the following form 
at the beginning of Aristotle's Physics: 
In a l l enquiries which have to do with principles 
or causes or elements, knowledge or understanding con-
sists i n f a m i l i a r i t y with these. I t i s when we have 
become familiar with i t s ultimate causes and f i r s t 
principles and when we have arrived at i t s elementary 
parts that we claim to have knowledge of something. And, 
by the same token, i n the study of nature i t s e l f , our 
f i r s t objective must be to establish principles. 
The direction of our enquiry must be from that which 
i s more immediately cognizable and clear to us, to that 
which i s clearer and more intimately cognizable i n 
i t s e l f . For i t i s not the same thing to be immediately 
available to cognition and to be i n t r i n s i c a l l y i n t e l l i g i b l e . 
Thus, i n proceeding to that which i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y more 
luminous and available i n i t s e l f to deeper knowledge, 
we must begin from that which is more immediately within 
our cognition, though i n i t s e l f lass readily available 
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to understanding. * 
By way of the very i n f l u e n t i a l commentaries on Aristotle written 
during the t w e l f t h century by the Arab philosopher Mohammed Ibn 
Roshd (more usually known as Aveuoes), t h i s method had, by the 
fourteenth century, found i t s way into the universities of I t a l y . 
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I t took especially deep root at the University of Padua, where 
i t was developed with particular s k i l l and success - and whero, 
of course, i t was to be brought to perfection by Galileo. I t s 
essentials are captured by the fourteenth-century writer Pietro 
d'Abano (frie n d and colleague of the more notorious Averroist, 
Marsilius of Padua), who speaks, i n connection with medicine, 
of 'the way of resolution 1 and 'the way of composition': 
The way of composition...is. the-contrary of the f i r s t 
way [ i . e . of the way of resolution^ . In i t , you begin 
with the thing at which you have arrived by the way of 
resolution, and then return to the very things resolved, 
and put them together again i n their proper order. J 
In order to elucidate t h i s method, l e t us t r y to make Aristotle's 
passage a l i t t l e clearer. The point, b r i e f l y , i s t h i s : An 
object as present to us i n the world of our sensory experience 
i s taken to be a whole comprised of parts. To put the same thing 
another way, any such object i s taken to be an effect of causes 
which are anterior to i t s e l f . Therefore, i f we wish f u l l y t o 
understand any object of our experience, i t i s not s u f f i c i e n t 
simply to take i t as given. We must f i r s t resolve i t in t o i t s 
constituent parts or causes and examine the properties of these 
constituents i n is o l a t i o n from the context of the whole. We 
must then reassemble them i n order to see how they interact 
with one another i n order to give the phenomenon or combination 
of phenomena which we o r i g i n a l l y observed. To return to Hobbes™ 
ian language, philosophical method, or 'ratiocination', amounts 
to a process of analysis (subtraction) and synthesis (addition). 
*0. 
In analysis, on the one hand, reasoning proceeds from the 
pa r t i c u l a r , public and experiontially known to universal 
or f i r s t principles. These f i r s t principles are ' i n t r i n s i c a l l y 
i n t e l l i g i b l e ' - that i s to say, they are atomic and therefore 
not susceptible of further analysis. This i s the i n i t i a l 
procedural step, since i t i s necessary to know such f i r s t 
principles before we can go on to reason about causes and effects. 
As Hobbes puts i t , 
The cause of the whole i s compounded of the causes 
of the parts; but i t i s necessary that we know the 
things that are to be compounded before we aan know 
the whole compound....Moreover, seeing universal things 
are contained i n the nature of singular things, the know-
ledge of them i s to be acquired by reason, that i s , by 
resolution. 
l(\!hen, on the other hand, we come to composition, the procedure 
operates i n the other direction. Here, beginning with f i r s t 
principles or universal causes, the object of the exercise i s 
to construct t h e i r possible effects. In short, establishing 
the kind of causal explanations which Hobbes takes to be the 
subject-matter of philosophy i s a process involving two separate 
but related stages: an empirical, inductive stage, answering to 
the resolutive process, and a l o g i c a l , deductive stage of 
composition. 
This method has become known to historians of science as the 
'resolutive-compositive' (or 'resoluto-compositive') method. 
Obviously, i t i s not necessarily a process which involves crude 
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physical dissection. Indeed, the number of cases i n which 
actual dismantling of the object of study would be appropriate -
or even possible - must be r e l a t i v e l y small. More usually, i t 
is a technique of armchair analysis, beginning from what i s 
empirically given. As Hobbes puts i t , 
Now, by parts I do not means parts of the thing i t s e l f , 
but parts of i t s nature? as, by the parts of a man, I 
do not understand his head, his shoulders, his arms, 
etc., but his figure, quantity, motion, sense, reason 
and the l i k e ; which accidents being compounded or put 
together constitute the \sfhole nature of man, but not the 
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man himself. 
By way of i l l u s t r a t i o n , l e t us suppose that we wish to engage in 
an investigation of the kind so successfully undertaken by Gal-
i l e o , into the properties of objects f a l l i n g towards the earth. 
The enterprise would begin with the investigator devising an 
experiment of a kind easily set up in a laboratory and easily 
repeatable - the standard example i s that of a sphere r o l l i n g 
down an inclined plane. While performing the experiment, we shov 
be careful to take no notise of those accidents of the sphere 
and the plane which obviously have no bearing on the behaviour 
of the sphere while i n motion. We should, for example, ignore 
colour, smell, taste and what have you, and concentrate our 
attention only upon those observable characteristics which are 
both incapable of further analysis and able to be stated i n 
mathematical form - extension, figure and motion. In short, we 
should (figuratively,speaking) break down the whole cluster of 
phenomena that we see into such basic and quantifiable data as 
the weight of the sphere, the angle of the inclined plane, and 
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the time taken by the sphere to r o l l from the top to the bottom. 
I f we think about these variables for long enough, and repeat 
the experiment often enough, i t w i l l eventually strike us that 
they are invariably related i n a particular way - that the velo-
c i t y of the sphere i s a function of the time during which i t 
has been t r a v e l l i n g from rest, the distance being proportional 
to the square of the time taken. However often we repeat t h i s act 
of analysis or resolution, we shall arrive at the same conclusions. 
The same configuration of mathematical relations w i l l always be 
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the result of our resolution. And from t h i s result we shall 
therefore be able to formulate a law, i n the sense of a formula 
expressing the necessity of some action or event, from which we 
can 'compose' or deduce implications appropriate t o t h i s or any 
comparable situation. 
The 'resolutive-compositive 1 method is therefore both 
explicative and predictive. I t i s here that i t s enormous sig-
nificance i n the history of science i s located. I t enables i t s 
user to arrive at laws which, i f properly formulated, not only 
explain what has happened, but also make i t possible for him 
to predict what w i l l happen (subject, of course, t o the completely 
unforeseen - for example, the laws of motion being f a l s i f i e d 
through the operation of some divine f i a t ) . This i s why, so far 
as the physical world i s concerned, 'knowledge i t s e l f i s power'. 
But Hobbes's view i s that the method which Galileo applied to 
the physical world can also ba applied to social situations and 
made to y i e l d an ent i r e l y n a t u r a l i s t i c theory of ethics and 
p o l i t i c s . And t h i s , of course, introduces a t h i r d p o s s i b i l i t y 
i n addition to those of explanation end prediction - namely, that 
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the findings of the moral and c i v i l philosopher can be made the 
basis of accurate prescription of what should happen. I t may sound 
curious to speak as I do of 'accurate prescriptions'; but this 
i s only another way of expressing Hobbes's own conviction that 
'a certain rule and measure of right' both can and should be 
established, and much of t h i s curiousness w i l l disappear when 
we have elucidated Hobbes's view of what kind of undertaking 
t h i s 'prescription' i s . 
Because, as we have seen, Hobbes understands philosophy as 
knowledge of a rather specialised kind, he i s compelled explic-
i t l y to exclude from his account of i t s province much that i s 
ordin a r i l y called knowledge: 
Although sense and memory of things, which are common 
to man and a l l l i v i n g creatures, be knowledge, yet because 
they are given us immediately by nature and not gotten 
by ra t i o c i n a t i o n , they are not philosophy. 
Secondly, seeing experience i s nothing but memory, and 
prudence, or prospect into the future time, nothing 
but expectation of such things as we have already had 
experience of, prudence also i s not to be esteemed p h i l -
1 ? 
osophy. 
In other words, knowledge, as we normally use the term, has a 
very wide reference. I t includes both our noni-propositional 
apprehension, such as perception, memory or introspection, and 
also the propositions or judgments by which we express such 
apprehension. But the kind of knowledge which arises out of <• 
the application of philosophical method has to be isolated 
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from t h i s very wide f i e l d . Hbbbes's attempt to do so may be 
expressed i n the following terms. 
Let us suppose that I look westwards on a number of consec-
utive evenings and see a series of sunsets. I t would be true to 
say that I now have a kind of knowledge of sunsets - the kind 
which i s 'given...immediately by nature', that i s , by simple 
perception. For instance, I know how varying weather conditions 
have altered the colours of the sunsets which I have seen. I 
might, i f I had the s k i l l , be able to translate t h i s knowledge 
onto canvas. Thus, the knowledge which I have might i n certain 
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circumstances be called a r t i s t i c knowledge. But I could not 
be said to have philosophical or s c i e n t i f i c knowledge of sunsets, 
on Hobbes's understanding of what i t is to know philosophically 
or s c i e n t i f i c a l l y . Simply i n virtue of having perceived the 
effec t , I have not arrived at any conclusion about the cause. 
Th° a c t of perceiving effects i s not the same thing as the 
process of formulating laws of motion which describe (not r e a l l y 
govern) the regularities involved in the setting of the sun. By 
the same token, i f my 'prudence, or prospect into the future time' 
led me to expect that the sun w i l l set again tomorrow, t h i s 
expectation, insofar as i t i s based simply upon remembered past 
experiences and not upon a general causal explanation, would not 
be s c i e n t i f i c knowledge. My b e l i e f that the sun w i l l set tomorrow 
evening (or rise tomorrow morning) may indeed turn out to have 
been j u s t i f i e d when the time comes. But that knowledge which 
consists i n experience without reason - without resolution and 
composition, or analysis and synthesis - i s not philosophical . 
*5. 
In remarking that 'prudence. .„ JjLsJ.. .nothing but expectation 
of such things as we have already had experience o f and that 
therefore 'prudence also i s not t o be esteemed philosophy', 
Hobbes i s , i n eff e c t , expressing misgivings as to the v a l i d i t y 
of inductive inferences similar to those l a t e r to be formulated 
by David Hume. ^  To the extent that the kind of inductive 
inferences which we make i n our everyday experience assume that 
there i s a necessary causal connection between a collection of 
remembered past conjunctions of event A and event B end expected 
future conjunctions of events of the same kind, vre are confronted 
by p o s s i b i l i t i e s which have grave epistemological implications. 
These p o s s i b i l i t i e s are, f i r s t , that our memories have deceived 
us and, second, that the past conjunctions which form the basis 
of our expectations as to the future amount, in sum, to nothing 
more than prolonged coincidence, and are not causal relationships 
at a l l . The tendency to i d e n t i f y mere repetition with causality 
may be no more than a psychological quirk that we happen to have. 
And given that these p o s s i b i l i t i e s exist, simple inductive gen-
eralisations can have only an unscientific, rule--of~thumb status. 
We may make the operational assumption that they w i l l hold. But 
in the absence of the kind of rational account of cause and effect 
for which Hobbes i s arguing, there is no reason to accept the 
conclusions of any inductive argument as true or certain. Hobbes 
would wish to say that when we see an event and remember having 
seen i t , we have knowledge only of fact, not of cause and effect. 
The mere repetition of similar events as such adds no new idea -
i.e. that of causation - to what we already know. As he puts i t , 
There are of knowledge two kinds, whereof one i s 
knowledge of fact, the other knowledge of the consequences 
of one affirmation t o another. The former i s nothing 
else but sense and memory, and is absolute knowledge, 
as when we see a fact doing or remember i t done; and 
t h i s i s the knowledge required in a witness. The l a t t e r 
i s called science, and i s conditional; as when we know 
that, i f the figure shown be a c i r c l e , then any straight 
l i n e through the centre shall divide i t into two equal 
parts, tod t h i s i s the knowledge required i n a philos-
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opher, that i s to say, of him that pretends to reasoning. ' 
To return, then, to Hobbes's original d e f i n i t i o n : Philosophy 
i s knowledge of effects acquired by true ratiocination or 
computation from causes, or knowledge of causes acquired by 
true ratiocination from effects. Such ratiocination, when i t 
proceeds from causes to effects, i s compositive or deductive. 
When i t proceeds from effects to causes, i t i s resolutive, and 
has i t s beginnings i n the empirically known. 
An immediate d i f f i c u l t y now supervenes, of which, as the 
passage j u s t quoted shows, Hobbes was perfectly well aware. 
I t i s very often the case that, before we can resolve a given whole 
in t o i t s component parts or an effect into i t s causes, we must 
make an educated guess i n advance as to what these elements or 
causes might be. This i s so because we cannot know before the 
resolutive stage has taken place that a given effect can have 
been produced by one particular cause or sat of causes. Similarly, 
we cannot know that a perceived whole must be made up of elements 
of any particular kind. Yet very often we must have some idea 
of what i t i s that we are looking for before resolution can 
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commence at a l l . Thus, i f the resolutive stage i s ever to get 
under way, we must break t h i s vicious c i r c l e by a step into the 
dark, since we can have no a p r i o r i certainty as to what i t i s 
that we are looking for - we can only make an i n t e l l i g e n t guess. 
We are thus confronted by the p o s s i b i l i t y that we shall guess 
wrongly - that we shall step towards the wrong set of causes or 
elements. The consequence of t h i s w i l l be that we shall be 
landed with a set of obviously untenable deductive steps when 
we come to the compositive stage. And th i s p o s s i b i l i t y , of course, 
becomes stronger i n direct proportion t o the complexity of the 
object of our enquiry. The resolutive-compositive method, there-
fore, i s not, s t r i c t l y speaking, a method of s c i e n t i f i c discovery. 
The logic of resolution,;will not allow i t to incorporate i t s own 
presuppositions, so that there can be no i n i t i a l guarantee that 
the entire process i s not on the wrong track. I t i s re a l l y no-
thing mora than a method which w i l l enable i t s user to set up 
testable hypotheses. And i t i s i n the testing of such hypotheses 
rather than i n t h e i r formulation that the process of discovery, 
properly so-called, takes place. Moreover, such hypotheses are 
only testable experimentally, not deductively: 
Knowledge of consequence, which I have said before i s 
called science...is not absolute, but conditional. No 
man can know by discourse that t h i s or that i s , has been 
or w i l l be; but only that i f this be, that i s ; i f t h i s has 
been, that has been; i f t h i s shall be, that shall be; 
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which i s to know conditionally. * 
To the enquirer who, waary of the old philosophers, wishes to 
qualify himself as a s c i e n t i s t , Hobbes gives., inter a l i a , the 
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following advice: 
You are to consider also the several properties and 
kinds of motion, v i z . , when a body being moved by one 
or more movents at once, i n what way i t i s carried, 
straight, circular or otherwise crooked; and what 
degree of swiftness; as also the action of the movent, 
whether trusion, vection, percussion, reflection or 
refraction; and farther you must furnish yourself with 
as many experiments...as you can. And supposing some 
motion for the cause of your phenomenon, t r y i f by,-evident 
consequence, without contradiction to any other manifest 
t r u t h or experiment, you can derive the cause you seek 
for from your supposition. I f you can, i t i s a l l that 
i s expected, as to that one question, from philosophy. 
For there i s no effect i n nature which the Author .of nature 
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cannot bring to pass by more ways than one. 
In short, I think that Hobbes has here f i r m l y grasped the idea of 
framing explanatory hypotheses from experience, deducing t h e i r 
consequences, and testing the results of such deduction by further 
reference t o the natural - or the social - world. He knows 
that general s c i e n t i f i c explanations are fundamentally conditional 
- that propositions expressing them must take an'if...then' form. 
And t h i s leads him to a correspondence theory of t r u t h ~ to the 
view that a proposition purporting to be about the world i s true 
only i n virtue of there being a one-one correspondence between 
the terms of the proposition and the elements of some fact; which 
correspondence can, of course, be established only by reference 
to the natural (or social) world about which the proposition 
purports to be. 
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I I . 
What I have so far had to say by way of exposition has a l l 
been straightforward and familiar enough. But i t has served 
to clear a path back to the types of c r i t i c i s m which I mentioned 
at the beginning. I t w i l l be recalled that I there drew attention 
to criticisms of two kinds: F i r s t , that Hobbes deliberately 
set out to create a purely r a t i o n a l i s t i c system which he then a l l -
owed to become polluted, so to speak, by empirical matter; second, 
that he f a i l e d adequately to grasp the significance of empirical 
s c i e n t i f i c method as practised by Bacon and the Royal Society. 
As I have already indicated, I do not wish to suggest that 
these criticisms are wholly inappropriate; but I think that i t 
has already begun quite clearly to emerge that neither of tham 
is e n t i r e l y t o the point. I shall devote the remainder of this 
chapter to elaborating t h i s conclusion. 
The method of deduction by means of which we proceed from 
universal f i r s t principles to causal explanation i s , of course, 
precisely the method of geometry with which Hobbea f e l l so 
heavily i n love at the age of f o r t y or so. Indeed, the terms 
'analysis' and 'synthesis' which he tends to use i n preference 
to 'resolution' and 'composition' are themselves borrowed dir e c t -
l y from Euclid and Archimedes. In a word, Hobbes shared the desire 
of Descartes to formulate a compendious system of philosophical 
knowledge from a process of deductive reasoning answering to the 
method of classical geometry: a process by means of which we can 
proceed to draw out the implications of what we know as far as 
they w i l l reach. But i t i s only with qualifications that we can 
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say that he shared t h i s desire. When his various methodological 
remarks are collected together, i t becomes clear enough that Hobbes 
did not wish to construct a purely r a t i o n a l i s t i c system. That 
i s , he did not wish to construct a system l i k e those of Descartes, 
Leibniz or Spinoza, i n which the c r i t e r i a of t r u t h are i n t e l l e c -
t u a l and deductive rather than sensory. We p l a i n l y cannot deny 
his a f f i n i t y with Descartes - that much i s obviously beyond the 
reach of argument. But neither can we ignore his own assertion 
that the 'resolutive-compositive 1 method i s partly r a t i o n a l i s t i c 
and p a r t l y empirical, or p a r t l y deductive and partly inductive. 
We certainly cannot ignore remarks l i k e the following, which i s 
taken from the beginning of his account of physics in Part IV 
of the De Corpora; 
The principles...upon which the following [discussion of 
physicsj depends, are not such as we ourselves make and 
pronounce i n general terms, as definitions! but such, as 
being placed i n the things themselves by the Author of 
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nature, are by us observed i n them. 
Had he wished to embrace a purely deductive system l i k e that of 
Descartes and the continental r a t i o n a l i s t s , Hobbes would have 
had to believe i n the p o s s i b i l i t y of knowing f i r s t principles 
or d e f i n i t i o n s a p r i o r i or i n t u i t i v e l y . He would have had to 
pin his f a i t h to innate ideas independent of experience, from 
which necessarily true conclusions might be deduced. And i t i s 
very clear that he could do nothing of the kind, for reasons 
associated with the fact that he i s a thoroughgoing philosophical 
nominalist, holding that abstract or general terms, or 'universals', 
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do not represent anything objectively r e a l , but are mere u t t e r -
ances or names. 
The importance of t h i s nominalism for our present purpose i s 
t h i s . Hobbes indeed had great f a i t h i n the power of deduction 
from general or universal definitions to more particular know-
ledge. But, at the same time, his nominalism inclines him to 
point out that we can have no guarantee independent of our own 
experience that such definitions as we may formulate i n fact 
correspond to the actual world of particular e n t i t i e s : 
Now primary propositions are nothing but def i n i t i o n s , 
or parts of d e f i n i t i o n s , and these only are the principles 
of demonstration, being truths constituted a r b i t r a r i l y 
by the inventors of speech, and therefore not to be 
demonstrated. 
For d e f i n i t i o n i s not the essence of any thing, but a 
speech signifying what we conceive of the essence there-
of; and so also not whiteness i t s e l f , but the word 
whiteness, i s a genus or an universal name.^ 
And, i n a famous aphorism, Hobbes t e l l s us that 
Words are but wise men's counters, they do but reckon 
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with them; but they are the money of fools. 
In short, definitions are, i n themselves, no more than combinations 
of words to which a purely arbitrary meaning has been assigned. 
They are made up of names which are themselves only words 
taken at pleasure to serve for a mark, which may raise 
i n our mind a thought l i k e to some thought we had before, 
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and which, being pronounced to others, may be a sign 
of what thought the speaker had or had not before i n 
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his mind. 
When operating with a system of deductive reasoning, therefore, 
we are, as i t were, placed at one remove from the real world. 
To put i t another way, whan we do geometry, say, wa are drawing 
conclusions, not about things, but about names which we have 
(quite a r b i t r a r i l y ) chosen. We are working within a conven-
t i o n i s t theory of t r u t h ™ the t r u t h of our propositions i s 
simply a matter of l i n g u i s t i c or postulational convention, 
and thus i s not i n any sense absolute. But, as we have already 
noticed, t h i s i s not adequate as a framework for s c i e n t i f i c 
enquiry, precisely because suoh an enquiry i s concerned with 
elucidating more than conventions. This i s certainly what Hobbes 
suggests i n his objections t o Descartes's Meditations; 
What shall we say, though, i f reasoning is perhaps 
nothing more than the joining and stringing-together 
of names by means of the vord 'is'? I f this be so, 
then reason gives conclusions, not about the nature of 
things, but only about t h e i r names....If t h i s be so, as 
i t may be, then reasoning w i l l depend upon names, names 
upon imagination, and imagination (at least, i n rny opinion) 
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on the motions of the bodily organs. 
Thus, although 'experience concludeth nothing universally' 
and deductive science does enable us to draw universal conclusions, 
the process of deduction cannot have relevance to s c i e n t i f i c 
enquiry i n the absence of empiric ally-derived information about 
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events i n the external world. As he puts i t , 
The f i r s t beginnings...of knowledge are the phantasms 
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of sense and imagination. 
This i s so for one eminently good reason. There is no point i n 
meticulously reasoning about words and definitions which are only 
names unless we have f i r s t discovered some means of establishing 
what the things actually are that the names name. Philosophy, 
as distinguished from other forms of knowledge, i s grounded i n 
'ratiocination'. But ratiocination i t s e l f i s made possible - at 
least i n the world of practice - only by the fact of our having 
had experiences which we can ratiocinate about, and by the further 
fact of our anticipating further experiences against which to 
check our 'ratiocinations*. In other words, a l l knowledge which 
i s not purely formal and axiomatic ( i . e . based upon merely 
sti p u l a t i v e definitions) has i t s roots i n our sensory awareness 
of the world of nature. This i s so even though such knowledge 
cannot properly be called philosophical u n t i l i t i s expanded 
by reason in t o a connected system of causal explanation. The 
procedure which Hobbes recommends i s neither wholly deductive 
nor wholly empirical, but an integrated system containing elements 
of both. Methodologically, Hobbes is both a r a t i o n a l i s t and an 
empiricist. 
Hobbes's substantive philosophy i s noted for the incisiveness 
and c l a r i t y ^ of i t s presentation; but as an exponent of a theory 
of philosophy he i s often confused and confusing. At the same 
time, some grasp of theoretical matters i s a necessary prerequisite 
of a proper understanding of his account of man and the State. 
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This i s why I have thought t h i s bria£ exposition worth including 
- even though, for reasons of space, I have omitted much that 
might have been included on his theory of knowledge and t r u t h , 
and p a r t i c u l a r l y his views on language and i t s use. Considering 
the size of the'task which he set himself, i t i s not surprising 
that a post mortem reveals a certain amount of i l l - d i g e s t e d 
matter. But careful analysis establishes him, for a l l his lapses 
and inconsistencies, as a scientist i n the mould of Galileo and 
not as a r a t i o n a l i s t i n that of Descartes. Hobbes does not 
believe, with Descartes, that the t r u t h of s c i e n t i f i c statements 
i s established by the fact that they are deduced from self-evident 
axioms. He realises f u l l well that, because a mathematical or 
deductive system depends for i t s necessary t r u t h e n t i r e l y upon 
self-consistency within a framework of defined terms, only exper-
ience can show whether the d e f i n i t i o n of such terms actually 
describes the real world. But, at the same time, he has no f a i t h 
i n mere dabbling experimentation without 'ratiocination' to 
give wholeness and coherence to the results of experience. Thus, 
he shares with Galileo both a f a i t h i n the power of deduction 
and an insistence that deduced consequences be supported and 
confirmed by observation and experiment - a fact which may be 
obscured by his tremendous over-reaction to the discovery of 
geometry. Hobbes made an egregious fool of himself over geometry 
i n the famous controversy with Wallis; but he was more aware of 
i t s l i m i t a t i o n s than he was of his own. 
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GHJ1PTER FOUR - NATURE AND MM. 
We have now b r i e f l y considered Hobbes's account of the theory 
and method of philosophy. I t i s true that what he says a philos-
opher ought to do does not always coincide with what he himself 
actually does - during his long l i f e , Hobbes delivered himself 
of many methodological (and other) opinions which, taken together, 
do not consort at a l l comfortably. But, for a l l that Hobbes i s 
a self-conscious system builder, this is hardly to be wondered at. 
The same could probably be said of any comparably long-lived, 
p r o l i f i c and quarrelsome philosopher - pa r t i c u l a r l y of one who 
spent as much of his time coping with the exigencies of cont-
emporary p o l i t i c a l circumstances. For my part, I have t r i e d to 
make his methodological presuppositions i n t e l l i g i b l e t o the 
extent necessary for our present purposes; and, i n doing so, 
I have skimmed over many d i f f i c u l t i e s which are not germane to 
these purposes. I t i s enough for us to have established that, 
from a point of departure set by those things given to us 
through 'the phantasms of sense and imagination', Hobbes's 
system rests upon a process of resolution and composition, or 
analysis and synthesis. The end towards which t h i s procedure 
is directed i s that of causal explanation. Hobbes wishes to 
account for the generative processes by which things come to 
be as they are i n the world of our experience, kid amongst the 
occupants of the world of our experience, of course, are 
included bodies p o l i t i c as well as animal bodies and inanimate 
and natural objects and phenomena. Hobbes takes i t for granted 
that we can analyse the body p o l i t i c i n a s c i e n t i f i c fashion -
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mors readily, i n fac t , than we can analyse, say, a b a l l r o l l i n g 
down a sloping surface or any other purely natural occurrence. 
He takes t h i s for granted because he holds that the commonwealth 
or body p o l i t i c i s an a r t i f i c i a l body created by man himself.1 
Hobbes d i f f e r s from, say, Aristotle or St Thomas Aquinas in 
holding that p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y and the rules which govern i t are 
man-created. The commonwealth i s an artefact which i s equally 
capable of being, so to speak, 'uncreated' or resolved into 
elements. Hobbes stands i n the t r a d i t i o n which conceives the 
State as being analogous to a biological organism; 
For by art i s created that great Leviathan called a 
commonwealth or State, i n Latin Givitas, which i s but 
an a r t i f i c i a l man? though of greater stature and strength 
than the natural, for whose protection and defence i t was 
intended; and i n which the sovereignty i s an a r t i f i c i a l 
soul, as giving l i f e and motion to the whole body; the 
magistrates and other off i c e r s of judicature and execution, 
a r t i f i c i a l j o i n t s ; reward and punishment, by which fastened 
to the seat of sovereignty every j o i n t and member i s 
moved to perform his duty, are the nerves, that do the 
same i n the body natural; the wealth and riches of a l l 
the particular members are the strength; salus populi. 
the people's safety, i t s business; counsellors, by whom 
a l l things needful for i t to know are suggested unto i t , 
are the memory; equity and laws, an a r t i f i c i a l reason 
and w i l l ; concord, health; sedition, sickness; and 
c i v i l war, death. Lastly, the pacts and covenants by 
which the parts of t h i s body p o l i t i c were made, set 
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together and united, resemble that f i a t or ' l e t us 
make man' pronounced by God i n the creation. ' 
To be sure, the analogy is i n places rather strained. Quite 
apart from the rather questionable character of Hobbas's 
assumption that every member of the commonwealth i s 'moved to 
perform his duty' either by the threat of punishment or the 
hope of reward, i t i s a l i t t l e curious to suggest that the 
nerves 'do the same' - function as rewards and punishments -
i n the 'body natural'. But t h i s i s a quibble - Hobbes does 
not intend his manner of speaking to be anything more than 
i l l u s t r a t i v e or analogical. The real point is that the body 
p o l i t i c i s conceived as an organic unity. Like Aristotle, 
Hobbes would wish to hold that i t is f u l f i l l i n g i t s proper pur-
pose, namely the 'protection and defence' of those who have made 
i t , only when i t i s complete. Like Hegel, he would wish to 
hold that i t s r a t i o n a l purpose, i t s i n t e g r i t y , i s capable of 
being realised only i n wholeness. Hence, c i v i l war is to the 
body p o l i t i c what death is to the animal body. We canno.t too 
greatly stress, however, that Hobbes regards p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y 
not as natural, but as the a r t i f i c i a l result of rational 
necessity. The commonwealth stands in the same relationship 
to man as man himself stands i n relation to God. Man has, 
for purposes of his own, assembled the body p o l i t i c by means of 
pacts and covenants answering to the divine f i a t . But man's 
purposes d i f f e r from God's i n that they can be grasped by human 
reason. I t i s up to man himself to understand the body which 
he has created by analysing I t and synthesising i t i n accordance 
with what Hobbes takes to be the proper method of s c i e n t i f i c 
enquiry. The purpose of t h i s chapter i s to show something of 
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the way In which Hobbes passes, smoothly and systematically, 
from n a t u r a l - s c i e n t i f i c to psychological explanation, i n order 
that we may then bring out what he took to be the implications 
of such explanation for p o l i t i c a l and social organisation. 
if if » * * 
Hobbes's natural philosophy i s dominated and stimulated by 
a feature which we have already noticed. This feature i s his 
preoccupation with the problem of the nature and causes of 
sensation. As we have seen, the beli e f at which he eventually 
arrived was that the cause of everything i s to be found i n the 
varieties of motion, and that t h i s must apply to sensation as 
much as to anything else; and no subsequent finding ever 
caused him to doubt the t r u t h of this presupposition. Matter 
and motion are the lowest common denominators of a l l our percepts, 
and bodies and t h e i r movements are the only subject matter of 
philosophy, since philosophy i s concerned only with causes and 
effects. I t i s through motion that a conscious subject is 
modified by the presence of an object; and coupled with t h i s i s 
the characteristically empiricist b e l i e f that a l l knowledge is 
ultimately derived from sensations. This doctrine i s known 
as Sensationalism, and finds i t s most t y p i c a l exponent i n 
Oondillac.^1' So f a r as I know, however, i t s earliest modern 
exposition i s to be found i n Hobbes's De Oorpore of 1655; 
although Hobbes himself had already developed the doctrine i n 
a tentative form i n the L i t t l e Treatise and his early writings 
on optics. 
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As H'obbes developed t h i s idea to i t s maturity, he came also to 
believe that geometry, physics, physiology and animal psychology 
could a l l be incorporated within a general theory of motion. Indeed, 
he t e l l s us that he turned to geometry 'in order to learn the 
5 
varieties and kinds of motion'; and the empiricist s t r a i n which 
wa discussed i n the la s t chapter creeps into his understanding 
even of t h i s most formal science, for he held that we cannot 
understand the definitions of geometry without f i r s t conducting 
experiments with motion l i k e those involved i n drawing a cir c l e 
with a compass. His conviction that the cause of everything i s 
motion led him to the b e l i e f that sensation could be located 
i n a position somewhere between the large-scale motions of the 
external world and the small motions of the bodily organs. And 
by taking t h i s i n t u i t i v e step, Hobbes created for himself pre-
cisely the kind of opportunity which he desired. In short, he 
made i t possible to attempt an explanation of sensation, and there-
fore of behaviour, i n terms just as objective and intractable 
as those used i n na t u r a l - s c i e n t i f i c explanations. Hobbes had 
constructed a bridge between natural and social science which, 
i n some form at least, continues to stand. Perhaps his feat 
was a regrettable one from some points of view; but i t s h i s t -
o r i c a l significance can hardly be too greatly stressed. 
Hobbes's development of t h i s kind of explanation i s very 
lengthy and complex. I t occurs i n several versions i n a 
number of dif f e r e n t places, and Hobbes delights i n the mu l t i -
p l i c a t i o n of examples. But we need consider no more of i t than 
i s immediately pertinent to his theories of man and the State. 
Very simply, we may express what he has to say as follows. 
Sensation and apparition - which, taken together, are what we 
should now c a l l perception - are, as i t were, located at the 
point of juncture between external and internal motions. Our 
organs of sense are acted upon or jarred by movements in 
the external world (by which I mean no more than that part of 
the world which l i e s outside the individual's body), and 
themselves move i n response to such movements,, Hobbes never 
doubted that t h i s argument i s obviously v a l i d . I f i t x^ ere not, 
ho held, then there would be no faculty of discrimination and 
therefore no sensation. To perceive a world which was always at 
rest, or a l l parts of which always moved in exactly the same way, 
would, to a l l intents and purposes, be to perceive nothing. And 
i f we always perceived nothing, than i t would be d i f f i c u l t to see 
how the word 'perceiving 1 and i t s relatives should ever have come 
to mean anything at a l l , since we should never have become aware 
of the a c t i v i t y to which such words re far. 
Now, odd as t h i s argument may sound, there i s , i n fact, obvious-
l y something to be said for i t . I f , for example, I stand s t i l l 
and look at something s t a t i c - say, the Last Supper - and say, 
'What a beautiful painting]' then my t o t a l experience (and my 
jejuneness as an a r t - c r i t i c ) can only be explained i n terms of my 
having had other experiences. The acts of stopping, looking, 
u t t e r i n g , using words l i k e 'beautiful' or 'painting', or operating 
with concepts such as 'supper' or 'last' are rendered i n t e l l i g i b l e 
only by the fact that my present experience stands, as i t were, in 
a dynamic relationship with past experiences. I f , , from the moment 
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of my b i r t h to the moment of my death, I experienced nothing 
but the Last Supper, then r e a l l y i t would be odd to say that I 
had experienced anything at a l l . Hobbes's doctrine, therefore, 
i s perhaps not quite so peculiar as i t sounds. 
Hobbes holds that i f we are to i d e n t i f y the entire cause of 
sensation, we must make an analysis of a l l movements i n external 
bodies - 'whether trusion, vection, percussion, reflection or 
refra c t i o n ' . And one of the ways i n which geometry makes i t s e l f 
useful i s i n helping us to.; analyse the possible kinds of motion*. 
Geometry enables us to see something of the nature of circular 
motion, for example, by causing us to notice that a cir c l e is 
described by a moving point rotating about a fixed point; to 
go on to deduce that a c i r c l e rotating about a fixed axis 
would describe a sphere; and so fo r t h . These motions i n 
external bodies are transmitted to the organs of sense either 
d i r e c t l y or through a medium. The usual medium of th i s trans-
mission i s a i r , which Hobbes, as a consistent materialist, 
regards as materia s u b t i l i s - as a very t h i n , intangible, material 
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s t u f f . But sensation i s not only the end-product of external, 
motions. I t also functions as an e f f i c i e n t cause of the actions 
of sentient beings. Actions, to Hobbes's mind, are re a l l y 
reactions to st i m u l i passed on from the external world by means 
of the organs of sense. Sensation, i n short, operates as a 
mechanical linkage between movements i n the external, world and 
the observable behaviour of animals and men. 
In order more ef f e c t i v e l y to carry o f f the tran s i t i o n from 
mechanics to physiology and psychology, Hobbes now introduces 
into his system the concept of cpnatus, or endeavour. This notion, 
which i s also, of course, important i n the philosophy of Spinoza, 
occurs as a key principle of explanation throughout Hobbes's 
English and Latin works. The concept i s defined as 
motion made i n less space and time than can be 
given; that i s , less than can be determined or 
assigned by exposition or number; that i s , motion 
made through the length of a point and i n an instant 
of time. 7 
In other words, the term 'endeavour1 i s here used simply to 
postulate i n f i n i t e l y small motions, which Hobbes, l i k e Spinoza, 
takes to be directed towards the self-preservation of the 
thing whose motions they are. By means of t h i s concept, Hobbes 
thought i t possible to close the gap between physics and 
psychology. He held that external objects, operating on the 
sense organs, produce minute motions i n the sense organs that 
proceed to the heart and there make some alteration to the v i t a l 
motions involved i n the ci r c u l a t i o n of the blood. When these 
v i t a l motions are assisted by the addition of such minute motions, 
we experience pleasure - or, rather, to have one's v i t a l motions 
assisted i n t h i s way i s what i t i s to feel pleasure. By the 
same token, when the v i t a l motions are impeded by such additional 
minute motions, we experience pain. The body w i l l seek to 
preserve and increase those motions which are beneficial 
(pleasurable) and r i d i t s e l f of those which are the reverse. 
To Hobbes, t h i s i s quite obvious and needs (indeed, can have) 
no demonstration, since, as Spinoza puts i t , there can be no 
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conatus towards self-destruction^- this i s j u s t a statement 
about the way the world happens to be. And t h i s process of 
conserving and enhancing beneficial motions and damping-down 
or getting r i d of inimical ones i s what produces animal motion -
and, consequently, human and social behaviour.^ According to 
Hobbes - who i s always ready to give hostages to fortune by 
pushing his explanations as far as they w i l l go ~ even habitual 
kinds of behaviour are no more than motions made easier by 
repeated endeavours. They are, he t e l l s us, rather l i k e the 
bending of a crossbow. 
I t i s , I think, obvious that t h i s explanation of animal motion 
and behaviour derives much of i t s p l a u s i b i l i t y from an appealing 
s i m p l i c i t y . Unfortunately, however, t h i s simplicity i s achieved 
only by a disproportionate concentration upon rather tenuous 
s i m i l a r i t i e s and a f a i l u r e (or refusal) to notice much more 
substantial differences. There i s , of course, a sense i n which 
the l i f e of man vis-a-vis other men i s a matter of bodies moving 
towards or away from one another i n the interests of s e l f -
preservation, j u s t as there i s a sense in which doing work i s 
a matter of moving s t u f f about. But these def i n i t i o n s , i f they 
are d e f i n i t i o n s , are clearly not exhaustive. Social l i f e i s not 
ju s t a matter of bodies moving relative to one another, any more 
than working i s jus t a matter of moving s t u f f about. Again, 
habits may well be formed i n part by constantly repeated motions; 
but to suggest that, when we use the word'habit', we mean no more 
than 'constantly repeated motions' i s simply implausible. Never-
theless, however many weaknesses we may discover i n i t , the fact 
I 
i 
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remains that Hobbes professed himself s a t i s f i e d with his psychol-
ogy. He believed himself to have found principles of social 
and psychological explanation which were i n conformity with the 
Galilean principles of natural science. He was able to declare 
that 
We have discovered the nature of sense, namely, that 
i t i s some int e r n a l motion i n the sentient....Sense i s 
a phantasm, made by the reaction and endeavour outwards 
i n the organ of sense, caused by an endeavour inwards 
10 
from the object, remaining for some time more or less. 
The external body, either d i r e c t l y or through a medium, presses 
on the sense organ, 
which pressure, by the mediation of the nerves and 
other strings and membranes of the body, continued 
inwards to the brain and heart, causeth there a 
resistance or counter-pressure, or endeavour of the 
heart to deliver i t s e l f , which endeavour, because 
11 
outward, seemeth to be some matter without. 
A l l my sensations, therefore, are nothing but motions within me. 
I f I see a tree i n the quad, I form the impression of i t s 
being i n the quad rather than i n my heart because of the 'outward 
endeavour' of my heart. This explanation of perception i s , I 
suppose, no stranger than many another; but Hobbes does not 
take us very f a r in t o the standard questions concerning the 
ontological status of the tree i n the quad. In spite of some 
ambiguity of language, his view i s certainly that objects have 
an existence of t h e i r own independent of the fact that they 
are perceived. I f t h i s were not so, of course, i t would 
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be d i f f i c u l t to hold that such objects cause our perceptions 
according to the mechanical theory just outlined; and, i n any 
case, Hobbes i s an out-and-out materialist - he would certainly 
have regarded Berkeley's views as nonsensical. ' 
Having provided a mechanical point of departure for his 
psychology, Hobbes now attempts to describe known psychological 
phenomena i n terms appropriate t o a mechanical theory. His 
celebrated account of imagination, for example, i s a direct 
deduction from the law of i n e r t i a . As he puts i t , 
When a body i s once i n motion, i t moveth, unless 
something else hinder i t , eternally; and whatsoever 
hindreth i t cannot i n an instant, but in time, quite 
extinguish i t , as we see i n the water, though the 
wind cease, the waves give not over r o l l i n g for a 
long time after, so also i t happeneth in that 
motion, which i s made i n the internal parts of a man, 
then, when he sees, dreams, etc. For after the object 
is removed, or the eye shut, we s t i l l retain an image 
of the thing seen, though more obscure than when we see 
i t . 1 3 
Imagination, therefore, i s 'nothing but decaying sense', or 
'nothing else but sense decaying or weakened by the absence of 
the object'. J This decay i s not a decay of motion - that would, 
of course, be contrary to the known natural regularities 
described by the law of i n e r t i a . Rather, i t comes about because 
the sense organs are moved or jarred by other objects, and 
subsequent motions obscure previous ones, 'in such manner as 
16 
the l i g h t of the sun obscureth the l i g h t of the stars'. ""And 
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memory, according to Hobbes, d i f f e r s from imagination only i n 
that the fading image i s accompanied by a feeling of f a m i l i a r i t y . 
Once again, i n a l l t h i s , we cannot but notice a lack of 
correspondence between Hobbes's remarks and our commonsense 
experience.- F i r s t , i f imagination ware really no more than 
decaying sense - i f , i n other words, i t were no more than 
the r e l i c s of past perceptions - then i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o see 
how we could imagine future states. Yet we pl a i n l y can imagine 
such states, and they need not be states similar to those which 
we have experienced previously, or about which we have heard from 
other people. Second, i f 'imagination' i s no more than the 
leftovers of past sensations, then i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see how 
we could imagine things which cannot be sensed at a l l or which 
have no reference to time - God, for example. Third, i f we accept 
Hobbes's general mechanistic account of sensation, we know no 
more than the way i n which naked and 'unprocessed' sensations 
come to be f e l t . We have no notion of how they are interpreted 
or related to one another by the mind - mind, of course, being 
something that does not enter in t o Hobbes's scheme of things, 
but f o r which he provides no adequate substitute. No doubt 
explanations could be devised which would enable us to get round 
these objectionsj but Hobbes furnishes no such explanation. 
Rather, he forges ahead with his empirical psychology, traversing 
the whole gamut of psychological phenomena. He explains attention, 
concentration, thought, dreams', and so on, as well as sense and 
imagination. Consciousness i n i t s sensitive and cognitive dimen-
sions amounts to a j a r r i n g of the nervous system by external bodies 
i n motion. In i t s affections! and v o l i t i o n a l aspects, i t i s a 
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reaction to t h i s j a r r i n g - although we shall have some more to ' 
say about v o l i t i o n presently. From our point of view, however, 
the most interesting aspect of Hoboes's psychology i s his theory 
of the passions. I t i s t h i s which, i n his system, affords the 
immediate prelude to social and p o l i t i c a l theory; and i t i s t o 
t h i s that I now turn. 
As we have seen, by means of the concept of conatus or endeavour, 
Hobbes t r i e d to show how the observable behaviour of creatures 
could be explained i n terms of immeasurably small motions within 
the body. Through t h i s concept, i n other words, he contrived to 
translate the mechanistic and materialistic kind of explanation 
characteristic of Galilean natural science into a technique 
for the explanation of animal and human behaviour; and central to 
such explanation i s an account of desire and aversion. According 
to Hobbes, when such endeavour i s directed towards whatever i t i s 
that has caused i t , i t i s called appetite or desire. When i t i s 
directed away from i t s cause, i t i s called aversion. The same 
instance of an endeavour can, of course, be both an appetite and 
an aversion at one and the same time. When a man acts i n such a 
way as to avoid pain, he may be said to be both averting from 
pain and desiring painlessness. By the same token, we can speak 
of a particular endeavour as either an appetite or an aversion, 
depending on how we care to express ourselves. The most element-
ary forms of endeavour, then, are appetite or desire on the one 
hand, and aversion on the other. Both forms are motions within 
the body - small motions which are the beginnings of such large-
scale motions as those involved i n f l i g h t or f i g h t . They originate 
i n sensation, which i s i t s e l f explicable i n terms of motions i n 
the body responding to motions i n the external world. And i t 
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ought to be possible to deduce the consequences of any particular 
kind of motion i n terms of desire or aversion, just as we can 
deduce the consequences of motions i n the natural world i n terms 
of action and reaction. 
Aversion and desire, Hobbes t e l l s us, are more or less the same 
17 
as hatred and love respectively. The only qualification which 
he cares to make i s a small one. I t i s simply that, i n common 
usage, desire s i g n i f i e s the absence of the desideratum while love 
signi f i e s i t s presence. Aversion, too, signifies the absence 
of the object of aversion, while hatred signifies i t s presence. 
Thus, while I fe e l a powerful aversion from the prospect of 
being eaten alive by a t i g e r , hate would be the emotion which I 
should actually entertain for a tiger i f one were eating me. I t 
would, I think, be possible to quibble with t h i s ; but the point 
is hardly an important one. Hobbes goes on to t e l l us that 
some desires and aversions are born with men; but, by t h i s , I 
take i t that he does not mean that they are i n some sense innate. 
Since, on his d e f i n i t i o n , they are movements which are causally 
related i n a mechanistic way to our experience of the outside 
world, t h i s could hardly be the case, what he means i s no more 
than that men begin t o experience desires and aversions of a 
certain order from the very earliest moments of their l i v e s . 
Examples are the desire for food and the aversion from hunger 
(which r e a l l y , of course, amount to the same thing). Other 
desires and aversions take longer to develop. They have something 
of the character of habits. They do not arise immediately and 
fully-fledged out of our sensory processes. Rather, they develop 
from our cumulative experience of the good or bad effects which 
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t h i n g s have on us. But. Hobbes's account of these notions of 
'good' and 'bad' i s very s t r i k i n g . He holds t h a t , however many 
forms of desire and aversion there may be, one t h i n g i s clear? 
Whatsoever i s the object of any man's appetite or 
d e s i r e , t h a t i s i t which he f o r h i s p a r t c a l l e t h good; 
and the object of h i s hate and aversion e v i l ; and of h i s 
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contempt, v i l e and inconsiderable. For these words 
o f good, e v i l and contemptible are ever used w i t h r e l a t i o n 
t o the person t h a t useth them, there being nothing simply 
and absolutely so, nor any common r u l e of good and e v i l , 
t o be taken from the nature of the objects themselves, 
but from the person of the" man, where there i s no 
commonwealth, or, i n a commonwealth, from the person t h a t 
representeth i t ; or from an a r b i t r a t o r or judge whom men, 
disagreeing, s h a l l by consent set up and make h i s sentence 
the r u l e t h e r e o f . 
Good and evil.,;, t h e r e f o r e , are terms which are characterised by 
r e l a t i v i t y and s u b j e c t i v i t y . So f a r as value-judgments are 
concerned, each man i s the measure o f a l l t h i n g s . C l e a r l y , there 
w i l l be a wide area of agreement ~ a l l men, f o r example, w i l l 
agree t h a t poverty and death are e v i l s t o be avoided. Rut there 
i s n e i t h e r absolute good nor absolute e v i l . There i s therefore 
no o b j e c t i v e norm t o which i n d i v i d u a l s can appeal i n order t o 
d i s t i n g u i s h the good from the bad. An a r t i f i c i a l or conventional 
norm can be created, i n the form of the s p e c i f i c a t i o n s of the 
sovereign or a judge when the commonwealth has been set up. But 
i t does not e x i s t ab i n i t i o i n v i r t u e of any inherent property 
of t h i n g s . I'lhat I desire I c a l l good. What you hate you c a l l 
e v i l . Therefore, i f I desire what you hate, the same object 
i s c a l l e d both good aid e v i l . This looks l i k e an obvious 
i n f r a c t i o n of the law of c o n t r a d i c t i o n ; but once we escape 
the tyranny of words, we s h a l l see t h a t there i s no meaningful 
sense i n which any object of desire or aversion can be said 
a c t u a l l y t o be_ good or e v i l . Hobbes i s here asserting a version 
of what has subsequently come t o be known as the 'emotive theory 
of e t h i c s ' . Compare h i s views v/ith the f o l l o w i n g passage from 
A.J. Ayer's Language, Truth'and Logic; 
The presence o f an e t h i c a l symbol i n a p r o p o s i t i o n adds 
nothing t o i t s f a c t u a l content. Thus i f I say t o some-
one, "you acted wrongly i n s t e a l i n g t h a t money," I am 
not s t a t i n g anything more than i f I had simply said, 
"You s t o l e t h a t money." I n adding t h a t t h i s action i s 
wrong, I am not making any f u r t h e r statement about i t . I 
am simply evincing my moral disapproval of i t . . . . Another 
man may disagree w i t h me about the wrongness o f s t e a l i n g , 
i n the sense t h a t he may not have the same f e e l i n g s about 
stealing;; as I have, and he may quarrel w i t h me on account 
of my moral sentiments. But he cannot, s t r i c t l y speaking, 
c o n t r a d i c t me. For i n saying that a c e r t a i n type of action 
i s r i g h t or wrong, I am not making any f a c t u a l statement, 
not even a statement about my own state of mind. I am 
merely expressing c e r t a i n moral sentiments. And the man who 
i s o s t e n s i b l y c o n t r a d i c t i n g me i s merely expressing h i s 
moral sentiments. So t h a t there i s p l a i n l y no sense i n 
asking which of us i s i n the r i g h t . For n e i t h e r of us 
i a asserting a genuine proposition.' 
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So too, f o r Hobbas - although the argument i s r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t -
no-one who makes an o s t e n s i b l y moral assertion i s saying anything 
meaningful about absolute value. He i s simply s t i p u l a t i n g h i s 
own l i k e s and d i s l i k e s . Now, we might be tempted t o suggest 
t h a t , i n asserting the s u b j e c t i v i t y and r e l a t i v i t y of moral 
judgments, Hobbes has i n a d v e r t e n t l y got himself i n t o a tangle; 
because i s i t not t r u e t h a t p r e c i s e l y what ho wishes t o show 
i s t h a t absolute government i s o b j e c t i v e l y good? This, however, 
would be a mistake. Not having heard of the 'ought-is' f a l l a c y 
which i t f e l l t o David Hume t o expose, Hobbes uses the language 
of p r e s c r i p t i o n somewhat i n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y . He f e e l s i t q u ite 
n a t u r a l t o pass from s c i e n t i f i c enquiry t o p o l i t i c a l p r e s c r i p t i o n ; 
and he i s b l i t h e l y o b l i v i o u s of the f a c t t h a t questions which 
may broadly be c a l l e d e t h i c a l cannot be answered by t h e o r e t i c a l 
arguments such as might bs used i n a s c i e n t i f i c discussion. 
What he r e a l l y wishes t o show, however, i s not t h a t absolute 
government i s an o b j e c t i v e e t h i c a l good, but t h a t i t i s a 
r a t i o n a l necessity shown t o be such on s c i e n t i f i c grounds. But 
t h i s i s t o a n t i c i p a t e . 
When a l l these basic premisses have been elaborated, i t turns 
out t h a t a l l the d i f f e r e n t passions to which men are subject are 
nothing more than d i f f e r e n t manifestations of endeavour towards 
or away from an o b j e c t . A l l passions are, It a word, d i f f e r e n t 
forms of e i t h e r appetite or aversion. The only exceptions t o 
t h i s are the obvious l i m i t i n g cases of pure pleasure and pure 
pa i n . These are exceptions because they are the end-states i n 
which aversion and desire are no longer f e l t : they are 'a c e r t a i n 
21 f r u i t i o n of good or e v i l . 1 " I t follows from a l l t h i s t h a t , 
as appetite and aversion are motions, so the d i f f e r e n t passions 
also are motions. Objects i n the externa]., world act upon 
the organs of sense and so give r i s e t o 'that motion and 
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a g i t a t i o n of the b r a i n which we c a l l conception.' This 
motion of the b r a i n i s then continued t o the heart, 'there 
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t o be c a l l e d passion.' ' Thus, Hobbes's psychology i s simply 
an extension of h i s m a t e r i a l i s t i c physics. I t i s purely 
e m p i r i c a l , i n t h a t i t r e l i e s upon no a p r i o r i metaphysical 
or t h e o l o g i c a l commitments} and i n t h i s respect Hobbes f o r e -
shadows Kant. I t i s also a b e h a v i o u r i s t i c psychology. Thinking 
and motion are presented as i m p l i c i t behaviour ( r a t i o c i n a t i o n 
ooxvatus Of. endeavour); and Hobbes has no need t o operate 
w i t h anything but the most attenuated concept of consciousness 
at a l l . .All of what are o r d i n a r i l y c a l l e d mental processes 
are simply by-products. They are s i d e - e f f e c t s or epiphenomena 
of events or motions of matter. These motions occur i n the world 
outside the i n d i v i d u a l and give r i s e t o corresponding motions 
w i t h i n him which i n c i d e n t a l l y cause him t o behave as he does. 
To e x p l a i n such an apparently i n t a n g i b l e n o t i o n as passion i n 
purely m a t e r i a l i s t i c and mechanical terms i s c e r t a i n l y an 
impressive f e a t } and, t o my knowledge, nothing of the kind was 
t o be attempted again u n t i l the appearance, i n 1914., of J„B. 
Watson's book. Behavior; An I n t r o d u c t i o n t o Comparative 
Psychology. 
Within h i s general psychological scheme, Hobbes i d e n t i f i e s a 
number of simple passions ~ a p p e t i t e , desire, love, aversion, 
hate, j o y , and g r i e f . He draws a d i s t i n c t i o n between, on the one 
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hand, pleasures and displeasures of sense and, on the other, 
pleasures and displeasures of the mind. Pleasures and displeas~ 
ures of the mind arise from expectation of an end or consequence. 
Pleasures of the mind are c a l l e d j o y , while displeasures of the 
mind are c a l l e d g r i e f , as d i s t i n c t from displeasures of sense, 
which are c a l l e d pain. These d i f f e r e n t passions assume d i f f e r -
ent forms, or at l e a s t are c a l l e d by d i f f e r e n t names, according 
t o d i f f e r e n t considerations. Thus, i f we consider the opinion 
which men have of a c t u a l l y g e t t i n g what they d e s i r e , we can d i s -
t i n g u i s h between hope and despair. Hope i s appetite or desire 
coupled w i t h b e l i e f t h a t the desired object w i l l be a t t a i n e d . 
Despair i s the same appetite not accompanied by the b e l i e f t h a t 
the desired object w i l l be a t t a i n e d , or accompanied by the 
b e l i e f t h a t i t w i l l not. Again, we can d i s t i n g u i s h an object 
which i s loved from one which i s hated. Further, we can d i s t i n -
guish the passion of covetousness, which i s the desire f o r 
wealth, from the passion of ambition, which i s the desire f o r 
o f f i c e or importance. But both covetousness and ambition are only 
d i f f e r e n t names, conferred according t o d i f f e r e n t circumstances, 
f o r d e s i r e . Then again, consideration of a number of conjoined 
passions may lead us t o use a special name f o r t h i s compound of 
passion. Thus, f o r example, 
love of one s i n g u l a r l y , w i t h desire t o be s i n g u l a r l y 
w i t h f e a r t h a t the love i s not mutual, jealousy. "' 
F i n a l l y , we can give a name t o a passion from a consideration of 
the kind of motion which causes i t . For instance, we can speak 
beloved [ i s c a l l e d ! the p assion of love. The same 
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sudden dejaction...the passion t h a t causeth weeping, 
[whi c h j i s caused by such actions as suddenly take 
25 away some vehement hope or some prop of t h e i r power. 
Thus, i n short, the simple passions become complex according t o 
the d i f f e r e n t circumstances i n which they are combined or t o 
the considerations which induce us t o name them. Moreover, 
since Hobbes regards names simply as having been chosen by 
a r b i t r a r y convention, i t i s h i s view t h a t much of t h i s complex-
i t y can be u n r a v e l l e d simply by clear t h i n k i n g and speaking. In 
any case, however many passions there may be, however many per-
mutations of them are p o s s i b l e , and however wide the range of 
names chosen f o r them, they a l l u l t i m a t e l y b o i l down t o 
motion. Thus, f o r example, d e l i g h t or pleasure i s 'nothing 
r e a l l y but motion about the h e a r t , as conception i s nothing 
but motion i n the head.' " To speak of d e j e c t i o n as being 
l i t e r a l l y no more than a sudden downward movement inside my 
heart may sound f a n t a s t i c t o the modern hearerj but i n the 
context of the seventeenth-century f a s c i n a t i o n w i t h motion, 
i t becomes more r e a d i l y understandable, and Hobbes was by no 
means alone i n embracing t h i s k i n d of explanation as a means of 
accounting f o r human behaviour. Descartes, f o r example, held 
t h a t the human soul resides i n the pineal gland and causes 
b o d i l y motions by a l t e r i n g the d i r e c t i o n of the flow of the 
' v i t a l s p i r i t s ' ; a curious d o c t r i n e , but one which no-one seems 
t o have thought p a r t i c u l a r l y odd at the time. 
Thus, Hobbes has given what he would regard as a p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
account of human behaviour - an account framed i n terms of cause 
and e f f e c t . .And t o the extent t h a t h i s psychology i s epiphen-
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omenalistic, i t i s also p u r e l y d e t e r m i n i s t i c . There i s no room 
i n Hobbes's account of behaviour f o r anything which we should 
normally f e e l i n c l i n e d t o c a l l v o l i t i o n . The nature of Hobbes's 
determinism i s f u l l y set out i n h i s controversy w i t h Bishop 
Bramhallj ~ and, f o r our own purposes, i t i s now necessary 
t o examine h i s account of what c a u s a l i t y a c t u a l l y i s . 
By 'cause', Hobbes understands 
the sum or aggregate of a l l such accidents, both i n the 
agent and i n the p a t i e n t , as concur t o the producing 
of the e f f e c t propounded; a l l which e x i s t i n g together, 
i t cannot be understood but t h a t the e f f e c t e x i s t e t h 
w i t h them; or t h a t i t can possibly e x i s t i f any one 
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of them be absent. 
I n other words, i f the whole set of accidents i s present, we 
cannot conceive of the non-occurrence of the e f f e c t . By the 
same token, i f any one of the accidents i s not present, we 
cannot conceive of the production of the e f f e c t . The cause 
of anything i s thus the sum t o t a l of a l l the conditions or 
accidents i n both agent and p a t i e n t required f o r the existence 
of t h a t t h i n g . As Hobbes himself puts i t , 
A cause simply, or an e n t i r e cause, i s the aggregate 
of a l l the accidents both of the agents, how many soever 
they be, and of the p a t i e n t , put together; which when 
they are a l l supposed t o be present, i t cannot be 
understood but t h a t the e f f e c t i s produced at the same 
i n s t a n t ; and i f any one of them be wanting, i t cannot bo 
29 
understood but t h a t the e f f e c t i s not produced." 
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Within the ' e n t i r e cause' as so defined, Hobbes goes on t o 
elaborate a f u r t h e r d i s t i n c t i o n between ' e f f i c i e n t cause' and 
'material cause'. The e f f i c i e n t cause i s the sum t o t a l of 
accidents i n the agent or agents which i s required f o r the 
production of an e f f e c t which i s a c t u a l l y produced. The 
m a t e r i a l cause i s the sum t o t a l of accidents i n the p a t i e n t 
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re q u i r e d t o produce such an e f f e c t . A l i t t l e l a t e r , he 
makes the f u r t h e r p o i n t t h a t 'cause' and 'power' are the same 
t h i n g . We can speak of the active power of the agent or the 
passive power of the p a t i e n t ; but these are o b j e c t i v e l y the 
same as the e f f i c i e n t and m a t e r i a l cause. We use d i f f e r e n t terms 
only because we can consider the same things from d i f f e r e n t 
standpoints. What he means by t h i s i s quite simple. When we 
consider the sum t o t a l of accidents i n the agent i n r e l a t i o n t o 
an e f f e c t already produced or caused, we c a l l i t the e f f i c i e n t 
cause. When, on the other hand, we consider the sum t o t a l of 
accidents i n r e l a t i o n t o the f u t u r e time, we c a l l t h i s sum t o t a l 
the active power of the agent. I n the same way, when we consider 
the sum t o t a l of accidents i n the p a t i e n t i n r e l a t i o n t o the 
past, we c a l l i t the m a t e r i a l cause. When we consider i t i n 
r e l a t i o n t o the f u t u r e , or t o e f f e c t s as y e t uncaused, we c a l l 
i t the passive power of the p a t i e n t . As f o r what the scholastics 
c a l l e d 'formal cause' or essence, and'final cause* or end, these 
amount, i n f a c t , t o no more than e f f i c i e n t causes! 
For when i t i s said the essence of a t h i n g i s the cause 
t h e r e o f , as t o be r a t i o n a l i s the cause of man, i t i s 
not i n t e l l i g i b l e ; f o r i t i s a l l one as i f i t were said, 
t o be a man i s the cause of man; which i s not w e l l said. 
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Aid yet the knowledge of the essence of anything 
i s the cause of the knowledge of the t h i n g i t s e l f ; 
f o r i f I f i r s t know t h a t a t h i n g i s r a t i o n a l , I know 
from thence t h a t the same i s man; but t h i s i s no 
other than an e f f i c i e n t cause. A f i n a l cause has 
no place but i n such things as have sense and w i l l ; 
and t h i s also I s h a l l prove hereafter t o be an 
e f f i c i e n t cause. 
In other words, t o express 'essence' as i f i t were a 'formal 
cause' r a t h e r than a s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d e f f i c i e n t cause of our 
knowledge i s simply t o express a tautology. And when he comes 
t o the promised proof, i t t u r n s out t h a t , for. Hobbes, f i n a l 
cause or purpose i s no more than the operation of e f f i c i e n t 
causes i n man w i t h d e l i b e r a t i o n . In other words, as we saw 
i n chapter two, i t makes no sense t o speak of things having 
purposes beyond those given t o them by men. 
There i s no need f u r t h e r t o elaborate Hobbes's assault on the 
sch o l a s t i c s t r u c t u r e of 'verbal fo r k s ' . Si.iffi.ce i t t o say t h a t 
he has made c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y quick work of the scholastic 
account of causation, rendering i t down t o a ba l d account of 
e f f i c i e n t c a u s a l i t y . For our purposes, one aspect of t h i s 
account of c a u s a l i t y i s p a r t i c u l a r l y important. As we have 
seen, i f the e n t i r e e f f i c i e n t cause i s present, the e f f e c t i s 
produced. This i s a statement which i s true by d e f i n i t i o n , 
since, i f the e f f e c t were not produced, then the cause would 
simply not be an e n t i r e e f f i c i e n t cause. As Hobbes puts i t , 
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I t f ollows...from hence, t h a t i n whatsoever i n s t a n t 
the cause i s e n t i r e , i n the same i n s t a n t the e f f e c t 
i s produced. For i f i t be not produced, something 
i s s t i l l wanting which i s r e q u i s i t e f o r the production 
of i t ; and th e r e f o r e the cause was not e n t i r e , as 
was supposed. 
And seeing a necessary cause i s defined t o be t h a t , 
which being supposed, the e f f e c t cannot but f o l l o w , 
t h i s also may be c o l l e c t e d , t h a t whatsoever e f f e c t i s 
produced at any time, the same i<s produced by a 
necessary cause. For whatsoever i s produced, i n as 
much as i t i s produced, had an e n t i r e cause, t h a t i s , 
had a l l those t h i n g s , which being supposed, i t cannot 
be understood but t h a t the e f f e c t f o l l o w s ; t h a t i s , 
i t had a necessary cause. And i n the same manner i t 
may be shown, t h a t whatsoever e f f e c t s are hereafter t o 
be produced, s h a l l have a necessary cause; so t h a t 
a l l the e f f e c t s t h a t have been, or s h a l l be, produced, 
have t h e i r necessity i n things antecedent." 
I n other words, on the assumption t h a t every e f f e c t i s 
preceded by an e n t i r e e f f i c i e n t cause, the very f a c t t h a t 
something has happened in d i c a t e s t o us t h a t i t could not not 
have happened. Mien the cause i s present i n i t s e n t i r e t y , the 
e f f e c t always and instantaneously f o l l o w s . Hence, the cause 
i t s e l f i s a necessary cause, and ' a l l the e f f e c t s t h a t have been 
or s h a l l be produced have t h e i r necessity i n things antecedent. 1 
And whatever may be wrong w i t h t h i s argument, i t i s true t h a t , 
t o Hobbes's s a t i s f a c t i o n , i t at once excludes from the discussion 
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any p o s s i b i l i t y of freedom i n man. To put i t more p r e c i s e l y , 
i t precludes us from using the term 'freedom' t o s i g n i f y 
absence of n e c e s s i t a t i o n , because, i f an e n t i r e cause i s 
present, there is_ no absence of n e c e s s i t a t i o n . To be sure, 
we o f t e n use the term 'free ' t o s i g n i f y no more than t h a t a 
man i s not impeded by some ex t e r n a l obstacle such as the 
opposition of other menj and t h i s use of the term makes 
p e r f e c t l y good sense. But 
i f a man should t a l k t o me of...any free but free 
from being hindered by opposition, I should not say 
t h a t he were i n an e r r o r , but t h a t h i s words were 
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without meaning, t h a t i s t o say, absurd. 
We cannot t a l k of a 'free ' subject or a ' f r e e 1 w i l l i n any 
sense other than t h a t j u s t n o t i c e d , because, given a cause 
present i n i t s e n t i r e t y , the e f f e c t cannot not-happen or be 
prevented from happening. The e f f e c t follows of necessity, 
and i t i s not possible t o be free from t h i s necessity. I f the 
e f f e c t does not occur, t h i s does not mean t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l 
has stopped i t by the exercise of his own free w i l l . I t means 
no more than t h a t , a l l appearances t o the contrary n o t w i t h -
standing, the e n t i r e cause was not present. 
Now, i n a l l t h i s , Hobbes has not overlooked the obvious f a c t 
t h a t men f r e q u e n t l y seem t o perform actions a f t e r , and as a 
r e s u l t of, d e l i b e r a t i o n . At f i r s t s i g h t , t h i s seems t o create 
a large d i f f i c u l t y i n the context of an unambiguous theory of 
necessary c a u s a l i t y . A capacity f o r d e l i b e r a t i o n seems t o imply 
p r e c i s e l y t h a t freedom of the w i l l which i s c l e a r l y i n c o n s i s t e n t 
i 
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w i t h a d e t e r m i n i s t i c psychology, and which Hobbes has already 
denied. This, however, t u r n s out not t o be a problem as f a r 
as Hobbes i s concerned. F i r s t of a l l , although he accepts the 
f a c t of d e l i b e r a t e a c t i v i t y , h i s account of what i t i s t o act 
d e l i b e r a t e l y i s very narrowly drawn. He defines d e l i b e r a t i o n 
p u r e l y and simply i n terms of the passions. Suppose t h a t , i n 
the mind of an i n d i v i d u a l , the desire t o achieve, say, the ascent 
of Everest i s present together w i t h an aversion from the dangers 
involved i n doing so. We have here two opposing and competing 
passions. In such a case, 'the whole sum of desires, aversions, 
hopes and fears continued t i l l the t h i n g be e i t h e r done or thought 
impossible i s t h a t we c a l l d e l i b e r a t i o n . ' v This theory of 
d e l i b e r a t i o n against a background of necessary c a u s a l i t y does not 
account f o r such things as t r y i n g and f a i l i n g or d e l i b e r a t i n g 
about how t o do something which involves no danger; but these 
are d i f f i c u l t i e s which Hobbes does not n o t i c e . They are, i n f a c t , 
acute d i f f i c u l t i e s ; because, not only do I d e l i b e r a t e on the 
question of whether t o do something or not - I also d e l i b e r a t e 
as t o how t o do i t , and i t i s here, surely, t h a t the process which 
ve o r d i n a r i l y c a l l d e l i b e r a t i o n i s c h i e f l y located. I f I t r y t o 
do something and f a i l , then my ' d e l i b e r a t i o n ' must have been i n 
some sense mistaken; yet i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o see how the 
necessarily-determined outcome of a c o n f l i c t between two comp-
e t i n g passions can be said t o have been 'mistaken'. S i m i l a r l y , 
there i s no danger or aversion (at le a s t i n Hobbes's sense) i n 
the process o f , say, t r y i n g t o understand Hegel's l o g i c ; but 
people p l a i n l y do d e l i b e r a t e as t o the best way of achieving such 
understanding. Nevertheless, leaving these d i f f i c u l t i e s on one 
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side, i t i s Hobbes's view t h a t the strength of the passions 
rather than freedom of the w i l l i n any ordinary sense . 
determines the outcome o f d e l i b e r a t i o n . And t h i s i s taken 
t o be t r u e by d e f i n i t i o n , since a see-sawing contest between 
opposing and more or less finely-balanced passions i s p r e c i s e l y 
what we mean when we t a l k of d e l i b e r a t i o n . Presumably, the 
more f i n e l y balanced the respective strengths of the opposing 
passions, the more prolonged and agonising the process of 
d e l i b e r a t i o n , or the state of 'indecision', w i l l be. 
Second, Hobbes e x p l i c i t l y denies t h a t there i s any element 
i n the human psychological make-up answering t o the t r a d i t i o n a l 
n o t i o n of a ' w i l l ' which i s capable of being ' f r e e ' . ' W i l l ' , 
he says, 'therefore i s the l a s t appetite i n d e l i b e r a t i n g . 1 
That i s t o say, the l a s t appetite of aversion i n the process 
of d e l i b e r a t i n g i s what we mean by the act of w i l l i n g - and 
f o r the purposes of malting f u r t h e r progress we s h a l l have simply 
t o ignore the f a c t t h a t t h i s suggestion i s , f o r the reasons 
already given, obviously not t r u e . According t o Hobbes, whether 
the- action i s performed or not depends upon the nature of t h i s 
f i n a l ' w i l l ' ; but t h i s i s a matter which i s determined q u i t e 
simply by the r e l a t i v e strengths of passions. I t i s there-
fore not w i t h i n the c o n t r o l of any i n d i v i d u a l . And so i t 
fo l l o w s t h a t , 
from the use of the word ' f r e e - w i l l 1 , no l i b e r t y can 
be i n f e r r e d of the w i l l , desire or i n c l i n a t i o n , but 
the l i b e r t y of the man; which consisteth i n t h i s , 
t h a t he f i n d s no stop i n doing what he has the w i l l 
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35 desire or i n c l i n a t i o n t o do. 
L i b e r t y i s defined as 
the absence of a l l the impediments t o a c t i c n t h a t are 
not contained i n the nature and i n t r i n s i c a l q u a l i t y 
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of the agent. 
And, t h e r e f o r e , 
such a l i b e r t y as i s free from necessity i s not t o 
be found i n the w i l l e i t h e r o f men or beasts. But i f 
by l i b e r t y we understand the f a c u l t y or power, not of 
w i l l i n g , but of doing what they w i l l , then c e r t a i n l y 
t h a t l i b e r t y i s t o be allowed t o both, and both may 
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equally have i t , whensoever i t i s t o be had. 
The f a c t t h a t men d e l i b e r a t e i s therefore not, t o Hobbes's mind, 
i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h a thoroughgoing determinism as an explanatory 
p r i n c i p l e of psychology. He simply defines the problem away. 
In a n u t s h e l l , the case can be put as f o l l o w s . I f I am i n 
danger, I s h a l l i n e v i t a b l y act i n such a way as w i l l preserve 
my own l i f e . At l e a s t , I s h a l l i n e v i t a b l y act i n such a way as 
I t h i n k w i l l preserve my own l i f e - and the f a c t t h a t t h i s 
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p r o p o s i t i o n i s m a n i f e s t l y f a l s e need not detain us.' The p o i n t 
i s t h a t Hobbes takes i t t o be a brute f a c t of psychology. I t 
i s explained i n terms of a chain of motion which, when complete, 
i s a chain of necessary c a u s a l i t y . I cannot be said to be free 
t o w i l l the preservation of my own l i f e . Neither can I be said 
t o be fre e not t o do so - any more than I can be said t o w i l l 
myself not t o f a l l i f I step out of my bedroom window. My w i l l 
i s simply not something which l i e s w i t h i n my own c o n t r o l . What 
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we commonly c a l l the w i l l - t h a t i s , the apparent mental f e a t which 
immediately precedes action ~ i s no more than the f i n a l desire 
i n the process of d e l i b e r a t i o n . This process of d e l i b e r a t i o n , 
whereby I seem t o 'choose1 whether to do x, y or z, i s determined 
p u r e l y by the strength of my ( i n v o l u n t a r y ) passions i n respect of 
each possible a l t e r n a t i v e . I can only be c a l l e d 'free' i n one 
sense. This i s the sense which becomes meaningful i f no-one 
a c t u a l l y prevents me from doing what my d e l i b e r a t i o n has l e d 
me t o do. This may seem t o be a very attenuated sense of the 
word ' f r e e ' . But Hobbes would wish t o argue t h a t there i s no 
p o i n t i n using the word t o r e f e r t o actions which are free from 
n e c e s s i t a t i o n , because there are no actions which are free from 
n e c e s s i t a t i o n . 
* » «• * » 
.-; Such i s Hobbes's account of human behaviour i n terms of 
motion, cause and e f f e c t ~ i n terms, i n other words, of the 
presuppositions of seventeenth-century mechanics. I t might seem 
t h a t we have now wandered r a t h e r f a r away from the d i r e c t i o n set 
i n the previous chapter by our discussion of Hobbes's methodology. 
But i n drawing out Hobbes's empirical, psychology from h i s account 
of motion and necessary c a u s a l i t y , we have, i n f a c t , embarked upon 
the process of applying the 'resolutive-compositive' method t o 
the c h i e f object of our (and Hobbes's) enquiry - the commonwealth 
or p o l i t i c a l order. I f we analyse or resolve the commonwealth 
i n t o i t s smallest p a r t s ~ i f we remove laws, i n s t i t u t i o n s , customs 
and a l l means of formal coercion and manipulation - we are l e f t 
w i t h a p l u r a l i t y of atomic, i n d i v i d u a l human, beings. Each of 
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these beings i s by way of being a highly-complex machine, 
driven by passions which are themselves epiphenomena of the 
m a t e r i a l world, j u s t as one machine can be driven by another 
through gears, transmission, and suoh. These passions are quite 
i n v o l u n t a r y . A man cannot choose or decide not t o f e e l them, 
because f e e l i n g them i s a process determined by necessary 
c a u s a l i t y , j u s t as, when the a p p l i c a t i o n of a force causes a 
body t o move, i t cannot ' r e f r a i n ' from moving. In t u r n , 
these passions determine f o r each i n d i v i d u a l what i s good and 
what i s e v i l . They necessitate a l l h i s actions and they 
f u r n i s h t h e i r ends. The p i v o t of Hobbes's p o l i t i c a l speculation 
i s t h i s ! I f we consider what the l o t of such atomic i n d i v i d u a l s 
i n an imaginary 'state of nature' would be, we s h a l l be able 
t o 'compose' the commonwealth by deduction, and so s t i p u l a t e 
( f o r the b e n e f i t of those u n w i l l i n g or unable t o perform the 
deductions f o r themselves) the necessary conditions of p o l i t i c a l 
r e g u l a t i o n . We are t o consider what would be the predicament 
of i n d i v i d u a l s i n a s i t u a t i o n from which any k i n d of organised 
or r e l i a b l e c o n s t r a i n t ware absent. We s h a l l then be i n a 
p o s i t i o n t o perform two important operations. F i r s t , we s h a l l 
be able t o deduce how such men must l i v e , given the kind of 
creatures t h a t they are: what p r i n c i p l e s of action they must 
devise f o r themselves, and how they w i l l eventually come together 
t o create c i v i l associations. Second, we s h a l l be able t o show, 
w i t h a l l the force and r a t i o n a l c o n v i c t i o n of a s c i e n t i f i c 
argument, p r e c i s e l y what the conditions w i t h i n the organised 
p o l i t y must be i f breaches of the peace are t o be avoided. I t , 
i s t o t h i s 'compositive' or deductive stage t h a t we must now begin 
t o t u r n . 
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NOTES. 
1. The fac t that the State i s an a r t i f i c i a l rather than a 
natural body* means that we can know the formula of i t s 
construction wi th more certainty than i s available i n 
respect of the natural world. As he puts i t , 
Geometry...is demonstrable, f o r the l ines and figures 
from which we reason are drawn and described by ourselves; 
and c i v i l philosophy i s demonstrable because we make the 
commonwealth ourselves. But because of natural bodies 
we know not the construction, but seek i t from e f fec t s , 
there l i e s no demonstration of what the causes be we 
seek f o r , but only of what they may be. (E.W. Vol .7 ,p . 1^ 4.) 
Hobbes does not , I th ink , wish to say that the principles 
of ' c i v i l philosophy' are self-evident i n the way that those 
of geometry are. His point is that geometrical and p o l i t -
i c a l ' f a c t s ' are man-made, whereas, the natural world i s not, 
so that the former are more readily comprehensible than the 
l a t t e r . 
2« Leviathan, E.H. Vo l .3 ,pp . ix -x . 
3. Hobbes'a materialism i s , i n a sense, methodological; but 
i t i s more than merely methodological. I t i s not tha t , i n 
his view, philosophy should not concern i t s e l f with the 
non-material. Rather, he holds that there are no non-
material things -» that the phrase 'non-material things' i s 
se l f -cont radic tory . Vide, e.g., Leviathan, E.W. Vol.3,pp'i'T7, 
27, 34.-35, and f . n . 12 i n f r a . 
108. 
4* Tral te des Sensations, 1754. 
5. T. Hobbes, Malmesburlensis Vi ta , L.W. V o l . I , p . x x i . 
6. Hobbes and Descartes had both arrived at t h i s idea of 
materia s u b t l l i s independently of one another and at more 
or less the same time. Their i n a b i l i t y to agree on who 
had had the idea f i r s t , and the jealousy of eaoh of his 
reputation as an innovator, was apparently one of the 
chief sources of tension between them. Vide F. Brandt, 
Thomas Hobbes' Mechanical Conception of Nature, Oh.IV. 
7. Concerning Body. E.W. Vol.1,p.20A. 
8. Ethic a, 111,4.. 
9. The d i s t i n c t i o n which Hobbes draws between v i t a l and animal 
motions i s simply that which, i n modern terminology, i s 
drawn between involuntary motions (the beating of the 
he art j" breathing) and voluntary motions (running; fending 
o f f a blow). 
10. Concerning Body, E.W. Vol.1,pp>390-391. 
11. Leviathan, E.W. Vol .3 ,p .2 . 
12. To Hobbes, even God i s 'a most pure, simple, i nv i s ib l e 
s p i r i t corporeal' (E.W. Vol .4 s p«313); and he does not 
see any contradiction i n the term ' s p i r i t corporeal ' . 
Indeed, to Hobbes's mind, the scholastic term 'incorporeal 
substance' i s self-contradictory - these 'are words which, 
when they are joined together, destroy one another, as i f 
a man should say, an ' incorporeal body.' Clearly, then, 
Berkeley's contention that matter i s non-existent would 
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have made no more sense to Hobbes than the t r a d i t i o n a l claim 
that s p i r i t u a l substances are incorporeal. To Hobbes, 'substance' 
equals 'matter ' or 'body'5 and in support of his contention that 
God i s material he cites Genesis, ~ 'the S p i r i t of God 
moved upon the face of the waters. ' The Bible i t s e l f a t t r ibutes 
motion and locat ion to God, which attr ibutes .are only i n t e l l i g i b l e 
when applied to bodies. (Vide Leviathan, E.W. Vol .3,pp.331 f f . ) 
"13. Leviathan, E.W. Vol.3,p.4-. 
14. Leviathan, E.W. Vol .3,p.5. 
15. Concerning Body, E.W. Vol .1,p.396. 
16. Leviathan, E.W. Vol .3,p.5. 
17. Leviathan, E.W. Vol.3,p.4-0. 
18. An object of contempt cannot, I take i t , be one which produces 
no kind of endeavour either towards or away from i t s e l f . I f t h i s 
were so, we could not, on Hobbes's own account, know that the 
contemptible object was there at a l l . Rather, an object of 
contempt i s presumably one i n respect of which feelings of 
• aversion and desire exactly equal one another and so cancel one 
another out. Endeavour exis ts , but i n a state of balance amount-
ing to neither aversion nor desire. 
1 9 . Leviathan, E .E . Vol.3,p.4-1. 
20. Language. Truth and Logic, pp. 107-108. Vj.de also G.L. Stevenson, 
Ethics and Language. One might point out, i n passing, that 
Professor i t e r ' s example i s s ingularly i l l -chosen, since i t 
makes no more sense to ask, ' Is stealing wrong?' than i t would 
make to ask, 'What colour i s an orange?' or 'How many angles has 
a t r i ang le? ' But, as Hobbes the nominalist would have been quick 
to point out, t h i s objection i s not f a t a l to the argument. 
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2 1 • Concerning Body, E.W. Vol .1 , pp.4.09-4.10. 
2 2 « Human Nature, E.W. Vol.4,p.34. 
2 3 . Human Nature, E.W. Vol.4,p.34. 
2 4- ligZl9*Ml> Vol.3,p.4-4-. 'What Hobbes rea l ly means i s 
that 'des i re 'of one s ingular ly , with desire to be singularly 
£ QJM2£l i s cal led the passion of love. The same, with 
fear that the desire i s not mutual, jealousy. ' This desire 
would presumably be more than simple sexual desire, although 
i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see what else i t might involve; and 
perhaps th i s d i f f i c u l t y explains Hobbes's evasively 
c i rcu la r way of put t ing i t . 
? 5 . Leviathan, E.W. Vol .3,p.4^. 
SHSSLjature, E.W. Vol .4 ,p .31. 
27. .An excellent summary and discussion i s to be found i n 
Richard Peters, Hobbes, Ch.7. 
2 S « Concerning Body. E.W. Vol .1,p.77. 
29. Concerning Body. E.W. Vol .1,pp. 121-122. 
30- Concerning Body, E.W. Vol.1,pp.127-128. 
31* Concerning Body, E.W. Vol.1,pp.131-132. 
3 2 » Concerning Body, E.W. Vol .1,p.123. 
33. Leviathan, E.W. Vol.3,p.33. 
34. Leviathan, E.W. Vol.3,p.48. 
35. Leviathaa, E.W. Vol.3,p.197. 
36. Of,,Liberty and Necessity, E.W. Vol.4.,p„273. 
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37. Concerning Body. E.W. Vol.1,p.409. 
38. In f a c t , Hobbes does occasionally concede that a man might 
in some circumstances prefer death to dishonour - might 
desire the glory of a valorous death more than he dreads 
the prospect of death i t s e l f ; but these cases are, i n the 
nature of things, very rare. In any case, t h i s concession 
does not weaken the allegedly empirical point that men 
generally fear death more than anything else ( i . e . that 
men almost invar iably act i n the interests of the i r own 
se l f -preservat ion) . Neither, of course, does i t v iola te 
the psychological p r inc ip le that men always act under the 
goad of t h e i r own desires and aversions. 
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GH.fiPT.ER FIVE - THE STATE OF NATURE AND ITS LAWS. 
Hobbes's account of human behaviour as we have jus t outlined 
i t c lear ly has some very far-reaching e th ica l consequences. To 
the extent that the conative side of human existence i s held to 
be quite outside the control of the ind iv idua l man, Hobbes's 
understanding of what i t i s to act morally inevi tably takes a 
somewhat unusual form; and the most important exposition of 
the moral consequences of his theory of motivation i s to be found 
c h i e f l y i n the th i r t een th , fourteenth and f i f t e e n t h chapters of 
the Leviathan. 
Every i n d i v i d u a l , Hobbes t e l l s us, has one predominant aim -
namely, to maximise his power over every other individual with 
whom he comes i n to contact. Every other desire - wealth, know-
ledge, honour, and so on - comes down eventually to the desire 
fo r power; since to be r i c h , knowledgeable, honoured, and so 
f o r t h i s i n each case to wield a d i f f e r e n t kind of power. This 
desire f o r power, however, i s not simply the naked urge to 
dominate. In claiming that men desire power, Hobbes means that 
every man wishes to be constantly i n a posi t ion such that he can 
be confident of always securing the future g r a t i f i c a t i o n of his 
appetites or desires; so that the drive to power i s explained 
i n terms consistent wi th Hobbes's general psychology. And the 
reason why th i s passion f o r power inevi tably persists throughout 
l i f e i s not so much that man i s never s a t i s f i ed with what he has, 
as that he i s always unsure as to whether he w i l l always be able 
to secure the same degree of sa t i s fac t ion i n the fu tu re . As 
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Hobbas puts i t , 
In the f i r s t place, I put f o r a general i nc l ina t ion 
of a l l mankind a perpetual and restless desire of power 
a f t e r power, that ceaseth only in death. And the cause 
of t h i s i s not always that a man hopes f o r a more 
intensive del ight than he has already attained to ; or 
that he cannot be content with a moderate power; but 
because he cannot assure the power and means to l i v e 
w e l l , which he hath present, without the acquisit ion 
of more. 
Hobbes's pos i t ion more than supe r f i c i a l l y resembles that of 
Machiavell i as enunciated i n The Prince. To Machiavell i , 
the prince i s a free man to the extent that his safety and w e l l -
being are not contingent upon luck or any other man's w i l l . I f 
they are en t i r e ly i n his own hands, he i s f ree ; so that to 
becqme a free man i s to ensure that no-one else has the power to 
impose his w i l l on you. You must either submit to domination 
or s t r i ve to dominate i n your own r ight - l i b e r t y i s expressed 
in the s t r i v i n g f o r power over other men; and becoming free i s 
a zero-sum game. The prince must be prepared to act as the s i t -
uation demands, and he must suppose that whatever conduces to his 
3 
own power and advancement i s good; so tha t , f o r the sake of 
* 
power, and therefore of l i b e r t y , he must be able to act both 
ruthless ly and with the utmost res t ra in t , as circumstances require. 
He must be able, as Machiavelli puts i t , t o make use of both the 
beast and the man i n him. In 3hort, both Hobbes and Machiavelli 
conclude that i t i s i n the interests of a man to maximise his 
power; although the advice which Machiavelli gives i s framed 
1 U . 
i n terms whioh presuppose freedom of the prince's w i l l , where-
as Hobbes w i l l not allow that the notion of ' f r e e - w i l l ' i s a 
coherent one at a l l . 
Aided to t h i s craving f o r power is the natural scarcity of 
resources and the tendency which men have (according to Hobbes) 
always to desire the respect and admiration of t h e i r fe l lows .^ 
And the chief problem which Hobbes takes to be associated with 
the f ac t that men are creatures of desire l i v i n g i n a world of 
scarce resources i s that presented by the fur ther fac t of 
equal i ty . Any one man, he suggests, i s more or less the equal 
of any other. To the extent that mental facu l t i es depend upon 
prudence rather than upon s c i e n t i f i c knowledge, a l l men are more 
or less equally prudent. This i s held to be so since, as we saw 
i n chapter three, prudence depends upon experience; and a l l men 
have roughly the same experiences to make them prudent., Scient-
i f i c knowledge i s here l e f t out of the account, of course, 
because so few people have i t - indeed, i n the state of nature 
i t i s presumably the case that no-one has i t . I n t e l l ec tua l 
attainments i n the state of nature are reduced, r ea l l y , to 
the c u l t i v a t i o n of simple cunning in the l i g h t of experience; 
and a l l men are roughly equal i n the degree of cunning which 
they possess, since a l l are roughly equal i n terms of t he i r ex-
periences. When i t comes to physical capab i l i t i e s , Hobbes suggests 
that inequal i t ies of strength do not much matter. Men are, indeed, 
d i f f e r e n t i n terms of bodily strength. But the fac t i s that the 
weakest man can k i l l even the strongest, either by ganging up 
on him wi th others, or by what Hobbes ca l l s 'secret machinations' -
by which he presumably means poisons, ambushes, booby-traps and 
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the l i k e . As a consequence of t h i s equal i ty, there would never 
be any f i n a l solut ion to competitive struggles between men i f 
i t were not f o r the unnatural order imposed upon human a f f a i r s 
by p o l i t i c a l organisation. In the absence of such organisation, 
the human predicament would be one of constant and universal 
competition, wi th no power strong enough to resolve th i s 
predicament by imposing general control upon human transactions. 
There would p reva i l a state of 'war 'of every man against every 
m a n . T h i s state of war, to use modern terminology, might be 
either hot or cold. There would, in other words, be either 
actual f i g h t i n g , or else the constant readiness or disposit ion 
to f i g h t . L i f e would be a matter of constant brinkmanship; and 
Hobbes seems to regard the constant p o s s i b i l i t y of war as being 
jus t as bad as an actual state of war. In ei ther case, everyone 
i s the enemy of everyone else; and no-one can count upon any 
safety beyond that provided by his own strength or ingenuity -
which, given the natural equality of men, i s not a very sat isfactory 
state of a f f a i r s . Moreover, i n th i s state of war, where every-
one i s competing f o r the scarce resources of ' f e l i c i t y ' , there 
i s no moral law to set l i m i t s to human conduct. Recognition of 
a moral law, according to Hobbes, can only take place amongst men 
l i v i n g i n c i v i l society and respecting t he i r mutual r ights and 
dut ies . As he puts i t , 
To t h i s war of every man against every man, th i s also 
i s consequent; that nothing can be unjust . The notions 
of r i gh t and wrong, jus t ice and i n j u s t i c e , have there no 
place. Where there i s no common power there i s no law; 
where no law no i n j u s t i c e . Force and fraud are i n war the 
two cardinal v i r tues . Justice and in jus t i ce are none of the 
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f acu l t i e s neither of the body nor mind. I f they were, 
they might be i n a man that were alone i n the world, 
as wel l as his senses and passions. They are qual i t ies 
that re la te to men i n society, not i n sol i tude. I t i s 
consequent also to the same condition that there be no 
thine d i s t i n c t ; but only that to be every man's, that 
he can get, and f o r so long as he can keep i t . ^ 
Here, though elsewhere he i s ambiguous on t h i s point , Hobbes 
denies that there are any transcendent, e x t r a - p o l i t i c a l moral 
standards such as those postulated by the t r a d i t i o n a l exponents 
of natural law theory. Mora l i ty , l i k e the State i t s e l f , i s an 
a r t e fac t . Before i t i s made - that i s , i n the state of nature -
universal anarchy obtains, because there i s a complete absence of 
any rule regulative of human conduct. And f o r as long as th i s 
anarchy l a s t s , says Hobbes ( i n what must be one of the most 
quoted remarks i n a l l p o l i t i c a l theory), 
there i s no place f o r industry; because the f r u i t 
thereof i s uncertain: and consequently no culture of 
the ear th j no navigation nor use of the commodities that 
may be imported by sea; no commodious bui lding; no 
instruments of moving and removing such things as require 
much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no 
account of time; no ar ts , no l e t t e r s , no society; and, 
which i s worst of a l l , continual fear and danger of 
v io len t death, and the l i f e of man so l i t a ry , poor, 
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nasty, b ru t i sh and short . 
propriety .e. property I , no dominion, no mine and 
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Hobbes does not wish to suggest that such a state of nature 
has ever actually obtained - t h i s is an important point , to be 
returned to l a t e r . Nevertheless, ha reinforces his argument by 
appeal to three cases which he considers adequate to support 
his po in t . F i r s t , he remarks that 
the savage people i n many places of America, except 
the government of small fami l ies , the concord whereof 
dependeth on natural l u s t , have no government at a l l , 
g 
and l i v e at t h i s day i n that brut ish manner. 
This, of course, i s an argument resting en t i re ly upon ignorance 
of pre-technological modes of social organisation. Such 
ignorance i n Hobbes i s en t i r e ly understandable; but the 
argument of which i t i s the source need not detain us - except 
f o r long enough to point out that i t i s , i n f ac t , s ign i f i can t 
that so-called 'savage people' do not l i v e ' i n that brut ish 
manner'. But t h i s i s another point to which we shal l return 
at a l a t e r stage. His second appeal - and here he i s on 
somewhat bettas ground - i s to the absence of res t ra in t shown 
i n the mutual relat ions of States which, precisely because they 
are sovereign States, have no common power set over them. To 
the extent that there i s no internat ional power able to regulate 
in te rna t iona l relat ions as a sovereign regulates in te rna l re la t ions , 
such States are i n a 's tate of nature' re la t ive to one another. 
Hence the mistrust and uncertainty which infect , in ternat ional 
a f f a i r s . This of t -no t iced fac t has, inc identa l ly , been taken 
by p o l i t i c a l moralists from Dante to Bertrand Russell as an 
argument i n favour of world government; and i t i s perhaps some-
what surprising that Hobbes makes no such point himself. His 
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t h i r d l i n e of argument i s to Inv i t e us to consider t y p i c a l 
human behaviour even under government, where there are laws 
to protect the ind iv idua l and o f f i c e r s appointed to enforce 
the laws. When a man t r ave l s , does he not arm himself and go 
i n the company: of others? When he is at home, does he not lock 
his doors, keep his belongings secured i n chests, and so forth? 
Does he not, i n short, display every sign of suspicion and 
mist rust , even towards his own servants and family? And 'does 
he not there as much accuse mankind by his actions as I do by 
Q 
my words?' This l as t suggestion has a very plausible r ing to 
i t ; but i t turns out, i n f a c t , to be a very poor argument. On 
inspection, i t becomes quite obvious that such precautions do 
not count as evidence f o r Hobbes's implied thesis that a l l men 
w i l l be robbers i f they can. When I leave my house, i t i s 
cer ta in ly true that I lock the door. But I do not do so 
because I suppose that a l l men are thieves - I do not 'accuse 
mankind'. I lock my door because, 
(a) I know that some men are thieves. 
(b) I do not know which men are thieves. 
(c) I am therefore prudent enough to assume that any man might 
be -
which i s not at a l l the same thing as assuming that a l l men are. 
However, one sal ient point i s by now clear ly established. To 
Hobbes, the state of nature i s a state of constant war, whether 
actual or po ten t i a l . - Assuming, as he does, that men obviously 
w i l l not care f o r such a state of a f f a i r s , the burning question 
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w i l l c lear ly be how they can escape from i t . Hobbes i s con-
cerned, i n other words, to deduce from the end-product of 
' r e so lu t ion ' ( i . e . from the state of nature) what men so s i t -
uated might reasonably be expected to do; he has arrived at the 
jumping-off point of the 'compositive' stage. This, f a r from 
being a mere description of exis t ing States, w i l l be a deductive 
account of the generative processes which would produce a p o l i t -
i c a l order exactly suited to men's needs and propensities; and 
i t w i l l thus also funct ion as an i m p l i c i t c r i t ique of exis t ing 
orders insofar as they deviate from t h i s model. 
The most general answer to the question of how men can escape 
from 'na tu ra l ' anarchy i s t h i s . Although the state of nature 
i s so dreadful , man i s not compelled hopelessly to remain i n i t . 
His salvation rests upon the fac t that he i s both passionate 
and r a t iona l - a p o s s i b i l i t y of escape exis ts , founded pa r t ly 
upon man's reason and pa r t l y upon his passions. The passions 
push, the reason p u l l s ; and, between them, they provide an 
escape route. The p o s s i b i l i t y of escape i s founded pa r t ly upon 
the passions since, amongst these passions, there are several 
which, i f circumstances permit them to predominate, conduce to 
a peaceful and orderly existence. These passions include ' fear 
of death, desire of such things as are necessary to commodious 
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l i v i n g , and a hope by t he i r industry to obtain them.• I t i s 
founded also upon reason, since i t i s reason which suggests to 
mankind the proper means of securing the g r a t i f i c a t i o n of the 
passions, including these peaceful ones. The reason 'suggesteth 
convenient a r t ic les of peace, upon which men may be drawn to 
120. 
12 
agreement.' * The question which then immediately presents 
i t s e l f , of course, i s t h i s : How i s i t that men, who can only 
l i v e by the unregulated and uncontrollable promptings of 
egoist ic desire, can ever come actually to l i s t e n to these 
suggestions of reason? Hobbes answers t h i s objection - rather 
lamely - by point ing out that we a l l have calmer moments, when 
r a t iona l r e f l e c t i o n i s unimpeded by the immediacy of passion; 
and i t i s then that these ra t iona l promptings towards ' a r t i c l e s 
of peace' are able to make themselves heard. 
These a r t i c l es of peace are called by Hobbes, 'laws of nature ' . 
This i s a term which he borrows from the scholastics whom he so 
profoundly despised, and which i s capable of being traced back 
through the Roman j u r i s t s to the Stoic philosophers and beyond. 
I t has, i n f a c t , been one of the most fundamental and enduring 
concepts of moral and p o l i t i c a l thought from the ear l ies t 
an t iqu i ty ; and i t i s by no means dead to t h i s day, surviving, 
f o r example, i n the neo-Thomist writ ings of Jacques Mari ta in , 
or i n the modern versions of the doctrines of 'human r i g h t s ' , 
' r i gh t s of man', and so f o r t h . A characterist ic of Hobbes,' 
however, i s that he uses the t r a d i t i o n a l language of natural law 
to argue i n favour of conclusions very d i f f e r e n t from those 
favoured by the main stream of natural law theor is ts . Far from 
asserting, say, tha t , i n v i r tue of his nature, man ought to be 
l e f t as free as possible to pursue his own good in his own way, 
Hobbes argues that the ra t iona l perception of 'natural lavrs' 
cannot but convince those who perceive them that , i n t he i r own 
in teres ts , t he i r ' na tu ra l ' freedom ought to be' very s t r i c t l y 
cu r ta i l ed . Also, at f i r s t s ight , i t seems rather incongruous 
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that Hobbas shpuld be using the language of natural law theory 
at a l l , since he i s an exponent of what i s known as the 'command 
theory of l aw ' . Law, to Hobbes, has nothing 'na tura l ' about i t . 
I t i s simply 'the word of him that by r i gh t hath command over 
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others ' ; and the state of nature, of course, i s precisely the 
state i n which no-one has such a r igh t of command. As i t happens, 
however, there turns out to be no fundamental inconsistency 
between Hobbes's use of the term 'laws of nature' and his view 
that a law i s the command of a superior which cannot, as such, 
exis t i n the state of nature. He explains that these laws of 
nature' are not commands - at least , not the commands of any 
earthly power - but ' ru les of reason'. They are, i n other 
words, t rue universal propositions as to the' conditions which 
must be observed i f peace and security are to be achieved. 
A law of nature, lex na tu ra l i s . i s a precept or 
general r u l e , found out by reason, by which a man i s 
forbidden to do that which i s destructive of his l i f e , 
or taketh away the means of preserving the same, and to 
1A 
omit that by which he thinketh i t may best be preserved. 
Now, i f we are to make sense of Hobbes's doctrine, his use 
of the word ' forbidden ' i n t h i s context must be taken i n a 
purely metaphorical sense. He wishes, i n f ac t , simply to hold 
tha t , since every man desires as a matter of brute psychological 
f ac t to preserve his l i f e , common sense t e l l s him that i t would 
be i r r a t i o n a l to do anything that might endanger his l i f e , or 
to f a i l to take any and a l l steps to protect i t . So f a r , so good. 
But t h i s prompting of reason, though i n a very obvious sense 
i t ' f o r b i d s ' us t o certain courses of action and exhorts us to 
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others, has no moral s ignif icance of i t s e l f . St Thomas 
Aquinas, f o r example, also holding that self-preservation i s 
a ' law of nature ' , held that we can i n f e r from th i s the moral 
precept, ' thou shalt not k i l l 1 . But, f o r Hobbes, reason i s not 
conceived as furnishing us wi th the ends of action; because the 
ends of action are already given by the passions. What reason 
does i s quite simply to indicate general rules as to the means 
by which such - purely egoist ic - ends are to be achieved. 
There are nineteen of these 'general rules found out by reason'. 
A l l of them are capable of being deduced from a single supreme 
r u l e , ' t ha t every man ought to endeavour peace as f a r as he has 
hope of obtaining i t , and where he cannot obtain i t , that he 
may seek and use a l l the helps and advantages of war. The f i r s t 
branch of which rule containeth the f i r s t and fundamental law 
of nature, which i s to seek peace and fo l low i t ; the second the 
sum of the r i g h t of nature, which i s , by a l l means we can to 
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defend ourselves. ' Again, i t i s perhaps as wel l to make clear 
what i t i s that Hobbes r ea l l y means when he says that men ought 
to endeavour peace. He means no more than tha t , because of the 
hazards of the war of a l l against a l l which obtains i n the state 
of nature, i t i s p l a i n l y to the advantage of each indiv idual to 
seek peace where he can. He i s not suggesting, i n any simple 
sense, that I ought to seek peace as a moral good - i n other 
words, he i s not suggesting that I ought to seek anyone's peace but 
own, except insofar as my own peace depends upon other people 
also having a peaceful and ordered existence. The laws of nature, 
at least as we have so f a r considered them, are nothing more than 
the kind of r a t iona l conclusions that we might suppose would occur 
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to a psychological hedonist who desires peace and securi ty. 
Man, therefore, has, i n the state of nature, what Hobbas cal ls 
a supreme ' r i g h t of na ture ' , which amounts to a r i gh t to do 
whatever he thinks w i l l conduce to his own safety. And because 
the state of nature i s a war of a l l against a l l , 
i t fo l lowath tha t , i n such a condition, every man has 
a r i g h t to every t h i n g , even to one another's body, itad, 
therefore, as long as t h i s natural r i gh t of every man to 
every thing endureth, there can be no security to any man, 
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how strong or wise soever he be. 
To digress a l i t t l e , i t i s rather curious that Hobbes should here 
have chosen to speak of a r i g h t of nature. He does not seem 
to have undertaken any analysis of what i t i s to have a r i g h t , 
or of what 'having a r i g h t ' has t r a d i t i o n a l l y been taken to 
mean. F i r s t , i f I am to make any plausible claim to have a 
r i g h t , i t i s surely true that I must, i n making such a claim, 
be able to indicate some other party who i s , or who on some 
ra t iona l grounds capable of specif icat ion should be, under an 
obl igat ion to respect my r i g h t . I t i s , I th ink , clear that there 
can be no r igh ts i n the absence of correlative obligations. The 
mutual existence of r igh ts and obligations i s what i s consti tut ive 
of each, and i t would make no sense to t a l k of either without 
acknowledging the existence of the other. Yet, fo r Hobbes, the 
state of nature i s precisely a state i n which there are no 
obl igat ions: Every man has a r i g h t to every th ing . Second, 
i t i s obvious tha t , when we speak of having a r i g h t , we are 
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speaking of being i n some sense en t i t l ed to do or be or become 
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or receive something. But we are also, surely, implying a r igh t 
to r e f r a j n from doing what we are e n t i t l e d to do. For instance, 
i f I lend a sum of money, I have a r igh t to require that the 
loan be repaid} but I also have a r igh t to forgive debts i f I 
so wish •- I have a r i gh t not to exercise my r i g h t . And i f t h i s 
idea of r e f r a i n i n g , of nonexercis ing, were not i m p l i c i t i n the 
very idea of my having a r i g h t , then the conceptual difference 
between my having a r i g h t and being under an obligation would 
cease to ex i s t . For example, i n Great B r i t a i n , every adult c i t -
izen, with a few specif ied exceptions, has the r igh t to vote; 
but he or she also has the r i g h t to abstain from vot ing . In 
Austral ia or the Republic of Ireland, where voting i s compulsory, 
i t would be odd to speak of a r i g h t to vote - simply because there 
i s no r i g h t t o abstain. In Australia or the I r i s h Republic, one 
i s under an obl igat ion to vote - the obligation being to the 
legis la ture which made the lav/, and which has the r igh t to enforce 
i t or not , as i t pleases. Now, we see tha t , on Hobbes's account 
of the ' r i g h t of nature ' , every man i s apparently en t i t l ed to 
do everything that he thinks w i l l conduce to his own safety. 
Buto Hobbes's determinist ic psychology cer ta in ly entai ls that 
a man who i s threatened cannot r e f r a i n from protecting himself -
or at least tha t , i f he does, he i s simply acting i r r a t i o n a l l y 
or i n such a way that his behaviour cannot be explained. Neither, 
however, can we r ea l l y say tha t , i n Hobbes's view, a man i s under 
an obl igat ion to protect himself; because we cannot i d e n t i f y 
anyone to whom th i s obl igat ion i s owed and who has the r igh t to 
enforce i t or dispense wi th i t at w i l l . Hobbes's discussion of 
human behaviour i s supposed to be a discussion about psychological 
f ac t s , snd the concept of a r i g h t has no l o g i c a l place i n such a 
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discussion. I t i s d i f f i c u l t to see on what ra t iona l grounds h® 
introduces i t at a l l , unless i t ba that ' i t already existed i n 
the work of previous thinkers and he set out to render i t 
innocuous' since, as we sha l l see, ' i t i s a cardinal point in 
h is argument that i f p o l i t i c a l authority and government are to 
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be established, each man must give up his r igh t of nature ' . 
In any case, what Hobb©s r e a l l y seems to have i n mind when he 
speaks of the ' r i gh t of nature' i s simply a complete natural f r e e -
dom - a t o t a l absence of ob l iga t ion . Within his own terms of 
reference, to involve us i n t a l k of r ights before the common-
wealth i s set up i s simply misleading. 
To return to the main thread, an immediate consequence of the 
f i r s t law of nature i s that each msn should be 
w i l l i n g , when others are so too, as fa r f o r t h as fo r 
peace and defence of himself he shal l think i t necessary, 
to lay down th i s r i gh t to a l l things, and be contented 
wi th so much l i b e r t y against other men as he would allow 
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other men against himself. 
This i s the second law of nature. According to Hobbes, i t 
amounts to something l i k e the ;Golden Rule of the Gospels -
the rule of 'do. as you would be done b y ' . This second law 
provides the foundation of the whole p o s s i b i l i t y of contract 
and, consequently, on Hobbes's account, of the foundation of the 
p o l i t i c a l order as w e l l . This i s so because what the rule provides 
f o r i s the termination of the chief feature of the state of 
nature: the laying-aside by each individual of some part -
perhaps a very large par t , although never the whole - of his 
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natural r i gh t to everything. This process can take one of two 
forms. F i r s t , the r i g h t can be merely renounced. Second, i f the 
r i gh t i s to be l a i d aside f o r the benefit of a par t icu lar person 
or persons, i t can be t ransferred to that person or persons. In 
other words, men may make contracts with one another, ( i t i s d i f f -
i c u l t , i nc iden ta l ly , to see how A can t ransfer any r igh t to B i f 
they both already have a r i gh t to everything - i f I have a r i gh t 
to everything anyway, you cannot add anything to i t by t ransfer r ing 
your own r i gh t to me. But t h i s i s a d i f f i c u l t y which Hobbes does 
not notice; and, i n any case, we have already remarked that his 
use of the term ' r i g h t ' i s fundamentally incoherent.") 
This transference of r i g h t , being an act vo lun ta r i ly undertaken, 
i s inevi tably undertaken out of motives of s e l f - i n t e r e s t . This 
i s so since, according to Hobbes, some good to the actor i s vgso 
facto the object of every voluntary act - t h i s i s the only sense 
in v/hich an act can be said to be voluntary. In each such case 
of transference, the contracting parties a l l act with an eye t o 
t h e i r own advantage. I t i s of no consequence whatever to any one 
of them that good consequences might also come out of the contract 
f o r any of the others. Moreover, since there are some things 
which se l f - in t e re s t i t s e l f dictates must not be relinquished, 
there are certain parts of the r i gh t of nature which cannot be 
t ransferred. In other words, there are certain things which 
a man cannot contract to do or r e f r a i n from doing. For example, 
a man cannot undertake to lay down his r igh t to res i s t an attack 
upon his l i f e or an attempt to in jure or imprison him. More 
generally and more accurately, since the whole point of my making 
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a contract, i . e . of t r ans fe r r ing my r i g h t , i s to secure my l i f e 
and the means to enjoy i t , i t would be unreasonable to interpret 
any word or deed of mine as indicat ing an in tent ion on my part 
to l e t the means of my self-preservation go out of my own control . 
This f a c t , as we sha l l see l a t e r , is a l i m i t i n g condition of the 
power even of the sovereign. Thus, contracts or bargains, which 
amount t o transferences of r i g h t , are i n pr inc ip le possible. 
They are possible because men know by the l i g h t of natural reason 
that the transference of r i gh t i s often a means to advantage. 
This i s a pre t ty s tark moral philosophy; but there i t i s . 
I t so happens, however, that when two parties s t r ike a bargain, 
i t may of ten be the case that one of them i s required to perform 
his part before the other has performed h i s . Indeed, t h i s w i l l 
obviously be true i n the vast majori ty of cases. In other words, 
i n a l l contracts apart from straightforward corner-shop trans-
actions or exchanges, a cer ta in minimum of t r u s t i s a prerequisite. 
The party performing f i r s t has to t rus t the other party to do his 
part at some time i n the fu tu r e . In cases of th i s kind, the 
contract i s ca l led , from the point of view of the party who i s 
t rus ted , a covenant. In view of th is covenantal aspect of some 
kinds of contract, i t i s possible to deduce a t h i r d law of nature 
from what has gone before. Aid Hobbes takes t h i s t h i r d law, 
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' tha t men perform t h e i r covenants made', to be the basis of 
a l l ob l iga t ion . The l o g i c a l process by means of which we arrive 
at t h i s t h i r d law of nature i s quite clear. I t may be expressed 
as fo l lows: 
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i . A breaks his agreement with B. 
i i . B's whole motive i n entering into the agreement i n the 
f i r s t place was to secure some advantage f o r himself. 
i i i . Ms f a i l u r e to perform his part has removed the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of any such advantage. 
i v . Therefore, B no longer has any reason fo r f u l f i l l i n g his 
side of the agreement, and the whole purpose of making 
covenants has collapsed. 
To look at the same thing the other way round, i f A performs his 
part of the agreement and B then refuses to perform h i s , i t is 
hardly l i k e l y that A w i l l be prepared to s t r ike a bargain with 
B again. And, moreover, i n the state of nature, where there i s 
n o l ega l redress, A w i l l presumably take the law into his own 
hands and force B to do what he w i l l not do vo lun ta r i l y . In any 
case, the whole point of making agreements i s v i t i a t e d by f a i l u r e 
to keep them. Unless men do, what they say they w i l l do, there i s 
no point i n t h e i r having said that they w i l l do i t i n the f i r s t 
place; and Hobbes takes t h i s to be a 'law of nature' f o r no 
more esoteric reason than that i t is obvious i f we th ink about 
i t . The argument i s not that i t i s immoral, i n any ordinary 
sense, to break an agreement; only that i t i s f u t i l e and s e l f -
contradictory to do so. While men do not do what they say they 
w i l l do, 'covenants are i n vain , and but empty words, and the r igh t 
of a l l men to a l l things remaining, we are s t i l l i n the condition 
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of war' , where we cer ta in ly don't want to be. This argument, 
though i t i s an argument from advantage rather than from p r inc ip l e , , 
cer ta in ly has a strong Kantian f lavour which, as A.E. Taylor points 
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out, i s a characteris t ic of many of Hobbes's e th ica l posi t ions. 
Although i t i s not i n i t s e l f a moral argument, Hobbes holds 
that t h i s t h i r d law of nature forms the basis fo r the d i s t i nc t ion 
of jus t ice from in ju s t i ce and, i n d i r e c t l y , the foundation of the 
whole of social moral i ty . He takes t h i s to be so since 'the 
d e f i n i t i o n of i n ju s t i ce i s no other than the not-performance of 
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covenant. And whatsoever i s not unjust i s j u s t . ' " This remark, 
i n f a c t , seems to embody the rather curious be l ie f that acting 
wrongfully i s l o g i c a l l y p r i o r to acting r i g h t f u l l y - a be l i e f 
which, i nc iden ta l ly , was also held by Schopenhauer. But t h i s 
d e f i n i t i o n at least serves to c l a r i f y Hobbes's contention tha t , 
i n the state of nature, there can be no i n j u s t i c e . Breach of 
covenant i f precisely what in jus t i ce i s ; but the formation of 
covenant requires mutual t r u s t . No two parties w i l l enter in to 
an agreement or 'transference of r i g h t ' unless each can be reason-
ably sure i n advance that the other w i l l not renege on the bargain. 
But what can make such mutual t r u s t possible? Only, according 
to Hobbes, a coercive power re l iable and strong enough to i n f l i c t 
penalties so severe and so certain that i t ceases to be worth 
anyone's while to be untrustworthy. Covenants can, i n other 
words, only occur wi th in c i v i l society under sovereign power; 
and i t i s f o r the same reason that the i n s t i t u t i o n of property 
can exist only under c i v i l government. There can be no ' r i g h t 
of mine and thine d i s t i n c t ' without a power strong enough to 
see to i t that such a r i gh t i s not in f r inged . In the state 
of nature i t s e l f , there are only two kinds of contract which are 
possible. The f i r s t kind consists of those contracts which 
involve present performance - that i s , transactions such that a l l 
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the part ies to the agreement f u l f i l t h e i r undertakings at the 
same time. The second kind i s simply the social compact i t s e l f , 
by which a coercive power strong enough to enforce that and a l l 
future agreements i s instantaneously created. These are the only 
possible operative cases of contract i n the state of nature, 
because they are the only instances i n respect of v/hich the need 
fo r t r u s t does not arise. The object which the contract i s 
intended to achieve i s , i n these cases, immediately real ised. 
No reliance need therefore be placed on any kind of future con-
duct by any of the contracting par t ies . 
There would obviously be certain prac t ica l d i f f i c u l t i e s 
involved i n a ' soc ia l compact' creating coercive i n s t i t u t i ons 
instantaneously; and these prac t ica l d i f f i c u l t i e s would surely 
be insoluble . But th i s i s a d i f f i c u l t y which need not fo r the 
present concern us. A more immediate problem is t h i s : What 
real, grounds axe there fo r holding that i t i s a 'law of nature' 
that men always, should perform the i r covenants made? We have 
already established, i n uncompromising terms, what my motive fo r 
entering in to any kind of 'transference of r i g h t ' w i l l be. At 
the most general l e v e l , i t w i l l be because I wish to achieve some 
advantage fo r myself. I make contracts only because i t servos 
my turn to do so - my turn being the g r a t i f i c a t i o n of some 
desire or the successful avoidance of some object of my aversion. 
But i f t h i s i s so, how can I be i n any sense bound to keep 
them i n cases where breaking them is l i k e l y to confer more 
advantages upon me than keeping them? The fac t of the existence 
of such obligation i s something which Hobbes never ca l l s i n 
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question. Indeed, his conviction that men are under such an 
obl igat ion i s carr ied to lengths that wa might be incl ined to 
regard as rather extreme. For example, he holds that a promise 
given to a robber to pay a sum of money i n return f o r being 
released i s binding upon the promisor unless declared inva l i d 
by a properly constituted court of law. However, Hobbes'a 
arguments i n support of t h i s view are not very impressive. 
F i r s t , he asserts that a man who breaks promises f o r the sake of 
immediate advantage w i l l lose i n the long run because, as we have 
noted, there w i l l eventually come a time when he w i l l no longer 
be t rusted - i t i s precisely t h i s that makes contracts impossible 
i n the state of nature. This, as we have seen, comes somewhere 
close to being a Kantian argument, and, as f a r as i t goes, i t 
i s reasonable enough. But the trouble with men, on Hobbes's 
theory of behaviour, i s precisely the i r constant tendency not 
to act with a view to the long run. In any case, i t i s d i f f i -
cu l t to take seriously the claim that anyone w i l l cease t o t ru s t 
me because I do not keep a promise made under duress to a t h i e f . 
Also, of course, the p o s s i b i l i t y exists that I might f i n d that 
breaking a promise confers upon me benefits so great that the 
r i s k of incurr ing mistrust i s worthwhile. Hobbes's second 
argument - or suggestion, f o r t h i s is rea l ly no more than a 
h in t - i s that there may, i n the long run, be a f i n a l judgment 
of God, at which, of course, the breaker of promises w i l l get 
his comeuppance. This, of course, is again open to the objection 
that the immediacy of passion causes men to neglect long-term in 
favour of short-term considerations. But, i n view of what we 
have already noticed of Hobbes's moral theory, t h i s suggestion 
that the breaker of promises w i l l be subjected to eventual divine 
132. 
punishment raises a f a r more acute d i f f i c u l t y . I t may be that 
i t i s made only as a sop to orthodox readers - Hobbes's contem-
porary c r i t i c s were themselves very ready to ta r a l l .his;;: 
re l ig ious remarks with the brush of disingenuousness, and, in 
the nature of the case, we have no sure way of knowing whether they 
ware r i g h t or wrong. But then again, i t may be taken as evidence, 
as by Professor Taylor i n the paper already c i t ed , of a be l i e f , 
on Hobbes's par t , that honesty i s not jus t the best pol icy from 
the merely prudential standpoint, but that i t i s imbued with a 
higher sanct i ty i n i t s own r i g h t . I f t h i s i s so, then Hobbes 
cer ta in ly does seem to be g u i l t y of an inconsistency, f o r i t i s 
quite clear that there i s no room f o r such a higher sancti ty i n 
his psychologically-baaed and deterministic analysis of behaviour 
and moral i ty . Perhaps a l l we can say i s that a philosopher who 
genuinely follows his argument through to conclusions incompatible 
with his own private convictions might nevertheless sometimes 
allow these convictions to make an appearance in his wr i t ings . 
Whan and i f he does so, there w i l l be a body of moral doctrine 
s ta t ing the convictions alongside, and inconsistent wi th , a body 
of philosophical doctrine s ta t ing the conclusions of the argument. 
There ce r t a in ly does seem to be a systematic inconsistency or 
ambiguity of th i s kind wi thin Hobbes's wri t ings ; although th i s 
and the issues which i t raises (the so-called 'Taylor-Warrender' 
t h e s i s ^ ) continue to be f r u i t f u l sources of scholarly debate. 
After he has dealt wi th the f i r s t three laws of nature, Hobbes 
goes on to enunciate sixteen more. A l l of them are precepts or 
maxims which contribute to the formulation of what Hobbes takes 
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to be the basic necessary conditions of peaceful coexistence. 
I t i s not necessary to enumerate them hare - i t i s the f i r s t 
three which are fundamental. I t i s enough to make three general 
observations as to t h e i r character. F i r s t , they are a l l prohib-
i t i o n s : they a l l proscribe cer tain forms of behaviour which, 
i f fol lowed, might be expected to lead to breaches of the 
peace. Second, the deductive process by which Hobbes i den t i f i e s 
them i n each case takes as i t s s tar t ing point the supposition 
that men w i l l invar iably reason from sel f - in teres ted motives. 
I f , f o r example, I lus t f o r revenge contrary to the seventh law 
of nature, or i f I am arrogant, contrary to the tenth, or 
unwi l l i ng to re fe r disputes to disinterested arbi t ra t ion. , , 
contrary to the sixteenth, then, i n each case, I am simply 
prolonging the state of war. I am, i n other words, throwing 
away the increased security and enjoyment of l i f e which reason 
t e l l s me that peace would confer upon me. P la in ly , then, to 
ignore the laws of nature i s to act i n an i r r a t i o n a l wayj because, 
to Hobbes, any act of mine which i s obviously against my own best 
interests can only be regarded as an i r r a t i o n a l act. I t may 
be true tha t , i n the heat of the moment, I cannot r e f r a i n from 
acting i r r a t i o n a l l y . But, i n moments of calm r e f l e c t i o n , I can 
see the sense of se t t ing up an authority able to prevent me from 
doing so i n the f u t u r e . Thi rd , Hobbes says of the whole corpus 
of laws that they can be summed up in the simple precept which 
he has already used to express the second law - t h i s simple way 
of put t ing i t being f o r the benef i t of those feeble i n t e l l ec t s 
who cannot perform the necessary deductions fo r themselves: 
To leave a l l men inexcusable, they jj-.o. the laws of naturej 
have been contracted in to one easy sum, i n t e l l i g i b l e even 
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to tha meanest capacity; and that i s , 'Do not that 
to another which thou wouldest not have done to t h y s e l f ; 
which showeth him that he hath no more to do i n learning 
the laws of nature but , whan weighing the actions of other 
men wi th his own, they seem toohaavy, to put them in to 
the other part of the balance, and his own in to t he i r 
place, that his own passion and sel f - love may add nothing 
to the weight; and then there is none of these laws of 
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nature that w i l l not appear unto him very reasonable. 
Calcul i of t h i s kind are, of course, notoriously easier to 
recommend than they are to apply; but i t i s not d i f f i c u l t to 
see what Hobbes i s d r iv ing a t . The laws of nature amount, very 
simply, to a formulation of the basic negative conditions upon 
which the maintainance of a peaceful and ordered existence 
depends. No man should expect more of others than he i s pre-
pared to allow them to expect of him. No man ought to in ter fere 
with the doings of others except to the extent that he i s pre-
pared to allow them to in te r fe re with h i s . I t i s as simple as 
tha t . We do not f i n d i n Hobbes any expression of a theme that 
recurs throughout the h i s to ry of social philosophy - i n Plato, 
A r i s t o t l e , the English Hegelians, and even in such an un l ike ly 
candidate as John Stuart M i l l - namely, the theme of s e l f - r e a l -
i s a t i o n , or the idea tha t , by submitting to rules and government, 
men may i n some sense make t h e i r l ives s p i r i t u a l l y r icher and 
more noble. Hobbes's laws of-nature lead to the set t ing up of 
the State as a r a t iona l imperative,held to be deductively a v a i l -
able to men as creatures of reason. Rut his view is that p o l i t -
i c a l l i f e merely allows men to do in safety what they would 
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have wanted to do i n any case; and nowhere does Hobbes consider 
as a p o s s i b i l i t y that the State might enable i t s members to 
realise to the f u l l t h e i r s p i r i t u a l and i n t e l l e c t u a l capacities 
as human beings. The State, according to Hobbes, comes in to 
being so that men may l i v e ; but he does not go on, with 
Aris tot le 1 , to say that i t enables them to l i v e w e l l . He has 
no notion of social and p o l i t i c a l organisation and sovereign power 
as instruments of progressive c i v i l i z a t i o n . Such ins t i tu t ions 
and power are merely conventional devices which enable men to 
pursue i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c a l l y conceived goals wi thin a tolerable 
status quo; and we must no\^  pass to a consideration of how such 
i n s t i t u t i o n s are created, and to some account of Hobbes's 
understanding of the nature and functions of sovereignty. 
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CHAPTER SIX - THE POLITICAL ORDER. 
The so-called Maws of nature' which we have been considering 
amount, i n the terminology of Kant, t o assartorie h y p o t h e t i c a l 
imperatives. They are the r u l e s which must be followed i f 
c e r t a i n ends, namely peace, s e c u r i t y and the preservation of 
l i f e , are t o be secured; and Hobbes take i t as a psychological 
t r u i s m t h a t these are ends which men do, i n f a c t , wish t o secure. 
I f these laws of nature were always observed i n actual conduct, 
then the peaceful coexistence of men w i t h men would be r e a l i s e d , 
and a l l the attendant b e n e f i t s of such peaceful coexistence would 
be w i t h i n reach. Taken as they stand, they represent a code 
of behaviour necessary and s u f f i c i e n t t o enable men t o achieve 
t h e i r c h i e f desires and t o l i m i t the impulses which make the 
achievement of s e c u r i t y impossible. Indeed, i f the laws of 
nature were obeyed more o f t e n than not, a t o l e r a b l e degree of 
peace would presumably obtain i n the state of nature i t s e l f . I t 
would then be necessary t o set up p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , not 
t o escape the l i k l i h o o d of v i o l e n t death and the c e r t a i n t y of 
constant f e a r , but merely t o overcome what Locke was t o c a l l the 
'inconveniences' of the state of nature. Formal p o l i t i c a l 
i n s t i t u t i o n s would not be the absolutely necessary guardians 
of i n d i v i d u a l safety which Hobbes takes them t o be. They would 
e x i s t merely t o provide such conveniences as lawcourts, judgments, 
f i x e d and known laws, and so on, and thus t o enhance the q u a l i t y 
of a l i f e which would already be p e r f e c t l y t o l e r a b l e . 
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The d i f f i c u l t y , of course, i s t h a t , according t o Hobbes, we 
can have no c e r t a i n t y , i n the state of nature, t h a t the rules 
which men's reason t e l l s them t h a t they ought i n t h e i r own 
i n t e r e s t s t o f o l l o w w i l l be followed. What we saw i n the l a s t 
chapter t o be t r u e of the t h i r d law of nature i s true of them 
a l l . No-one w i l l do unto others as he would be done by, because, 
the necessary minimum of t r u s t which would enable an i n d i v i d u a l 
t o b e l i e v e t h a t others would do the same i s absent. Thus, the 
lav/s of nature w i l l more l i k e l y than not be broken - i n s p i t e of 
the f a c t t h a t a l l men, a.s r a t i o n a l creatures, are equipped t o 
know them or, at l e a s t , t o apprehend t h e i r most general form-
u l a t i o n as the 'Golden Rule 1. As Hobbes puts i t , 
The laws of nature oblige i n foro i n t e r n o ; t h a t i s t o 
say, they bi n d t o a desire t h a t they should take place; 
but i n f o r o externo, t h a t i s , to the p u t t i n g them i n 
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act, not always." 
Hobbes would, I t h i n k , more accurately have conveyed h i s meaning 
i f , i nstead of 'not always', he had s a i d , 'almost never'. We 
can see why t h i s i s so by considering the case of a man who kept 
the laws of nature while those w i t h whom he came i n t o contact 
repeatedly broke them. Obviously, such a man would s u f f e r loss 
by a c t i n g as he d i d ; and Hobbes's psychology i n s i s t s t h a t i t i s 
impossible f o r a man t o go on doing what he knows w i l l be cont-
r a r y t o h i s own i n t e r e s t s . Thus, f o r as long as men remain i n 
the s t a t e of nature, w i t h no common superior over them, the laws 
of nature w i l l not h o l d i n f o r o externo. Indeed, they w i l l not, 
s t r i c t l y speaking, be laws at a l l ; f o r a law, according t o 
Hobbes, i s a command given by a superior and capable of being 
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enforced by an i d e n t i f i a b l e person or persons. In Hobbes's 
own words, 
These d i c t a t e s of reason men used t o c a l l by the name 
of laws, but improperly: f o r they are but conclusions, 
or theorems concerning what conduceth t o the conservation 
and defence of themselves; whereas law, p r o p e r l y , i s 
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the word of him t h a t by r i g h t hath command over others. 
We have n o t i c e d t h i s p o i n t before; but i t i s as w e l l t o make i t 
again here, because i t i s cru c i a l , t o the passage out of the 
s t a t e of nature and i n t o ordered p o l i t i c a l l i f e . This i s so 
since p r e c i s e l y what i s necessary i f i actual obedience t o the 
laws of nature i s t o be secured i s t h a t these laws or maxims be 
enacted i n t o p o s i t i v e laws p r o p e r l y so-called. That i s t o say, 
they must be enacted or c o d i f i e d by one who 'by r i g h t hath 
command over others' - they must be converted from mere theorems 
i n t o commands.. What Hobbes means by t h i s i s simply t h a t the 
lawgiver must be a properly c o n s t i t u t e d a u t h o r i t y w i t h a claim 
t o be obeyed which i s also capable of being enforced. The author-
i t y , of the lawgiver must be de. fact? as w e l l as dj3_Jlure_. A 
necessary c o n d i t i o n of t h i s i s t h a t he have a'degree of coercive 
power at h i s disposal adequate t o ensure obedience by i n f l i c t i n g 
such p e n a l t i e s f o r disobedience as w i l l make i t worth every 
i n d i v i d u a l ' s while always t o obey. I n short, what i s needed t o 
ensure t h a t the laws of nature a c t u a l l y hold i n foro externo, 
t h a t i s , i n act as w e l l as i n d e s i r e , i s a t r a n s i t i o n from the 
s t a t e of nature t o a p o l i t i c a l order w i t h a c e r t a i n d i s t i n c t 
s p e c i f i c a t i o n . U n t i l such a t r a n s i t i o n occurs, men i n the state 
of nature w i l l be constantly confronted by the brute r e a l i t y of 
l u s t - d r i v e n s e l f - d e s t r u c t i o n . I n Hoboes's system of ideas, 
society and p o l i t y are coextensive « p o l i t i c s and what we should 
now c a l l sociology have i d e n t i c a l subject-matters; because the 
c r e a t i o n of a p o l i t i c a l order i s i d e n t i c a l t o , or simultaneous, 
w i t h , the c r e a t i o n of s o c i e t y i t s e l f . By the same token, r e b e l l -
ion or c i v i l disobedience amount t o the d i s s o l u t i o n of society 
as a v e h i c l e of r a t i o n a l l y - o r d e r e d being. 
I have already h i n t e d at c e r t a i n d i f f i c u l t i e s and inconsisten-
cies l a t e n t i n Hobbes's mora], theory and explored by the so-
c a l l e d 'Taylor-Warrender t h e s i s ' . I t i s at t h i s p o i n t i n the 
proceedings t h a t c e r t a i n aspects of these d i f f i c u l t i e s come 
t o be very much i n evidence.^ Although Hobbes i n s i s t s t h a t the 
'laws of nature' do not, s t r i c t l y speaking, become laws u n t i l 
they are enunciated by someone w i t h power t o command and compel 
obedience, he maddeningly refuses to hold t h i s p o s i t i o n c o n s i s t e n t l y . 
I n other words, he w i l l not come down squarely on the side of i d -
e n t i f y i n g m o r a l i t y p urely and simply with the w i l l of the r u l e r . 
The laws of nature, he asserts on several occasions already noted, 
are maxims of prudence; but i t turns out t h a t they are not only_ 
maxims of prudence. As he puts i t , 
Those which we c a l l the laws of nature...are not i n 
p r o p r i e t y of speech laws, as they proceed from nature. 
Yet as they are d e l i v e r e d by God i n holy s c r i p t u r e s . . . 
they are most pr o p e r l y c a l l e d by the name of laws. 
And immediately a f t e r the passage from Leviathan c i t e d above, 
where Hobbes t e l l s us t h a t 'law, properly, i s the word of him 
t h a t by r i g h t hath command over others', he goes on t o say t h a t 
U 3 . 
i f we consider the same theorems, as del i v e r e d i n the 
word of God, t h a t by r i g h t commandeth a l l t h i n g s , then 
they are pro p e r l y c a l l e d laws. 
The 'laws of nature', then, are also commands of God, and, as 
such, may properly be c a l l e d 'laws' a f t e r a l l . Since they are 
such, i t i s the case both t h a t , 
i . they ought t o be obeyed ( o r , at l e a s t , we ought t o desire 
t h a t they be obeyed) i n a c a t e g o r i c a l sense of the word 
' ought'; and t h a t , 
i i . before p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s are set up, no coercion i s 
applied t o men t o make them a c t u a l l y obey the laws of 
nature; but t h i s , of i t s e l f , does not a l t e r t h e i r status 
as laws. 
God commands, but he does not compel - t h a t i s a fu n c t i o n l e f t t o 
e a r t h l y powers. And i n t h i s respect, of course, Hobbes i s 
p e r f e c t l y i n tune w i t h the c h i e f t r a d i t i o n s of medieval p o l i t i c a l 
s peculation. Rut the d i f f i c u l t y l i e s i n t h i s : Hobbes, as we 
have seen, sometimes makes i t q u i t e clear t h a t the laws of 
nature are only 'laws' i n the f i g u r a t i v e sense. They are not laws 
i n the way t h a t the laws of motion are laxjs, since they do not 
formulate any established and observable r e g u l a r i t y - they do not 
describe the world. Neither are they, s t r i c t l y speaking, 
laws i n the p r e s c r i p t i v e sense, because, according t o Hobbes, 
what makes a law a law i n t h i s sense i s command and compulsion. 
Rut, having s a i d a l l t h i s , i t now turns out t h a t the laws of 
nature are laws a f t e r a l l , i n the second sense. They are not, 
i n the state of nature, the commands of any e a r t h l y a u t h o r i t y ; 
because, i n the state of nature, there is.no e a r t h l y a u t h o r i t y . 
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But they are, the commands of God, and therefore have the status 
of law as Hobbes understands i t , even though, as i t happens, 
God himself does not d i r e c t l y intervene t o compel obedience. 
Now, when Hobbes i s i n t h i s mood, i t seems t h a t the laws of nat-
ure are, a f t e r a l l , more than more maxims of prudence. They are 
God's laws, and t h e i r character as such i s quite independent of 
the f a c t t h a t i t i s also prudent t o observe them ( t h i s , again, i s 
quite i n tuna w i t h medieval natural, law t h e o r y ) . When Hobbes 
says t h a t they oblige ' i n f o r o interne- , he seems t o have more 
i n mind than t h a t i t i s obviously i n our i n t e r e s t s t o wish t o see 
them obeyed. He seems t o be asserting t h a t t h i s o b l i g a t i o n i s 
also a mojral o b l i g a t i o n i n the usual sense. Yet t h i s i s p l a i n l y 
i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h much of what he says elsewhere. We have already 
seen Hobbes unambiguously asserting t h a t there i s no m o r a l i t y i n 
the s t a t e of nature. Now, we f i n d him asserting t h a t the need 
f o r a r u l e r a r i s e s , not t o create m o r a l i t y , but t o f u r n i s h the 
governed people w i t h a constantly-applicable incentive t o act 
morally. As I have already i n d i c a t e d , rny own view, f o r what i t 
i s worth, i s t h a t more has been made of t h i s d i f f i c u l t y than the 
nature of the d i f f i c u l t y demands; but i t c e r t a i n l y seems t h a t 
Hobbes's u s u a l l y impeccable l o g i c has f a l t e r e d i n t h i s attempt 
t o take up and re-use the medieval doctrine of n a t u r a l law. 
In any case, however they are read, Hobbes's p o l i t i c a l 
recommendations amount t o a strong argument f o r absolute govern-
ment. This f a c t has formed the basis of some of the most s t r i d e n t 
of the c r i t i c i s m s t o which he has been subjected. Yet i t i s both 
i n t e r e s t i n g and important t o note t h a t h i s argument stands upon 
e n t i r e l y r a t i o n a l i s t i c and democratic grounds. Nowhere does he 
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r e l y upon the type of argument found i n S i r Robert Filmer's 
P a t r i a r c h a » t h a t the king i s e n t i t l e d t o obedience by h e r e d i t a r y 
d i v i n e r i g h t , i n v i r t u e of h i s descent from Adam. This k i n d of 
argument had become very enfeebled by the seventeenth-century, 
anyway - as witness the easy demolition of Filmer at the hands 
of John Locke. But Hobbes w i l l have nothing t o do w i t h the 
Jure Divino argument which had become the c h i e f stalking-horse of 
the Stuart kings; and n e i t h e r , i n f a c t , does he believe t h a t 
mere force amounts t o r i g h t , a l l appearances t o the contrary 
notwithstanding. Hobbes's c h i e f objective i s t o show t h a t the 
absolute a u t h o r i t y which he v/ishes t o accord t o the sovereign 
i s grounded upon something more palpable and pla u s i b l e than 
Jure Divino - upon n a t u r a l r a t h e r than d i v i n e r i g h t . And he does 
so by t r a c i n g the o r i g i n of such a u t h o r i t y back t o a postulated 
' t r a n s f e r of r i g h t ' made by the subject i n h i s own i n t e r e s t s -
the s o c i a l compact. That t h i s transference i s supposed t o have 
been made by the subject i n h i s own i n t e r e s t s (how else could i t 
have been made?) i s , of course, profoundly s i g n i f i c a n t . 'What 
Hobbes i s t r y i n g t o do, i n e f f e c t , i s t o l e g i t i m a t e absolute 
p o l i t i c a l power by arguing along what may be c a l l e d ' u t i l i t a r i a n ' 
l i n e s . The f u n c t i o n of Hohbes's sovereign i s t o create harmony 
i n place of chaos and dissonance. The sovereign has the strong-
est i n t e r e s t i n r e q u i r i n g the great m a j o r i t y of h i s subjects t o 
obey the law - since i t i s p r e c i s e l y upon such obedience t h a t h i s 
remaining sovereign depends. And he also has the power t o compel 
them, because, although no single i n d i v i d u a l desires t o be 
r e s t r a i n e d , i t i s i n the i n t e r e s t s of every other t h a t he should 
be. Thus i t i s t h a t , when the sovereign compels any man t o obey, 
. a l l other men, i f they know t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s , are a l l i e d w i t h him. 
U6. 
The State i s a c o l l e c t i v i t y of individuals within which i t i s the 
se l f i s h interest of one man (or an assembly of men) to see to i t 
that every other man behaves i n ways which s u i t his neighbours; 
and where the fear that each man has of the mobilisation, by the 
sovereign, of the others against him, i s enough to keep order. 
Hobbes's essential purpose, inconsistencies notwithstanding, i s 
not t o explain why or t o what extent subjects are obliged to 
obey t h e i r rulers on moral grounds. His purpose i s quite simply 
to prove that i t i s , on a l l but a few occasions (which we shall 
come to presently), i n t h e i r best interests to do so. This i s 
why, although he speaks of a sovereign established by covenant, 
he i s also prepared to concede that, i f such a sovereign i s 
conquered i n war, then his conqueror succeeds to his r i g h t to 
rule. I f i t ceases to be i n the best interests of the subject 
people t o obey t h e i r sovereign, i t i s not the case that they 
may then disobey him; the fact of the matter i s quite simply 
that he i s no longer the sovereign. Ultimately, i t i s Hobbes's 
view th a t , whatever the o r i g i n of the sovereign's power, his 
subjects' motives for obeying him remain the same - self- i n t e r e s t . 
And t h i s , more or less, i s exactly the same view which was l a t e r 
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enunciated by David Hume. As John Plamenatz has expressed i t , 
Hobbes, l i k e the u t i l i t a r i a n s after him, thought i t the 
great function of government to reconcile s e l f i s h interests, 
to make i t worth every man's while t o obey laws giving 
security to a l l men. I t i s t h i s , more than any other 
part of his theory, that i s the essence of i t , i n the sense 
that i t gives i t a unity which i t would not otherwise 
possess. The state, according to him, i s neither the 
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promoter of the good l i f e nor the protector of rig h t s ; 
i t i s the conciliator of interests. Unlike the u t i l i t a r -
ians, Hobbes ca l l s interests 'natural r i g h t s ' , and so 
makes i t appear t h a t , l i k e the contract theorists before 
him, he regards the state as the protector of rights. 
Yet i t i s , I think, easy to see that he means no such 
thing, though his special use of the words 'natural rights' 
misleads not only his readers but sometimes also himself. 
For he not only c a l l s interests r i g h t s , but applies argu-
ments to them that could only hold i f they were r i g h t s , 
i n some sense of the word precluded by his assumptions. 
This i s the price that anyone is l i a b l e t o pay who uses 
words i n unusual meanings.^ 
And t h i s , of course, i s a point which we have already noted. In 
any case, i t i s not surprising that t h i s ' u t i l i t a r i a n ' approach 
made Hobbes extremely unpopular with ( i n t e r alia) supporters of 
the r o y a l i s t cause - a cause by now based exclusively* as far as 
I know, upon the ideology of divine r i g h t . As soon as the 
concession i s made that absolute sovereignty, though j u s t i f i a b l e , 
i s only j u s t i f i e d i f i t can be shown to be i n the general interests 
of the governed, then a fresh question i s opened. This question 
i s , whether any par t i c u l a r case of absolutism i s i n fact i n the 
general interests of the governed. I f the answer to t h i s question 
turns out to be negative, then the general argument for absolut-
ism can with equal f a c i l i t y be used to reject a particular case 
of absolute government. Thus, i n practice, the argument comes 
very close to being an argument i n j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the kind of 
constitutional government to which i t seems ostensibly to be most 
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strenuously opposed. In short, an argument for absolute govern-
ment which asserts that such government requires a ' u t i l i t a r i a n ' 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n has an obverse side which i s , i n effect, an 
argument fo r revolution. This consideration no doubt never 
occurred to Hobbes, with his dread of p o l i t i c a l upheaval; but 
the fact nevertheless remains that he has far more i n common 
with the most ardent opponents of absolutism than he does with 
the u l t r a - a b s o l u t i s t t r a d i t i o n associated with Fllmer. 
At the beginning of t h i s thesis, I emphasised the close 
relationship which exists between Hobbes's p o l i t i c a l theory and 
the p o l i t i c a l events which, personally or vicariously, he 
experienced during his l i f e t i m e . I suggested that, for reasons 
having to do with Hobbes's own circumstances and disposition, 
t h i s relationship was p a r t i c u l a r l y close and significant; and 
i t i s now as well to point out again that Hobbes's deduction of 
the rights of the sovereign - the 'composition' of the body 
p o l i t i c - i s closely connected with contemporary p o l i t i c a l 
controversy. Above a l l , i t i s his wish to refute the claim made 
by Parliament, against the king, to be i n some special sense 
the 'representative' of the governed people and of the rights 
of those people. The Parliamentary view, enunciated by Sir 
Edward Coke against James I , was that there i s a fundamental 
law which i s equally binding upon both king and people. Parliam-
ent i s the representative of the govenad people at large, operating 
as a species of court, and specifying i n i t s statutes what the 
law binding both king and people i s . I t i s against t h i s view 
that Hobbes adopts the 'command theory' of law; and his task, 
as he conceives i t , i s chiefly to argue that, i n every p o l i t i c a l 
community, the supreme executive authority i s already and of i t s e l f 
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the proper representative of the whole community. Thus, the 
community cannot again be represented by any other i n s t i t u t i o n 
or person - i n other words, the community cannot be represented 
twice over. Any claim made by another person or i n s t i t u t i o n , 
on the basis of an alleged representative character, to have 
an authority comparable to or higher than that vested i n the 
executive i s therefore simply redundant. And, i n t h i s respect, 
Hobbes i s on a very good wicket: He has the authority of the 
Roman Law of corporations and t h e i r legal representation to 
back his argument; and he avails himself of t h i s authority to 
the f u l l . His argument may be summarised somewhat as follows. 
A 'person 1, i n the legal sense of the term, i s 
he whose words or actions are considered, either as his 
own, or as representing the words or actions of another 
man, or of any other thing, t o whom they are attributed, 
whether t r u l y or by f i c t i o n . 
When they are considered as his own, then i s he called 
a 'natural person'; and when they are considered as 
representing the words and actions of another, then he 
9 
i s a'feigned' or ' a r t i f i c i a l person'. 
The standard example of an ' a r t i f i c i a l person' would be the 
managing director of a li m i t e d company, or a s o l i c i t o r arguing 
a case for a c l i e n t before a magistrates' court. The managing 
director i s an ' a r t i f i c i a l person' representing his shareholders, 
and the s o l i c i t o r , likewise, i s an ' a r t i f i c i a l person' repres-
enting his c l i e n t . In both cases, i t i s the shareholders and 
the c l i e n t who are the 'natural' or real people. What the 
s o l i c i t o r says, under certain circumstances specified by the 
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law of evidence and procedure, i s regarded i n law as i f i t 
were spoken by the c l i e n t himself. And when a representative 
thus speaks or acts on behalf of another, the person on whose 
behalf he speaks or acts i s said to authorise what he says or 
does. The representative thus acts with authority, which i s to 
say that an act performed by him as representative i s 'done by 
10 
commission or licence from him whose r i g h t i t i s . ' Hence, 
i t followeth that, when the actor maketh a covenant 
by authority, he bindeth thereby the author, no less 
than i f he had made i t himself; and no less subjecteth 
11 
him to a l l the consequences of the same. 
To repudiate a covenant made on one's behalf and with one's 
authority by a properly-authorised representative, therefore, 
i s exactly the same thing as repudiating a covenant made by 
oneself. And t h i s , of course, amounts to a breach of the t h i r d 
law of nature, that 'men perform t h e i r covenants made'. I t 
amounts, i n other words, to an act of i n j u s t i c e ; f o r 
i n t h i s law of nature consisteth the fountain and 
o r i g i n a l of j u s t i c e . For where no covenant hath 
preceded, there hath no r i g h t been transferred, and 
every man has. r i g h t to every thing; and consequently 
12 
no action can be unjust. 
Having gone so f a r , i t i s but a short step to Hobbes's central 
task. This i s to contend that a l l governments ought to be reg-
arded as having t h e i r beginnings i n an authorisation conferred 
by the whole community upon the government to 'represent' i t i n 
the sense j u s t outlined. In other words, Hobbes wishes to assert 
that the t r a n s i t i o n from anarchy to c i v i l order must be embodied 
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i n a social compact, whereby a l l members of a c o l l e c t i v i t y agree 
with one another to submit themselves to the ordering of a part-
i c u l a r government; and the terms of t h i s social compact are 
furnished by the rationally-apprehended laws of nature. The 
way i n which Hobbes approaches his central task may be expressed 
as follows. 
A collection of individual men and women, he affirms, can only 
become a social c o l l e c t i v i t y t o the extent that i t exhibits, i n 
some sense, a unity of w i l l and purpose. After a l l , the salient 
characteristic of the state of nature, most generally stated, i s 
exactly t h a t , within i t , there i s no such unity - t h i s i s why 
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the state of nature i s non-social and non-moral. The a f f i r -
mation that social l i f e consists i n such a unity of w i l l and 
purpose i s , of course, a commonplace of p o l i t i c a l and social 
theory; but the most notorious d i f f i c u l t y which i t raises, of 
course, concerns the precise sense in which we are to understand 
t h i s unity. What, i n other words, i s the cash-value of t h i s 
phrase 'unity of w i l l and purpose'? This has been one of the 
most stubbornly insoluble problems confronting p o l i t i c a l theor-
i s t s since i t was f i r s t formulated in a t r u l y problemmatical 
form by Rousseau; and i t s i n t r a c t a b i l i t y i s well i l l u s t r a t e d by 
the fact that l i n g u i s t i c analysis, the abracadabra of modern 
p o l i t i c a l thought, has not succeeded i n dissolving i t . In 
medieval p o l i t i c a l theory, of course, the problem did not exist 
i n anything l i k e the same form, since the unity of society was 
d i s t i l l e d into the concept of Christendom and i t s implications 
1A 
for human enterprise and motivation. ^ But such ready and 
comprehensive answers had already ceased to be available by the 
152. 
seventeenth-century; and the problem was presently to burgeon 
into d i f f i c u l t obscurity on an epic scale at the hands of Hegel 
15 
and his followers - notably Bernard Bosanquet. Now, i n 
comparison with what was subsequently to be made of i t , Hobbes's 
exposition of the doctrine of social unity or i d e n t i t y i s the very 
soul of l u c i d i t y ; and i t i s also quite i n keeping with what we 
have seen of his atomic individualism. He does not postulate 
any such thing as a 'general w i l l ' or w i l l of society, held to 
be a thing apart from the w i l l of each individual member of that 
society. He does not suggest, i n other words, that there i s some 
metaphysical e n t i t y greater than the sum t o t a l of individual 
w i l l s or i n any sense separate from or transcendent of such 
individual w i l l s . Indeed, as we have already seen, the term 
' w i l l ' i n t h i s sense i s i n any case quite foreign to Hobbes's 
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usage. In his view, there i s only one way i n which we can 
speak meaningfully of anything but individual Mings as possessing 
the kind of i d e n t i t y which we must necessarily predicate of a 
society; and that i s by having recourse to a legal f i c t i o n . 
Thus, the unity o'f a society i s possible only by representation. 
In other words, the i d e n t i t y of a society as such becomes real 
only when a l l the members of the orig i n a l 'natural' aggregate 
agree that they w i l l appoint a specific man or body of men as 
the representative of them a l l . The agreement consists, i n short, 
of an undertaking henceforth to recognise the acts and words of 
the appointed representative as authorised by every individual 
party to the agreement. By t h i s legal f i c t i o n , and only by i t , 
can a c o l l e c t i v i t y of men become one 'person' - that i s to say, 
a corporate e n t i t y c o l l e c t i v e l y having legal rights and owing 
correlative obligations. As Hobbes puts i t , 
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A multitude of men are made one person when they are 
by one man or by one person represented, so that i t be 
done with the consent of every one of that multitude i n 
part i c u l a r . For i t i s the unity of the representor, not 
the unity of the represented, that maketh the person one. 
And i t i s the representor that beareth the person, and 
but one person; and unity cannot otherwise be understood 
i n multitude. 
And because the multitude i s naturally not one but many, 
they cannot be understood f o r one, but many, authors of 
everything t h e i r representative saith or doth i n t h e i r 
name, every man giving t h e i r common representor authority 
from himself i n part i c u l a r , and owning a l l the actions the. 
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representor doth. 
In thus emphasising the r e a l i t y of the individual and concrete, 
Hobbes i s also adopting a familiar ideological stance - namely, 
that tho State exists f o r the sake of the individual, and not 
vice versa; and t h i s i s true even though Hobbes's insistent-belief 
i n absolute government may tend to make i t less than obvious. 
Each man has needs which he cannot satisfy alone. He needs to be 
protected from otteide attack. He needs the benefits which can 
only be conferred upon him by social production. Above a l l , he 
needs to be protected from the destructive and anti-social ten-
dencies inherent both i n others and i n himself. Hobbes would 
not agree with Rousseau's position, that the fundamental nature 
of man can be transformed by social l i v i n g ; but i t can be 
restrained. And the only way fo r individuals t o achieve the 
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security which t h e i r passions and th e i r reason induce them t o 
want, i s to come together t o form a p o l i t i c a l order. Thus, 
the p o l i t i c a l order exists t o service the needs of i t s i n d i v i d -
ual members; but i t w i l l always be such that the State functions 
as a repressive force. And part of what i t means to authorise 
a representative i s to e n t i t l e him to employ the united coercive 
power of the whole community, as though i t were his own, i n the 
suppression of a l l disobedience t o his commands. Thus, the social 
compact creates a p o l i t i c a l power s u f f i c i e n t l y strong t o make 
i t i n each man's interests t o obey - because each man, i n 
contemplating disobedience, has to contend with the p o s s i b i l i t y 
that the collective power of a l l his fellows w i l l be turned against 
him. And t h i s consideration alone, i n Hobbes's view, w i l l furnish 
him with a s u f f i c i e n t incentive t o obey. I f he did not obey, he 
would clearly be acting against his own interests - which, as we 
have seen, no rat i o n a l man w i l l do; for 'a being who always acts 
i n his own interests as he conceives them' i s exactly what a 
rat i o n a l man i s . 
The l i m i t s and nature of sovereign power are matters to which 
I s h a l l return i n due course. For the present, i t i s enough to 
remark that the 'resolutive-compositive' method, insofar as i t 
ig. applicable to commonwealths, i s almost complete. Resolve a 
commonwealth int o i t s smallest parts, and you are l e f t with 
atomic individuals, driven by necessary causes to satisfy t h e i r 
own desires and to escape from t h e i r aversions. In Hobbes's 
own rather peculiar way of putting i t , they are endowed with a 
'right to everything', which is, r e a lly nothing more than a complete 
absence of obligation. While a l l men retain t h i s r i g h t i n t a c t , 
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they are incapable of l i v i n g under anything but the most 
insecure and fortuitous peace. War i s always round the corner, 
and anxiety and tension are the l o t of everyone. Men cannot help 
being the psychological egoists that they are, because t h e i r 
appetites, aversions and a c t i v i t i e s , and a l l the mental processes 
which underlie them, are ultimately i d e n t i f i e d as eplphenomenal 
movements responding t o movements i n the outside world. But men 
do have reason i n addition to t h e i r passions; and while t h e i r 
passions in c l i n e them to want security, t h e i r reason i s able to 
calculate the means of achieving i t . This fact enables us, as 
philosophical investigators, to deduce what men i n the state of 
nature would themselves deduce as the necessary conditions of 
peace. Following the process of deduction through, we are led, 
f i r s t , t o the nineteen 'laws of nature'; and these provide rules 
which, i f obeyed, would lead to peace. I f the so-called 'laws of 
nature' held i n foro externo. p o l i t i c a l subjection would not be 
necessary; and so Hobbes's enterprise of specifying the most 
effective kind of p o l i t i c a l subjection would i t s e l f not;be needed. 
But, according t o Hobbes, i t i s needed because, i n the state of 
nature, the laws of nature would remain no more than unrealised 
ideals - they would hold i n foro interno only. Aid t h i s would 
be the case f o r two reasons. F i r s t , the degree of t r u s t nec-
essary for them to become operative would be absent. Second, 
men's egocentric desires are usually strong enough, i n the short 
term, to override the farsightedness necessary to act i n accordance 
with the long-term dictates of calm reason - and t h i s i s a doc-
t r i n e very similar to that of Hume, whose s i m i l a r i t i e s with Hobbes 
we have already noticed elsewhere. These two reasons are related, 
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since the f i r s t i s obviously a function of men's knowledge of 
human behaviour as stated i n the second. And i t i s as a result 
of these considerations that men conclude that peace can only be 
secured by setting up a p o l i t i c a l authority strong enough to 
coerce the r e c a l c i t r a n t . This i s the log i c a l step immediately 
precedent t o the social compact, by which such an authority i s 
brought into being. 
ALL these matters are so central to Hobbes's philosophy of man 
and the State that i t i s perhaps as well to l e t him speak for 
himself at some length: 
The only way t o erect such a common power as may be 
able t o defend them from the invasion of foreigners 
and the i n j u r i e s of one another, and thereby to secure 
them i n such sort as that by t h e i r own industry and by 
the f r u i t s of the earth they may nourish themselves 
and l i v e contentedly; i s t o confer a l l t h e i r power and 
strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that 
may reduce a l l ? t h e i r w i l l s , by p l u r a l i t y of voices, unto 
one w i l l : which i s as much as to say, to appoint one man, 
or assembly of men, to bear t h e i r person; and every one 
to own, and acknowledge himself to be the author, of what-
soever he that so beareth t h e i r person shall act or cause 
to be acted, i n those things which concern the common peace 
and safety; and therein t o submit t h e i r w i l l s , every one 
to his w i l l , and t h e i r judgment to his judgment. This i s 
more than consent or concord; i t i s a real unity of them 
a l l , i n one and the same person, made by covenant of every 
man with every man, i n such manner as i f every man should 
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say t o every man, ' I authorise and give up my r i g h t 
of governing myself to t h i s man, or to t h i s assembly of 
men, on t h i s condition, that thou give up thy r i g h t to him, 
and authorise a l l his actions i n l i k e manner.1 This done, 
the multitude so united i n one person i s called a common-
wealth. ...This i s the generation of that great Leviathan, 
or rather, to speak more reverently, of that mortal god, 
to which we owe, under the immortal God, our peace and 
defence. For by t h i s authority, given him by every part-
Icular man i n the commonwealth, he hath the use of so much 
power and strength conferred on him, that by t e r r o r there-
of he i s enabled to perform the w i l l s of them a l l , to peace 
at home, and mutual aid against t h e i r enemies abroad. And 
i n him consisteth the essence of the commonwealth; which, 
t o define i t , i s one person, of whose acts a great multitude, 
by mutual covenants with one another, have made themselves 
every one the author, to the end he may use the strength 
and means of them a l l , as he shall think expedient, for 
t h e i r peace and common defence. 
And he that carrieth t h i s person i s called Sovereign, and 
said to have sovereign power; and every one besides, his 
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subject. 
Before passing on to a consideration of the powers of the 
sovereign and the in t e r n a l organisation of the State, t h i s pro-
cess of deduction, as far as i t has gone, calls for one or two 
remarks. F i r s t , Hobbes has always been generally regarded as 
the apologist par^excellence of the absolute State. I t may be 
that there are l o g i c a l inaccuracies and methodological inade-
quacies within his work; but, considering his achievement overall, 
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he took the absolutism of the Stuart dogma of divine r i g h t and 
set i t upon a l o g i c a l foundation which a l l agree to be at least 
plausible. Nevertheless, although t h i s absolutism i s clearly 
central to Hobbes, i t ought also to be borne, inimind that, within 
the legal f i c t i o n s j u s t discussed, he i s also expressing something 
very l i k e the democratic idea of self-government. As I have 
already indicated, Hobbes i s (albeit probably unconsciously) far 
closer to the s p i r i t l a t e r to be expressed by Locke and Rousseau 
than he i s to that of Filmer or James I . The power which the 
sovereign has to coerce his subjects i s only legitimate or 
authoritative to the extent that i t makes effective what i s , i n 
r e a l i t y , the w i l l of the whole subject people, and to the extent 
that i t does so by t h e i r consent. And the t r u t h of t h i s i s not 
a whit diminished by the further fact that, after consent i s given, 
the sovereign i s absolute and immovable for as long as he remains 
able to protect his subjects. The sovereign i s the sovereign 
because he embodies i n his own person the general w i l l (to use 
a dangerous but serviceable phrase). Hobbes successfully contrives 
to avoid the confusions which came subsequently to dog t h i s notion 
of a collective w i l l ; and he comes, as a r e s u l t , very close t o 
the modern theory of representative democracy. Hobbes i s an 
i n d i v i d u a l i s t and a materialist. As such, he i s not prepared to 
concede that any purpose which cannot be shown to be that of an 
i d e n t i f i a b l e individual has any r e a l i t y . Therefore, he has to 
portray t h i s 'collectiveness 1 as having no actual existence u n t i l 
and unless i t becomes incarnate, so to speak, i n the person of a 
representative, or i n a representative assembly. The State i s 
depicted as one e n t i t y with a w i l l and purpose of i t s own; but 
t h i s i s r e a l l y no more than a legal f i c t i o n . I t i s a l o g i c a l 
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construction which regards the acts and vo l i t i o n s of an agent or 
representative as i f they were those of the people whose rep-
resentative he i s . And a mild and rational conservative l i k e 
Edmund Burke, who would no doubt have disagreed with almost 
everything else that Hobbes had to say on moral and p o l i t i c a l 
questions, would surely have had no f a u l t to f i n d with t h i s . 
Second, i t i s important t o emphasise that Hobbes i s an exponent 
of the doctrine that sovereign power is by nature i n d i v i s i b l e -
a doctrine which was to be resurrected i n the nineteenth century 
by Austin and his followers. There can be no d i s t i n c t i o n between 
l e g i s l a t i v e , executive, and j u d i c i a l acts of government; and the 
rationale of t h i s i s very easy t o see. Quite simply, i f the 
sovereign were to have power to enact laws which he could not 
then execute, or which could promptly be annulled by the jud i c -
i a r y , then he would not, after a l l , be the sovereign. In the 
sovereign, the f i n a l decision-making power i s reposed. In view 
of t h i s , he must be invested with a l l the functions of government, 
because, i f he i s not, he cannot be the f i n a l decision-maker and 
his status f a i l s , i n practice, to answer to i t s proper d e f i n i t i o n . 
I f the sovereign power were divided, there would be, not sovereignty, 
but a congeries of competing power-groups within the society. Thus 
- and p a r t i c u l a r l y i n view of Hobbes's account of what men are 
l i k e - the seeds of war would inevitably be sown, and the very 
purpose for which the commonwealth was set up would be v i t i a t e d . 
The standard l i b e r a l objection, that a man i n whom a l l the func-
tions of government were vested might freely abuse his power, 
does not bother Hobbes. As far as he i s concerned, the sovereign 
can do as he pleases, as long as 'doing what he pleases' does not 
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include f a i l i n g to protect his people. And i f he f a i l s to 
protect his people, he w i l l , by d e f i n i t i o n , cease to be the 
sovereign - a turn of events which, since i t i s against his own 
interests, he w i l l not allow to come about. The further, and 
more t e l l i n g , objection, that the sovereign need, i n fac t , only 
command the support of a strategic few to hang onto power, does 
not occur to Hobbes. 
In t h i s account of sovereignty, i t i s obvious that the s i m i l -
a r i t i e s which I have mentioned between Hobbes and Locke cease to 
hold. Locke, i n his Second Treatise, gave a systematic exposition 
to what was, i n e f f e c t , the ideology of the Whig Revolution of 
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1688; 7 and his primary purpose was to argue that resistance to 
a chief magistrate who breaches his t r u s t i s j u s t i f i e d . Hobbes's 
primary purpose, on the other hand, i s to argue that the sovereign's 
power should be absolute, and that resistance on the part of the 
subject i s never j u s t i f i e d , unless he i s actually threatened by 
the sovereign. Given t h i s contrast of purpose, Locke could hardly 
f a i l to make a d i s t i n c t i o n which i s diametrically opposed to 
the thinking of Hobbes i n t h i s area. In Locke's view, the o r i g i n a l 
social compact arises out of the wish of men to avoid the 
'inconveniences' of the state of nature - to l i v e under a known 
and settled law instead of under the guidance of uncertain and 
variable personal interpretations of natural law. To Locke, i n 
short, p o l i t i c a l society springs from the w i l l t o establish a 
common legislature; and there then follows the appointment of 
a separate executive branch with power to see to i t that the laws 
are obeyed. The creation of an executive i s a matter subsequent 
to the o r i g i n a l p o l i t i c a l move; and the chief magistrate there-
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fore becomes a mere appointee or trustee of the legislature. 
As such, he i s vulnerable i f he breaks f a i t h or exceeds the 
powers entrusted t o him. Locke i s thus the immediate predecessor 
of Montesquieu as the author of the doctrine of the separation of 
powers between d i s t i n c t and circumscribed branches of government, 
and of the theory of the central importance of constitutional 
checks and balances which operate to ensure that no one branch 
can usurp the functions of the others. No such doctrine, however, 
appears i n any form i n Hobbes's writings. To Hobbes's mind, 
plenitude of power i s precisely what characterises the sovereign; 
since without such plenitude, he or i t i s not r e a l l y the sovereign 
after a l l : the way i s as much open t o internecine s t r i f e as i t 
was i n the state of nature. 
Third, however, Hobbes does have in common with Locke a doctrine, 
i n an at least implied form, which was to become one of the chief 
features of l i b e r a l p o l i t i c a l theory during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. I t i s , indeed, a doctrine which has a great 
deal of l i f e l e f t i n i t at the present day - especially i n the 
United States. This doctrine i s that the sole function of 
government i s to preserve 'peace and common defence'. While the 
government i s doing t h i s , i t has the r i g h t to compel obedience by 
the exercise of coercive power. But while i t i s doing t h i s , i t 
i s doing a l l that i s required or expected of i t . In t h i s respect, 
Hobbes i s enunciating the negative, lalssez f a i r e doctrine of the 
functions of the State - the concept of what Nozick, i n his book 
Anarchyt State and Utopia, has called the 'minimal state'. The 
sovereign's role consists solely i n the removal of certain 
intractable d i f f i c u l t i e s i n the way of his subjects' secure 
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pursuit of t h e i r individualistically-conceived desires. His 
function i s simply to prevent society from collapsing i n t o an-
archy. But, as we pointed out at the end of the previous 
chapter, Hobbes never began to conceive of the State i n positive 
terms - as an association f o r the promotion of anything that 
subsequent thinkers have held t o distinguish the r a t i o n a l l y free 
man from the barbarian. Such concepts as ' s e l f - r e a l i s a t i o n 1 , 
'the good l i f e ' , 'progress' or ' c i v i l i z a t i o n ' are _nowhere 
systematically formulated or used by Hobbes. The sovereign has 
purely negative and protective duties to f u l f i l . What i s the 
extent of his power to perform them, and how he stands i n relation 
t o other persons and i n s t i t u t i o n s , are matters t o be considered 
i n the next chapter. 
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NOTES. 
1* Vide Second Treatise of C i v i l Government. Oh. DC.. 
2. Leviathan. E.W. Vol.3,p.145. 
3. Leviathan. E.W. Vol.3,p.l47. 
4. The 'Taylor-Warrender' thesis suggests that the t r a d i t i o n a l 
egoistic reading of Hobbes's moral philosophy i s mistaken. 
I t i s held that his characterisation of the laws of nature 
as commands of God implies a deontological theory of morality; 
and t h i s , of course, cal l s for a complete re-writing of 
his p o l i t i c a l theory. My own view i s that Hobbes i s simply 
unable t o dissociate himself completely from the Stoic-
Roman-Medieval t r a d i t i o n of natural law as ri g h t reason 
r e f l e c t i n g upon divine purpose, but that his own pref-
erence i s clearly f o r the egoistic view. That much, I 
think, i s very clear from our exposition so f a r . Hobbea 
i s certainly ambiguousj but I cannot think that these 
ambiguities are s u f f i c i e n t to overthrow the t r a d i t i o n a l 
and, indeed, obvious account of his psychology and moral 
theory. 
5. Philosophical Rudiments concerning Government and Society. 
E.W. Vol.2,pp.49-50. 
6. Leviathan. E.W. Vol.3,p.147. 
7. Thus, Hume remarks tha t , ' I f the reason be asked of that 
obedience which we are bound to pay to government, I 
readily answer, 'Because society could not otherwise 
subsist*j and t h i s answer i s clear and i n t e l l i g i b l e to 
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7 a l l mankind.1 (Of the Original Contract, p.229.1 This, 
i n a nutshell, i s Hobbes's own view; although Hume has 
no time f o r the Social Contract doctrine. He makes the 
shrewd point that since both the obligation to keep 
contracts and the obligation to obey the government arise 
out of 'the general interests or necessities of society' 
there i s no sense i n deriving the one from the other. 
Each i s a second-order principle subsumed under the 
f i r s t - o r d e r principle of 'general interests or necessities'. 
8. John Plamenatz, The English U t i l i t a r i a n s . pp .H-15. 
9. Leviathan. E.W. Vol.3,p.U7. 
10. Leviathan. E.W. Vol.3,p.K8. 
11. Leviathan. E.W. Vol.3,p.U8. 
12. Leviathan. E.W. Vol.3,p.130. 
13. At l e a s t , i t i s 'non-moral' in a l l operative or practical 
senses. 
H . Vide, e.g., W. Ullmann, Medieval P o l i t i c a l Thought, esp. 
pp.lOOff. 
15. A b r i e f and cogent discussion appears i n S.I. Benn and 
R.S. Peters, Social Principles and the Democratic State. 
Chs. 11, 12 & U. 
16. Vide pp.10lff supra. 
17. Leviathan. E.W. Vol.3,p.151. 
18. Leviathan. E.9. Vol.3,pp.157-158. 
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The question i s s t i l l by no means settled, but Peter 
Laslett, i n the Introduction to his edition of the 
Two Treatises, presents much evidence to show that the 
second trea t i s e i s the earli e r of the two, having been 
written between 1679 and 1681. I f t h i s suggestion i s 
correct, then there i s a clear p o s s i b i l i t y that the 
second treatise i s a revolutionary document, written 
t o give a theoretical basis to the struggle of 
Shaftesbury and his followers with Charles I I . 
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CHAPTER SEVEN - SOVEREIGNTY AND SUBJECTION. 
In the l i g h t of his account of human nature, Hobbes draws 
the conclusion that social order cannot exist i n the absence 
of p o l i t i c a l order. And i t follows j u s t as clearly from his 
psychological beliefs t h a t , i f i t is to be an effective a n t i -
dote t o natural anarchy, the legitimate power of the sovereign 
must be absolute i n i t s scope and degree, within the sphere of 
competence to which the sovereign has been appointed. And t h i s 
sphere of competence consists, quite simply, i n keeping the 
peace and creating conditions conducive t o continuous and 
re l i a b l e security. 
As we might expect, Hobbes w i l l not countenance the possib-
i l i t y of insurrection, or of any attempt to overthrow or replace 
the sovereign or to change the character of the sovereign power -
at least, he w i l l only allow such p o s s i b i l i t i e s within a very 
narrowly-drawn range of circumstances. Indeed, a l l resistance 
t o the sovereign, while he i s doing what he was created to do, 
constitutes a breach of the social compact, and, as such, i s an 
act of i n j u s t i c e . I f I am a member of a commonwealth, then I 
have ipso facto authorised the sovereign of the commonwealth 
to exercise certain functions as my representative. I have 
authorised him to make such provision as he may deem necessary 
fo r the preservation of peace. I have authorised him to use 
the whole of the available physical force of the commonwealth 
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t o punish those who threaten or disrupt the peace, and to deter 
potential offenders. Refusal to obey the sovereign's command, 
therefore, i s a breach of my own promise. Also, since the 
sovereign i s my representative i n the sense outlined e a r l i e r , 
such a refusal i s , i n an easily comprehensible sense, a denial 
of myself. And to break my promise i n t h i s way i s a vi o l a t i o n 
of the t h i r d law of nature, that 'men perform t h e i r covenants 
made.' I t i s , i n other words, a v i o l a t i o n of the rational 
imperative which t e l l s me that making covenants would be a 
pointless and s e l f - s t u l t i f y i n g operation unless covenants were 
kept. The implication of t h i s for our understanding of Hobbes's 
moral thought i s obvious. The moral obligation to keep my 
word appears t o Hobbes t o have a logical foundation. Breach 
of an agreement i s simply an i r r a t i o n a l or self-contradictory 
thing t o do, because i t negatives the very purpose for which 
the covenant was made i n the f i r s t place. 
Obviously, these considerations would not apply ^ except i n 
foro intemo - i n the state of nature. F i r s t , as Hobbes makes 
quite clear, there i s no obligation to keep an agreement i n 
circumstances such that there exists reasonable fear that the 
other party or parties w i l l not perform the other side of the 
*i 
bargain. And i n the state of nature there i s always, or nearly 
always, such fear. Second, as we have seen, I make covenants 
only to secure some good t o myselfj but, since t h i s i s so, i t 
i s clear t h a t , i f i t becomes more worth my while to break than 
t o keep an agreement, then I shall break i t . Under government, 
however, both these p o s s i b i l i t i e s cease to be material. F i r s t , 
there i s now no reason to fear that the other side w i l l not do 
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his part, because the sovereign w i l l coerce him i f he shows 
signs of wanting to renege. By the same token, i t can now never 
be more i n my interests t o break then t o keep an agreement, be-
cause I , too, s h a l l be subject t o coercion i f I break my word. 
Presumably, r e t r i b u t i o n can never be certain, and i t w i l l always 
be true t h a t , i f I can p u l l a fast one, I w i l l . But the coercive 
power of the sovereign w i l l be at least s u f f i c i e n t to ensure that 
agreements are kept more often than not. Hobbes would, I think, 
have agreed with the view of the Sophist Antiphon, that 
Doing j u s t i c e amounts t o not in f r i n g i n g the laws of the 
State of which one i s a c i t i z e n . Thus, a man would do 
justice t o his own greatest advantage i f he honoured the 
laws i n front of witnesses and the promptings of nature 
Justice, at least f o r a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes, i s a creation of 
the law; and the fact of the matter i s that no-one w i l l 'do 
j u s t i c e ' t o his own disadvantage i f he can avoid doing so. This 
i s not a matter f o r condemnation; i t i s simply a statement of 
fact. 
In a nutshell, then, the subject owes a duty of unconditional 
allegiance to the sovereign, and the sovereign w i l l see t o i t 
that i t i s never worth the subject's while to neglect t h i s duty. 
The sovereign himself, however, owes no reciprocal duty to the 
subject - subject t o the narrow l i m i t i n g conditions which we 
s h a l l examine presently. The sovereign has been authorised by 
his subjects to act as t h e i r representative i n making such 
regulations as w i l l ensure peace and s t a b i l i t y . Thus, the 
(-r=t TW foc-&J} when alone, with no witnesses present. 
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subject i s not i n a position to c a l l his judgment int o question 
i n respect of t h i s or that decision. I f t h i s principle were not 
conceded, then the very act of setting up the sovereign would 
be v i t i a t e d - a sovereign whose executive acts were subject to 
3 
question or control would simply not be the sovereign. 
This l a s t point, of course, states a position which reaches 
back i n t o the Middle Ages and beyond, and which was a favourite 
recourse of the Stuart kings: the Prince i s above the law, and 
not i n any sense l e g a l l y responsible to his subjects. This 
conclusion i s , after a l l , inevitable where a monarchy which i s 
not a purely constitutional monarchy i s the established form 
of governmentj and i t i s , moreover, obviously true. The king 
or prince i s above the law simply because i t i s he who says what 
the law i s , and i t i s he who has the enforcing of i t . Hobbes, 
of course, has no time for constitutional monarchy, so he i s 
led ineluctably to t h i s position. I t i s a position which, 
prima v i s t a , consorts rather strangely with the legal f i c t i o n s 
of contract and representation through which he has propounded 
his doctrine of the origins of the State. But Hobbes's account 
of why i t i s that the sovereign cannot be unjust - that i s , 
cannot break an agreement with his people - contrives to avoid 
any tension or inconsistency. The subjects of a ruler cannot 
enforce any agreement against t h e i r r u l e r simply because there 
never was any agreement for them to enforce, or for the sover-
eign t o break. The social compact, by which the commonwealth 
was brought into being, was a compact between each putative 
member of the commonwealth and every other. I t was not an 
agreement between the whole community on the one hand and the 
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sovereign on the other; and the reason why t h i s i s so i s not 
f a r to seek. Before the p o l i t i c a l order i s created, the parties 
t o the social compact have no corporate existence as such; and 
the man or men who w i l l become the sovereign i s or are simply 
part of the crowd, undistinguished from the mass. There are, 
i n short, no such parties as 'sovereign' and 'subjects' t o strike 
a bargain with one another. Meaning i s imparted to the terms 
'sovereign* and 'subject' precisely by the compact i t s e l f - the 
meaningful use of these terms i s l o g i c a l l y subsequent to the 
formation of the compact. I t i s , of course, a p o s s i b i l i t y that 
the sovereign-to-be achieves his eventual position by drumming 
up support amongst the crowd, by canvassing and making promises 
with individuals or groups within the undifferentiated ruck 
of putative subjects. But t h i s i s not l i k e l y to prove a 
d i f f i c u l t y : When the sovereign actually becomes the sovereign, 
says Hobbes, a l l such promises are rendered n u l l and void, 
since i t i s he alone who now has the r i g h t t o determine which 
agreements shall and shall not be kept. Thus, the sovereign 
i s by d e f i n i t i o n incapable of acting unjustly towards his 
subjects. Injustice i s defined as the breaking of covenants; 
and there i s no covenant between ruler and ruled for the sovereign 
t o break. A subject who acts unjustly breaks a covenant, not 
with the r u l e r , but with his fellow subjects - so that his 
fellow subjects may j u s t l y move against him at the sovereign's 
command. (There i s , of course, the p o s s i b i l i t y that the sover-
eign might enter i n t o a covenant with the ruled after the social 
compact has been concluded; although even i n these circumstances 
i t i s presumably the sovereign alone who i s e n t i t l e d to decide 
whether his covenants are binding or not. Also, since the sov-
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ereign i s himself beyond any coercion, he w i l l be quite free 
to break any covenant which i t does not suit him to keep, and 
would not, I take i t , be acting unjustly.) 
Hobbes supports his argument that the sovereign cannot be 
unjust by recourse t o the authority of the Bible. He draws 
attention to Psalm 51, i n which King David expresses con t r i t i o n 
for the murder of Uriah the H i t t i t e and his adultery with his 
wife Bathsheba. Hobbes invites us p a r t i c u l a r l y t o consider 
the fact that David never expresses the b e l i e f that he has 
wronged Uriah i n seducing his wife and having him assassinated. 
I t i s not f o r wrong done t o man, but for sin against God, that 
the Psalm asks forgiveness. Thus, according t o Hobbes, the 
point that the king cannot be unjust towards his subjects i s 
established not only by common sense, but by the evidence of 
scripture. The king i s above the law i n the sense that he cannot 
be held answerable to those who have undertaken t o be bound by 
his orders, and to take those orders as the standards of 
justice and i n j u s t i c e . Nevertheless, i t i s s t i l l possible for 
the r u l e r to abuse his power, as David had done. Aid although 
such abuse cannot, s t r i c t 3 $ speaking, be called unjust, i t may 
s t i l l be regarded as iniquitous. ALthough he cannot properly 
be accused by his subjects, the ruler i s s t i l l susceptible to 
the judgment and condemnation of God. As Hobbes expresses i t , 
Though the action be against the law of nature, as being 
contrary to equity (as was the k i l l i n g of Uriah by David), 
yet i t was not an i n j u r y t o Uriah, but to God. Not t o 
Uriah, because the r i g h t t o do what he pleased was given 
him by Uriah himself; and yet t o God, because Uriah was 
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God's subject, and prohibited a l l i n i q u i t y by the law 
of nature. Which d i s t i n c t i o n David himself, when he 
repented the f a c t , evidently confirmed, saying, 'To 
thee only have I sinned.'^ 
This may be cold comfort f o r one whose misfortune i t i s to be 
the subject of an iniquitous r u l e r j but Hobbes i s here quite 
i n accord with a principle which had come down through the 
Middle Ages from St Paul, 1Pseudo-Dionysius1 and St Aagustine. 
The subject i s answerable to the ruler; the ruler i s answerable 
to Godj but the ru l e r i s not answerable to the subject, and a 
subject who finds himself under an 'iniquitous' ruler can r e a l l y 
do l i t t l e more than pray f o r deliverance - although we shall 
shortly see the ways i n which the sovereign's power i s , i n fac t , 
somewhat l i m i t e d by the logic of social l i v i n g i t s e l f . 
Hobbes devotes a small amount of space to the problem posed 
by an individual who re t o r t s that he, at least, does not consider 
himself a party t o the o r i g i n a l agreement by which t h i s p a r t i c -
ular sovereign was appointed. Aid i n such a case, the sovereign 
i s clearly not the sovereign of that particular individual. 
Equally, the individual himself i s clearly not a member of the 
society which was created when the sovereign was appointed. To 
the extent to which he wishes to push his claim, therefore, the 
individual concerned i s s t i l l i n a state of nature re l a t i v e to 
a l l the other members of the commonwealth; and, as such, he 
may without i n j u s t i c e be treated as an enemy. He i s i n no position 
t o complain that he i s not protected by a sovereign whom he 
refuses t o recognise. He s t i l l , i n f a c t , remains vulnerable to 
a l l the hazards of the 'war of every man with every man.' 
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I t i s , of course, open to us to object that the notion of 
justice i s open to a f a r richer and broader interpretation than 
simply the keeping of promises - although i t may well necessarily 
include the keeping of promises. I f we take Justinian's maxim 
cuique suum as a point of departure, we shall be able to cash 
the notion of justice far more generously than Hobbes i s pre-
pared t o allow. We might, f o r example, make out a case for the 
proposition that giving to each his own implies a respect for 
human personality as such, formal bargains or covenants apart. 
We might, i n other words, argue that we are obliged to act with 
humanity and r e s t r a i n t towards a l l fellow human beings, i r r e s -
pective of whether or not we happen to be related to them by a 
promise or undertaking given or received. This, however, i s 
a very d i f f i c u l t area, and, i n any case, for the purposes of the 
present discussion we must accept Hobbes's own d e f i n i t i o n before 
we can make any further headway at a l l . 
.Although I have so far spoken only of kings and princes, i t 
i s not, i n f a c t , Hobbes's view that only a monarch can be an 
absolute sovereign r u l e r . As he i s at pains to point out, i t 
follows from his account of the social compact tha t , once est-
ablished, a government i n any form has absolute authority over 
i t s subjects. Aid nowhere, i n f a c t , i s t h i s more obvious than 
i n a democracy, where the whole assembly of the citizens i s 
i t s e l f the sovereign body. -As Hobbes puts i t , 
When an assembly of men i s made sovereign, then no man 
imagineth any such covenant to have passed i n the 
i n s t i t u t i o n , f o r no man i s so d u l l as to say, for 
example, the people of Rome made a covenant with the 
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Romans to hold the sovereignty on such and such 
conditions, which not performed, the Romans might 
l a w f u l l y depose the Roman people. That men see not 
the reason to be alike i n a monarchy as i n a popular 
government proceedeth from the ambition of some, that 
are kinder to the government of an assembly, whereof 
they may hope t o participate, than of a monarchy, which 
they despair to enjoy. 
Hobbes has a persistent and i r r i t a t i n g tendency to assume 
that opinions d i f f e r e n t from his own arise simply out of 
wickedness or ambition - Behemoth i s a choice example of t h i s 
kind of thing. He seems to have had an unshakeable b e l i e f 
that he had constructed a system of such l u c i d i t y and 
rigour that no well-intentioned man could doubt i t s t r u t h 
or f a i l , by taking thought, t o arrive at the same conclusions 
himself. But, given the p o l i t i c a l circumstances of mid-
seventeenth-century England, i t may be that Hobbes*s point 
has a certain shrewd accuracy. In any case, i t i s clear that, 
whatever the form of government, no covenant exists between 
sovereign and subject; the power of the sovereign i s absolute, 
and there i s no r i g h t of rebellion while the sovereign i s 
properly functioning as such. 
Although assemblies as well as monarchies receive a t i t l e t o 
absolute power when they are appointed to govern, Hobbes's own 
preference i s f o r the monarchical form of government. In view 
of the length of his service i n an aristocratic and Royalist 
household, t h i s comes as no suprise; but he adduces a number 
of allegedly dispassionate reasons for his belief. F i r s t of a l l 
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he holds th a t , under a monarchy, there i s less l i k e l y to be 
a clash between public and private interests. The personal 
interests of one man are more intimately connected with those 
of his subjects than could be the ease with the combined personal 
interests of the members of a sovereign assembly: 
The riches, power and honour of a monarch arise only 
from the riches, strength and reputation of his subjects. 
For no king can be r i c h nor glorious nor secure whose sub-
jects are either poor or contemptible or too weak through 
want or dissention to maintain a war against t h e i r enemies; 
whereas i n a democracy or aristocracy the public prosperity 
confers not so much to the private fortune of one that i s 
corrupt or ambitious, as doth many times a perfidious 
advice, a treacherous action, or a c i v i l war. 
Look at i t how I may, I cannot see that t h i s i s a very good 
argument. I t i s surely true that the members of a sovereign 
assembly are no l i k l i e r than a monarch to do well i n a country 
whose subjects are 'poor or contemptible or too weak...to 
maintain a war against t h e i r enemies'; while, on Hobbes's own 
account of the way human beings are constituted, a monarch who 
stands t o gain more than he w i l l lose by s e l l i n g out his 
country w i l l surely do so. But Hobbes i s certainly not alone 
i n using weak arguments t o aupport positions which are also 
strong personal preferences. A second point i s that monarchs 
are more free than assemblies to receive advioe from whom they 
choose and to keep such advice secret; although i t might be 
objected to t h i s that the collective wisdom of an assembly i s 
more apt to select good advisers than the unaided judgment of 
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the monarch. Third, Hobbes holds that, while the decisions of 
a monarch can indeed be swayed by the inconstancies of human 
nature, t h i s i s not so great a hazard as i t i s under an assembly; 
fo r , i n the case of an assembly, the weaknesses of each individual 
nature are compounded by disagreements between the members. 
Monarchs, i n short, are more l i k e l y t o be consistent and constant 
i n t h e i r p olicies than are assemblies, the members of which may 
f a l l out amongst themselves, either out of genuine disagreement, 
or out of envy or personal greed* 
Monarchies, however, do have disadvantages, of which Hobbes 
notices two i n particular. F i r s t , the monarch's mind may be 
worked upon by f l a t t e r e r s and favourites, and th i s may have 
grave consequences i f the f l a t t e r e r s are out for t h e i r own and 
not the public good (as w i l l , presumably, inevitably be the case). 
Second, there i s always the danger that the monarchy w i l l come 
into the hands of a successor who i s not yet adult, or who i s 
mentally enfeebled to a degree that he cannot t e l l good from 
e v i l (by which, I take i t , Hobbes means no more than that he 
cannot make judicious p o l i t i c a l decisions). Hobbes does not, 
however, f e e l that these objections are very weighty. F i r s t , 
f l a t t e r e r s exist i n situations where the government i s an assembly, 
g 
as well as under monarchical government. Second, i n cases where 
the king i s f o r some reason u n f i t to r u l e , the usual practice i s 
to replace him by a regent pro tempore. Any e v i l consequences 
which then arise, therefore, do not t e l l against the monarchical 
principle as such, but simply i l l u s t r a t e the inadequacy or 
cupidity of the regent. 
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Al l t h i s , of course, i s an instance of the immemorial pol-
i t i c a l dispute which i s most commonly associated with Aristotle: 
Is the collective wisdom of the multitude, who know where the 
shoe pinches, to be preferred to the efficiency and (supposed) 
i m p a r t i a l i t y of the monarch? Or, in more modern terminology, 
i s the mass of the people better f i t t e d to govern i t s e l f than 
the minority of experts? Good arguments can be formulated on 
both sides, so that the l o g i c a l step i s to t r y to devise a 
mixed constitution comprising the wisdom of the many and the 
efficiency of the few or of the one. But Hobbes, of course, 
w i l l have none of that. He i s able to argue to his own sat i s -
faction t h a t , of a l l possible forms of government, monarchy i s 
to be preferred, and that the power of the monarch should be 
absolute. The monarch, i n other words, should have power t o 
govern simply by his own f i a t , and should not be bound or 
compelled by any other i n s t i t u t i o n or person. He should have 
the sole r i g h t t o command the armed forces; and he should have 
the sole r i g h t t o impose taxation. In short, Hobbes claims 
f o r the monarch a l l the rights and powers which the Puritan 
Revolution sought to deny the English crown; 
Nevertheless, i t i s important t o grasp that, i n a l l t h i s , 
Hobbes does not wish t o suggest that the governed people have 
no rights at a l l ; and, indeed, he could not have suggested 
anything of the kind. As we saw e a r l i e r , he himself has sought 
and found what he considers to be a ' u t i l i t a r i a n ' j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
of absolutism; and such a j u s t i f i c a t i o n i t s e l f imposes certain 
inevitable l i m i t s upon the absolute power of the sovereign. To 
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put i t another way, the logic of the very argument by which 
absolute power i s established i t s e l f indicates a certain area 
of necessary l i b e r t y for the subject. Aid Hobbes explains that 
t h i s l i b e r t y consists quite simply in that part of the supposed 
o r i g i n a l r i g h t of nature which the subject cannot be regarded 
as having given up - namely, the right t o use any and every 
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available means of self-protection. The subject cannot be 
supposed t o have transferred t h i s part of his 'right to every-
thing' when he entered in t o the social compact; and t h i s i s 
so for two independent reasons. F i r s t , given Hobbes's mechanistic 
and deterministic psychology, we may assume that no-one could 
r e f r a i n from protecting himself i n circumstances where he was 
threatened. As Kant would have put i t , we cannot reasonably say 
that a subject ought not t o protect himself i f the fact of the 
matter i s that he cannot r e f r a i n from protecting himself. Second, 
i f the subject were held to have surrendered his r i g h t of s e l f -
protection, then he would have thwarted his own purpose i n 
entering i n t o the social compact i n the f i r s t place. Since t h i s 
i s so, the subject i s free, f o r a l l the absolute power of the 
sovereign, t o refuse t o k i l l or injure himself i f the sovereign 
so commands, or t o r e s i s t those who are commanded by the sov-
ereign to k i l l or injure him (the coercive power of the sov-
ereign, therefore, must presumably be strong enough to overcome 
any possible resistance); and he i s not obliged to confess any 
crime unless he i s assured i n advance that he w i l l be pardoned 
fo r i t . Furthermore, he may refuse to carry out an order to 
k i l l another man or to perform any other act which might require 
him to encounter dangers to himself; and, on t h i s ground, Hobbes 
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holds that men of what he c a l l s 'feminine courage' may refuse 
without i n j u s t i c e t o do m i l i t a r y service - Hobbes here draws 
a d i s t i n c t i o n between inju s t i c e and cowardice. And he holds 
that even a band of rebels or murderers i s quite e n t i t l e d not 
t o surrender unless f i r m l y promised that there w i l l be no 
unpleasant consequences: by defending themselves, they add 
no new unjust act to those which they have already committed, 
since self-protection can never be unjust. In a nutshell, 
men cannot j u s t l y be required to act i r r a t i o n a l l y i n p o l i t i c a l 
society: they cannot be required to do that which would disable 
the very purposes f o r which the p o l i t i c a l community was o r i g i n a l l y 
set up. And, where the law i s s i l e n t , the l i b e r t y of the subject 
to act or r e f r a i n from acting as he pleases remains absolute. 
Obviously, i n p r a c t i c a l terms these l i b e r t i e s w i l l not amount 
to very much when the sovereign i s very powerful; and i t seems 
to be the case that the preservation of peace i s always a more 
important end than the safeguarding of rights and l i b e r t i e s . 
Moreover, the absolute power of the sovereign remains with him 
for as long as he i s able to guarantee peace. I f he i s defeated 
i n war and submits to a conqueror i n order to save himself, or 
i f he v o l u n t a r i l y releases his subjects from t h e i r allegiance, 
then the p o l i t i c a l order i s for the time being at an lend. The 
state of nature once more supervenes. The mortal God i s dead, 
and i t i s up t o those who were his members to create another by 
entering i n t o a fresh compact. 
* * * * * 
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In the course of his di s q u i s i t i o n upon p o l i t i c a l power, Hobbes 
contributes his own portion t o the long-standing debate which 
had been one of the c r i t i c a l issues of p o l i t i c a l discourse 
throughout the Medieval period - namely, the question of the 
respective spheres of regnum and sacerdotium. of kingship and 
priesthood. The nature and extent of the powers which should 
r i g h t l y be attributed to the church and denied the prince, or 
attributed t o the prince but denied the church, had been the 
subjects of s t r i f e - and sometimes of armed struggle - since the 
drawing-together of ecclesiastical and secular authority under 
Constantine. To the extent that he l i v e d i n a century of 
considerable religious animosity, and to the extent that he, 
l i k e many of his contemporaries, tended very readily t o espy 
ecclesiastical machinations behind c i v i l disturbances, Hobbes's 
p o l i t i c a l ideas could hardly be complete without some account 
of the standing of the church i n relation t o the commonwealth. 
And his position i n t h i s respect i s quite consistent with what 
we have so far seen. Since, i n the interests of the peace and 
sceurity which a l l men desire, the sovereign has sole and t o t a l 
power t o decide which beliefs s h a l l or shall not be taught i n 
the commonwealth, i t follows that the s p i r i t u a l power can have 
no existence separate from or superordinate to the seculars Hobbes 
i s a t o t a l Erastian. He holds, quite trenchantly and unambig-
uously, that the most f r u i t f u l source of p o l i t i c a l quarrelling 
l i e s i n the competing claims of clergymen of diff e r e n t persuasions 
to hold certain rights and powers in virtue of t h e i r o f f i c e . 
These rights are claimed to be independent of a l l secular author-
i s a t i o n . They include the r i g h t t o decide which religious 
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doctrines shall be taught or suppressed; the r i g h t t o order 
ecclesiastical discipline independently of the secular author-
i t i e s ; and, at the extreme, the ri g h t t o rebel against and 
depose any earthly r u l e r who refuses to accept t h e i r judgment 
i n such matters. These matters were by no means novel t o 
seventeenth-century England - they reach back at least as far 
as the quarrel between Henry I I and Thomas Beckett i n the t w e l f t h 
century. And ecclesiastical claims of t h i s magnitude are 
precisely those which Hobbes wishes to undermine. He does so, 
not only by an appeal to the kind of argumentation which we 
have so far been considering, but also to an extensive body of 
astute and s t r i k i n g l y modem Biblican c r i t i c i s m . The bare bones 
of his argument may be stated as follows. 
Religion i s not philosophy, but law. As we saw e a r l i e r , 
religious doctrines are not matters which can f a l l within the 
philosopher's terms of reference, since the philosopher i s 
concerned only with causal explanation. Hobbes would therefore 
wish t o conclude that theological disputes are not only p o l i t -
i c a l l y dangerous, but also devoid of any content which might 
form the subject of an argument. From t h i s position, he i s 
easily able t o draw conclusions which are inimical to eccles-
i a s t i c a l ambition. I t i s , he argues, up to the sovereign t o 
decide which doctrines shall be taught and which condemned, and 
the church has no say i n t h i s matter at a l l . This r i g h t does 
not, indeed, inhere i n the sovereign because he i s thought t o 
have any peculiar theological insights. He does not proclaim 
that certain doctrines are true and others false - simply because 
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no-one can know which doctrines are true or false (or indeed, 
Hobbes might have added, that any doctrine i s true or false). 
The sovereign simply encourages some beliefs and forbids others 
(or, at least, the expression of others) on the grounds that 
some beliefs conduce to peace, or at least do not threaten i t , 
while others are associated with discord and war. When we give 
our assent to the religious proclamations of the sovereign, i t 
does not seem to matter whether or not our h e a r t f e l t b e l i e f goes 
with that assent. What i s important, no matter what our un-
spoken b e l i e f s may be, i s that we submit to the legitimate 
authority of the commonwealth's sovereign. 
A l l t h i s , of course, i s open to what looks l i k e a f a i r l y 
severe objection. God has made available t o man i n his written 
word information as t o what he should believe. He can know 
the t r u t h by revelation, even though such knowledge i s not 
philosophical i n character - at least, not within Hobbes's 
understanding of what i t i s f o r knowledge to be 'philosophical'. 
Suppose, therefore, that a heretic sovereign commands men to 
express false b e l i e f s and so to disobey God. On Hobbes's 
argument from the absolute power of the sovereign, men who 
disobey and suffer persecution or martyrdom are to be accounted 
criminals who are j u s t l y punished for t h e i r disobedience. I t 
looks, i n other words, as though Hobbes i s recommending that 
men believe men rather than God; but he i s , i n fact, ready with 
an' answer to t h i s objection. The argument i s essentially t h i s : 
The true r e l i g i o n i s contained i n the canonical scriptures. But 
i n v irtue of what are the scriptures said to be canonical? Their 
canonicity i s conferred upon them by nothing other than the 
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authority of the sovereign; and the sovereign has, moreover, 
the f i n a l say i n matters touching upon the interpretation of 
scripture as well as i t s standing. And t h i s r i g h t of decision 
emanates d i r e c t l y from the general power of the sovereign t o 
suppress dangerous doctrines. Given that t h i s i s so, there 
can be no virtue i n any claim made by an individual or assoc-
ia t i o n within the State based upon the interpretation of a 
supposedly inspired document - unless, of course, the sovereign 
agrees that the document i n question i s inspired and has been 
r i g h t l y interpreted. Certainly, any resistance to p o l i t i c a l 
authority based upon a s c r i p t u r a l passage cannot be j u s t i f i e d . 
As for martyrs, Hobbes does not deny that there have been martyrs 
who were j u s t i f i e d i n suffering f o r t h e i r beliefs. He does, 
however, make a number of points i n t h i s direction which are 
intended t o reinforce the absolute power of the sovereign. A 
martyr, he says, i s a witness to the t r u t h of a revelation from 
God; and from t h i s i t follows that no-one can be a martyr, 
properly so-called, except the man who has himself received 
such a revelation. A l l that anyone else who claims to be a 
martyr can bear witness t o i s his own b e l i e f i n the person who 
claims t o have had the revelation. To reject what he has to 
say, therefore, i s not to reject the commands of God, but simply 
to declare as mistaken one man's belief i n the claim of another 
t o have had communication with God. Now the only conclusive 
proof which a man could offer t o demonstrate that he had had 
a revelation from God would be the working of a miracle. But, 
as a l l Protestants agree, miracles no longer occur, so that 
no-one can now establish his claim to be God's messenger except 
i n d i r e c t l y , by showing that his teaching agrees with that of 
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Christ and the Apostles. But the documents i n which t h e i r 
teaching appears owe t h e i r validation to the secular powers and, 
besides, Christ and the Apostles taught, by both word and deed, 
that men have a duty t o obey the c i v i l authorities; and so no 
man can claim t h e i r support i n respect of any claim of his to be 
e n t i t l e d t o disobey the secular authorities. I f a man were today 
to receive a communication from God, Hobbes i s perfectly happy 
to concede that he would have an excellent motive f o r obeying 
God, even i n defiance of the sovereign. God, after a l l , has i t 
i n his power to make things f a r more unpleasant for the dis -
obedient than the sovereign can; and no rational being w i l l 
act against what he knows to be his best interests. At the same 
time, however, no-one who now finds himself i n t h i s situation 
i s able t o substantiate his claim, so that he i s not i n a pos-
i t i o n t o complain i f the sovereign refuses t o believe him and 
punishes him for persisting i n his belief. This punishment w i l l 
presumably only be i n f l i c t e d i f the supposed revelation i s 
p o l i t i c a l l y dangerous - although Hobbes tends to suppose that 
a l l r e ligious innovation i s p o l i t i c a l l y dangerous, simply because 
^it^is^c^en^to^anyoneTiot^to^ accept i t ^ alid^th^b^currenc^e of such 
disagreements may well lead to c i v i l s t r i f e . A man who supposes 
himself t o have received a direc t communication from God w i l l 
presumably only be safe i f the revelation i s purely private and 
applicable t o himself alone, and i s not communicated; because 
Hobbes i s generous enough to concede that, however potentially 
dangerous they may be, a man's thoughts remain his own a f f a i r 
f o r as long as he keeps them to himself. 
Hobbes supports t h i s argument by proposing that the 'kingdom 
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of God1 of which the Bible speaks is not an ecclesiastical 
system separate from the secular power, but a system of c i v i l 
government i n which God, as represented by a v i s i b l e human agent, 
reigns as c i v i l sovereign. This' arrangement has i t s origin i n 
the i n s t a l l a t i o n by God of Moses as his representative i n the 
government of the people of Is r a e l ; but i t ceased to be oper-
ative when the I s r a e l i t e people revolted against t h e i r r i g h t f u l 
leader (Samuel, the l a t e s t successor of Moses) and i n s t i t u t e d 
the kingdom of Saul. The mission of Jesus was t o announce the 
restoration of the proper kingdom of God i n t h i s sense. This 
restoration was not t o take place i n his own l i f e t i m e , but i n 
a future age when the righteous w i l l rise from the dead and l i v e 
i n Palestine under the personal rule of Jesus as God's repres-
entative. Thus, the only condition imposed from the f i r s t as 
necessary f o r entrance in t o the Church was acceptance of the 
be l i e f that Jesus was the Messiah - that i s , that Jesus i s the 
rul e r who w i l l preside over the kingdom of God when i t f i n a l l y 
comes to be established. In other words, a l l that a Christian 
i s obliged t o do i s believe th a t , at some time i n the future, 
Christ w i l l reappear on earth as a c i v i l sovereign, and intend 
to submit to his authority when the time comes. Meanwhile, the 
believer i s bound by s c r i p t u r a l warrant t o submit himself to 
such powers as happen t o be r u l i n g for the time being. Hobbes 
then proceeds to argue at length that the only commission 
given by Christ t o his apostles, and by the apostles i n turn 
to t h e i r successors, was the commission t o teach and persuade -
t h i s i s an argument very l i k e that advanced by Marsilius of 
Padua i n the Defensor Pacis. The only weapon which was conferred 
upon them to assist them i n t h i s commission was that of excomm-
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unication - that i s , the threat of exclusion from the future 
kingdom of God. I t follows, therefore, that the powers which 
the clergy now actually possess i n Christian countries i s der-
ived, not from divine commission, but from the p o l i t i c a l 
sovereign. A l l authority, both s p i r i t u a l and temporal, comes 
from and i s dependant upon the sovereign. In relation t o him, 
the clergy amount, i n f a c t , t o no more than a body of c i v i l 
servants: 
The monarch or the sovereign assembly only hath immediate 
authority from God... and no man but the sovereign receiveth 
his power Dei Gratia simply; that i s to say, from the favour 
of none but God: a l l others receive theirs from the favour 
and providence of God and t h e i r sovereigns; as i n a 
monarchy, Dei Gratia et regis, or Dei Providentia et 
Voluntate regis. 
The section with which the Leviathan closes i s a b i t t e r attack 
upon the pretensions of Papal supremacy. I t i s here i n p a r t i c -
ular that 'his furious pen seems almost to jab and lacerate the 
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paper as i f i t were a.. .Catholic.' The section i s called 
Of the Kingdom of Darkness; and this 'kingdom of darkness' i s 
none other than the church organised as a society independent 
of the secular authorities, and arrogating t o i t s e l f a special 
s p i r i t u a l j u r i s d i c t i o n which i t can c a l l upon the secular power; 
to enforce by means of i t s coercive power. This notion f i r s t 
finds expression i n the p o l i t i c a l writings of St Augustine, and 
i t had been the dominant ideology of the Papacy throughout the 
Middle Ages - sometimes taking extreme p o l i t i c a l implications, 
and lying at the very centre of the dreary Investiture controversy. 
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Stated i n t y p i c a l form, the oase for t h i s conception of the 
church would run as follows. 
Christ l e f t with those who follow him on earth power of two 
kinds - secular or temporal on the one hand, and s p i r i t u a l or 
ecclesiastical on the other. These powers were frequently-
referred t o by controversialists as the 'two swords1, i n 
all e g o r i c a l reference t o the enigmatic passage i n St Luke's 
gospel: 
Then said he unto them, But now, he that hath a 
purse, l e t him take i t , and likewise his scrip: and 
he that hath no sword, l e t him s e l l his garment, and 
buy one....Aid they said, Lord, behold, here are two 
swords. Aid he said unto them, I t i s enough. 
The secular powers belong to the c i v i l authorities, while the 
s p i r i t u a l powers reside i n the church; and, i n normal circum-
stances, the two areas of power should not attempt to invade 
one another's provinces. The c i v i l authorities should not 
attempt to do the duty of the church; the church should not 
attempt to wield the sword of the secular arm. Aid ord i n a r i l y , 
of course, the Christian has an absolute duty to obey the 
decrees of the secular authorities - a duty rooted i n the 
authority of scripture i t s e l f : 
Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For 
there i s no power but of God: the powers that be are 
ordained of God. Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, 
resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that r e s i s t shall 
receive to themselves damnation.^ 
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This doctrine received an early and authoritative statement i n 
the f i f t h century by Pope Gelasius I ; 1 - * ' and i m p l i c i t i n t h i s 
way of viewing the r e l a t i v e disposition of church and secular 
authority was the b e l i e f that p o l i t i c a l peace depends upon 
neither sphere of competence being violated by the other: 
In the same c i t y and under the same king there are two 
peoples. Just as there are two peoples, there are two 
ways of l i f e ; and just as there are two ways of l i f e , 
there are two authorities; and just as there are two 
authorities, there i s a dual order of j u r i s d i c t i o n . The 
c i t y i s the church; the king of the c i t y i d Christ; the 
two peoples are the two orders within the church, the 
clergy and the l a i t y ; the two ways of l i f e are the 
s p i r i t u a l and the carnal; the two authorities are the 
priesthood and the kingship; and the dual j u r i s d i c t i o n 
i s the divine law and the human. Give to each what i s 
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due to each, and everything w i l l be i n harmony. 
The d i f f i c u l t y always lay, however, i n the fact that there would 
inevitably be occasions when the two areas of j u r i s d i c t i o n would 
not be clearly defined, or when some kind of tension between them 
would exist. Suppose, f o r example, the temporal sovereign were 
to command his subjects t o do something which expressly contra-
venes the teaching of Christ of which the church i s the appointed 
guardian - i n s i s t i n g that they worship pagan idols, for example, 
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as did Julian the -Apostate? Clearly, the church cannot r e f r a i n 
from claiming the r i g h t to intervene i n such a case, by forbidding 
the f a i t h f u l t o obey the command and, i f the sovereign persists, 
by encouraging them actually t o overthrow and replace him. Sim-
i l a r l y , i f the church wishes to enforce i t s commands against an 
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intransigent subject or State, and yet has no coercive power 
of i t s own, i t must f e e l i t s e l f e n t i t l e d to c a l l upon the sword 
of the secular power; and i f that c a l l i s not answered, i t 
must also f e e l e n t i t l e d t o dispense the subjects of that secular 
power from t h e i r allegiance. 
This ideology therefore contrived both to assert the separateness 
of the secular from the s p i r i t u a l , and yet at the same time t o 
affi r m the i m p l i c i t p r i o r i t y of the s p i r i t u a l power embodied i n 
the church. The doctrine also implied, moreover, that), when i t 
comes t o determining the exact boundaries of the two spheres of 
competence, the f i n a l decision rests with the ecclesiastical 
authorities. Aid i t i s precisely t h i s kind of argument that 
Hobbes so passionately wishes to confute i n the f i n a l section 
of the Leviathan, where he allows his phobia of the church i t s 
most lavish expression. The 'kingdom of darkness', he maintains, 
owes i t s origins to the ambition of the Roman clergy. This 
ambition led them, i n the f i r s t instance, to accept assistance 
and grants of power from the Roman Emperors from Constantino 
onwards; and then, when Imperial Rome entered i n t o i t s decline, 
i t led them s t i l l further to take over for themselves the status 
and powers of the Roman Empire which had o r i g i n a l l y protected 
them. As Hobbes puts i t , 
I f a man consider the o r i g i n a l of t h i s great ecclesiastical 
dominion, he w i l l easily perceive that the Papacy i s no 
other than the ghost of the deceased Roman Empire, s i t t i n g 
crowned upon the grave thereof. For so did the Papacy s t a r t 
18 
up on a sudden out of the ruins of that heathen power. 
And t h i s , incidentally, i s a comment with which, i f we remove 
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i t s polemical content, modern Protestant ecclesiastical 
historians would not take very serious issue. 
This ghost, of course, has now been par t l y exorcised i n 
England. I t was exorcised f i r s t by the Tudor sovereigns who 
overthrew the power of the Papacy in England. The process was 
continued by the Presbyterians of the Long Parliament who abol-
ished the Episcopacy; and i t was completed by the Independents 
who destroyed the domination of Presbyterianism. But the 
Leviathan ends on a warning note; for 
Who knows that t h i s s p i r i t of Rome...may not return, 
or rather an assembly of s p i r i t s worse than he, enter, 
and infiabit t h i s clean-swept house, and make the end 
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thereof worse than the beginning? 
I t i s Hobbes's constant asseveration that the ghost of Rome w i l l 
never be e n t i r e l y extirpated u n t i l a strong sovereign asserts 
himself over the universities; for 
the divines, and such others as make show of learning, 
derive t h e i r knowledge from the universities, and from 
the schools of law, or from the books which by men 
eminent i n those schools and universities have been 
published. I t i s therefore manifest that the instruction 
of the people dependeth wholly on the r i g h t teaching of 
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youth i n the un i v e r s i t i e s . 
I t i s from the universities that the arrogant pretensions of 
the ecclesiastics have o r i g i n a l l y come; and the sovereign should 
exclude from the universities a l l useless and dangerous teaching, 
and cause them to instruct t h e i r members in the proper grounds 
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of p o l i t i c a l submission. The universities should, i n short, 
be converted i n t o schools offering courses i n ' p o l i t i c a l science' 
as conceived and expounded by Hobbes. And, presumably, his 
intention was that the Leviathan should be required reading for 
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any such course. 
A l l i n a l l , i t comes as no surprise to findi that Hobbes made 
himself so b i t t e r l y unpopular with contemporary churchmen and 
academics alike. Seth Ward and John Wallis, John Bramhall, 
Ralph Cudworth, Sir Charles Wolsey, and many other formidable 
opponents believed, each i n his own way, but with unimpeachable 
since r i t y , that the doctrines of^Hobbism' were pernicious and 
dangerous. Bishop John Vesey held that the opinions of Hobbes 
'have had so great a share i n the debauchery of his generation 
that a good Christian man can hardly hear his name without 
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saying of his prayers'. Aril an unknown pamphleteer reserved 
a special place for Hobbes i n h e l l : 
Old Tom, with a Recanting Verse, 
Must his odde Notions dolefully rehearse 
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To new Disciples i n the D e v i l s - A r — . 
I t i s a measure of Hobbes's stature that, though i n seventeenth-
century terms he was never more than a domestic servant - albeit 
a highly-favoured one - to an aristocratic household, he should 
have been so unanimously seen as a threat t o so many established 
interests. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS. 
In the early part of t h i s thesis, I emphasised the importance 
of attending to the systematic, h o l i s t i c character of Hobbes's 
philosophical achievement. I stressed the need to approach 
his moral and p o l i t i c a l recommendations as an integral part -
although, t o our minds, incomparably the most important part -
of an articulated system. And t h i s has been a le.itmotif 
throughout the foregoing chapters. I t i s therefore as well, 
at t h i s point, to give a b r i e f summary of Hobbes's philosophy 
of nature, man and the p o l i t i c a l order as i t s has emerged 
during t h i s exposition. 
Philosophical knowledge, or what we should today more natur-
a l l y c a l l s c i e n t i f i c knowledge, i s knowledge of the relations 
between cause and ef f e c t . Such knowledge has not only explicative 
and predictive value, but, i n i t s moral and social dimensions, 
prescriptive value as well; and i t i s achieved, not by mere 
observation, but by reasoned enquiry into causal relations. I t 
i s thus rigorously separated o f f from other branches of our 
gognition. And i f Hobbes i s correct in supposing that s c i e n t i f i c 
enquiry i s capable of yielding conclusions about human behaviour 
of the same kind as i t yields about the behaviour of natural 
bodies, then he i s not g u i l t y of the 'ought-is' fallacy; since 
'prescriptive' w i l l now take on a new, quasi-scientific meaning. 
The question i s , i s he correct i n so supposing? In other words, 
i s 'pro-naturalistic historicism' a viable method of social 
investigation? I think that Professor Popper has advanced 
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arguments which show as conclusively as such a thing can be 
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shown that i t i s not; but that i s another story. 
The method to be used i n the pursuit of scientific/philosophical 
knowledge as Hobbes conceives i t i s both r a t i o n a l i s t i c and 
empirical. I t involves an analysis and synthesis of complex 
wholes after the manner of Galileo, s t a r t i n g from the i n i t i a l 
presumption that a l l causation i s due to the motions of matter, 
proceeding t o a deduction of such consequences as are entailed 
by t h i s presumption, and ve r i f y i n g (or f a l s i f y i n g ) these deduced 
consequences by reference t o further sensory experience. I f 
a l l the phenomena which f a l l within the observer's f i e l d of 
experience are s a t i s f a c t o r i l y explicable as forms and configurations 
of motion (and Hobbes i s s a t i s f i e d that they are) 1, there i s no 
reason why t h i s should not be as true of the human as i t i s of 
the natural world. A l l men's mental processes, passions, 
aversions, desires, are thus taken to be merely epiphenomena 
of events i n the outside world. And since events i n the outside 
world occur as effects of necessary causes, i t follows that men 
cannot but act i n the ways that , according to Hobbes, they 
actually do act. In other words, they cannot but seek to 
g r a t i f y t h e i r own desires and avoid danger to themselves, without 
any more regard f o r others than i s necessary to serve t h e i r own 
purposes. 
Thus, i f we take a commonwealth, a specimen of a p o l i t i c a l 
order, and analyse i t i n t o i t s component parts ( i . e . individual 
persons), we are l e f t with 'atomic' men i n a'state of nature'; 
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and Hobbes's individualism simply does not recognise the poss-
i b i l i t y that a commonwealth may be i n some sense more than the 
sum of i t s parts, or that the social chain amounts to more than 
the individual l i n k s . The state of nature, on Hobbes's account 
of i t , i s such that i t i s worse than even the worst form of 
p o l i t i c a l l i f e . And from t h i s supposed fact , and from our 
knowledge that men are both passionate and ra t i o n a l , we can 
proceed to deduce what men placed i n a state of nature would do. 
They would arrive, by 'ratiocination', at certain maxims, 
somewhat invidiously called 'laws of nature', and reckoned 
also t o be divine commands, which they would recognise as necessary 
and s u f f i c i e n t means to peace. But they would also be well aware 
that these laws would not i n fact be obeyed unless there were a 
sovereign authority with enough power to make obedience more 
in the interests of men than disobedience. I t may be (according 
to the 'Taylor-Warrender' thesis) that the laws of nature 
derive t h e i r authority from the fact that they are God's commands. 
But, such i s the strength of immediate and impulsive passion, 
there i s , i n the state of nature, no motive which w i l l impel 
men to obey them. I t happens to be true that God does not, i n 
fac t , send thunderbolts t o enforce his commands. Some means 
must be found, therefore, of making the desire to obey stronger 
than any possible desire which might be g r a t i f i e d by disobeying. 
Men are thus led by reason and passion to the social compact, 
whereby a sovereign authority with absolute and undivided power 
i s created t o represent the whole community, and to govern i t i n 
such a way as to keep at bay the horrors of the state of nature. 
Under such a sovereign, the prescriptive laws of nature which 
are seldom or never followed i n the state of nature can at la s t 
become pr a c t i c a l r e a l i t i e s , and men can enjoy the peace which they 
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so much desire. 
» # * » a 
Now for a l l the attractiveness of a purely n a t u r a l i s t i c 
argument which has a l l the appearances of o b j e c t i v i t y and 
v a l i d i t y of a s c i e n t i f i c demonstration, Hobbes's science of 
p o l i t i c s has been subjected t o constant and persistent attacks. 
Indeed, as Watkins remarks, part of the significance of the 
Leviathan from the point of view of l a t e r generations has been 
i t s eminent c r i t i c i s a b i l i t y . But a great deal of Hobbes 
c r i t i c i s m i s nowhere to the point as far as we are concerned. 
We have seen enough of his opponents to know that many of them 
were simply unworthy of him, and that much of what they say 
amounts to no more than abuse. Moreover, many of his weightier 
c r i t i c s (Ward, Wallls, Bramhall, etc.) frequently deal with 
issues which are only of peripheral importance t o us, or with 
matters which are now of interest;-only to the historian of 
science or of religious controversies. The more interesting and 
relevant arguments have tended t o centre upon the idea of a 
social compact; and many of the most resolute assaults on 
Hobbes's system have been concentrated i n t h i s area. Also, of 
course, a l l c r i t i c s of the idea of a social contract, whether 
they name Hobbes or not, are, i n fact, c r i t i c s of Hobbes. At 
the r i s k of some oversimplification, such arguments may be 
cl a s s i f i e d under the following four headings. 
1. The Practical Impossibility of the Social Compact. 
I t i s argued that the kind of agreement involved i n the social 
compact would be impossible t o arrange i n practice between 
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individuals numerous enough to comprise the population of a 
viable and s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t State. This argument would, of 
course, be p a r t i c u l a r l y t o the point i f i t were r e a l l y true 
that men are as v i v i d l y i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c , untrusting and hostile 
as Hobbes takes them to be. 
2. The Logical or Conceptual Impossibility of the Compact. 
This i s a rather less naive argument, which points out that 
the very concept of a compact i s i t s e l f a highly sophisticated 
one. I t i s essentially a legal notion and, as such, presupposes 
a legal system; and a legal system, i n turn, presupposes a 
degree of social awareness, organisation and co-operation, and 
s k i l l i n communication which men i n the state of nature by 
d e f i n i t i o n do not possess. On t h i s view, as George Sabine has 
put i t , i f a contract were possible i t would not be necessary -
for men who had such attributes would already be l i v i n g the 
kind of ordered social l i f e which the compact i s supposed to 
bring i n t o being. By the same token, i f the contract were 
necessary, i t would not be possible, precisely because these 
attributes were lacking. I f t h i s argument i s v a l i d , then Hobbes's 
theory i s involved i n a vicious c i r c l e . I f agreements cannot 
be made i n the natural state of man before a social contract 
has created organised social l i f e , then i t i s impossible for a 
social contract i t s e l f t o be made. I f the idea of moral 
obligation depends upon the conventions of law, then men i n 
the state of nature, where there are no conventions of law, 
w i l l have no conception of obliging themselves by a contract. 
In other words, i f ever there had been 'natural men', they would 
never have been able to cease from being natural men. 
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3. The Unreality of 'Free Choice'. 
The social compact i s held to derive i t s binding force from 
the fact that i t arises out of the free (that i s , the necessitated 
but uncoerced) choice or consent of the contracting parties. 
The transference of r i g h t involved i n making such a compact i s 
free i n the sense that i t i s supposed not to be compelled. I f 
t h i s were not so, the compact would not, properly speaking, be 
a compact or covenant at a l l , and so no obligation could be 
held to flow from i t . Obligation, to Hobbes, i s obligation to 
keep my word. This, i n tu r n , presupposes that I gave my word -
that my word was not, so to speak, wrested from me. But to 
what extent i s a man r e a l i s t i c a l l y to be called'free' to enter 
c i v i l society when the alternative ( i . e . the war of every man 
with every man) i s so appalling? A course of action which no 
sane man would dream of not taking can hardly be said to be a 
matter of uncoerced choice, save i n the most unusual and 
attenuated sense of the word 'uncoerced'. I t would be unusual, 
for example, for me to declare myself 'free' to choose whether 
or not t o blow out my brains. Yet Hobbes seriously suggests, 
fo r instance, that a man might be 'free' to choose whether to 
submit t o an enemy or be k i l l e d by him - even though, i n 
practice, he w i l l always choose the option of submission. This, 
I think, i s j u s t as s i l l y as the Hegelian suggestion that a man 
i s only r e a l l y fred when he i s obeying. Quite apart from the 
fact that t h i s kind of suggestion consorts oddly with Hobbes's 
empirical psychology, i t i s surely somewhat curious to suggest 
that a man might be 'free' to l i v e a l i f e which i s ' s o l i t a r y , 
poor, nasty, brutish and short 1. 
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A. The Unreality of 'Consent'. 
Even i f the above argument i s disallowed, a further objection 
remains. To enter i n t o c i v i l society by freely-given consent 
i s one thing. To bind your sons and daughters to remain within 
that society i s something else again. Yet unless the descendants 
of the o r i g i n a l contracting parties are held t o be so bound, the 
commonwealth w i l l be of exceedingly short duration, since the 
p o s s i b i l i t y w i l l remain open that i t w i l l f l y apart with the 
coming of age of the new generation and the passing away of the 
old. This i s not, as i t happens, a d i f f i c u l t y which i s . 
peculiar t o Hobbes. Clearly, i t w i l l dog anyone who wishes to 
ground p o l i t i c a l obligation i n consent. Locke attempts to 
escape i t by introducing the notion of 'implied' consent: anyone 
who uses the highways of a commonwealth, or inherits property 
within i t s t e r r i t o r i a l l i m i t s , or takes lodgings within i t , i s 
held to have consented to the terms under which i t i s constituted. 
And what t h i s means, quite simply, i s that, i f people do not 
leave, they are presumed to be remaining by t h e i r own free, 
albeit implied, consent. The d i f f i c u l t y , of course - and t h i s 
was noticed by Hume - i s that the advice to emigrate i s a 
great deal easier t o give than i t is to take. In short, i t i s 
not at a l l beyond the bounds of p o s s i b i l i t y that a so-called 
'free' p o l i t i c a l association may comprise a significant number 
of members whose only reason fo r staying i s that they cannot 
leave; which makes consent quite unreal. And a similar ob-
jection holds against Hobbes. C i v i l society i s held ultimately 
to depend upon free consent embodied i n a social compact 
appointing a sovereign representative - i t i s precisely t h i s 
which makes the absolute power of the sovereign legitimate. 
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However, the sovereign power thus created i s held also to bind 
the generations succeeding the parties to the o r i g i n a l compact, 
even though the members of these succeeding generations cannot, 
i n any re a l sense, be said t o have given t h e i r consent. So i t 
cannot, after a l l , be true that p o l i t i c a l organisation rests 
upon the consent of those who are to be p o l i t i c a l l y organised; 
and the argument from a social compact collapses. Also, on 
Hobbes's account of operative justice as defined by the w i l l of 
the sovereign, i t w i l l always b© up to the sovereign t o stipulate 
that, i n future, consent or otherwise w i l l not be material to 
p o l i t i c a l obligation. 
(More generally, of course, the objection which we have just 
considered i s pertinent t o a l l l i b e r a l p o l i t i c a l theory i n that 
i t draws attention t o a real and unbridgeable gulf between 
p o l i t i c a l philosophy and p o l i t i c a l practice. There i s not a 
great deal of point i n spinning out philosophical systems 
centred upon moral concepts such as freedom or consent or 
justice - or, at least, there i s not much point i n claiming that 
such systems have any grip upon affai r s i n the real world. Real, 
as d i s t i n c t from philosophical, p o l i t i c s i s not about e t h i c a l 
notions, but about the d i s t r i b u t i o n of power. I f I d i s l i k e the 
rules of the p o l i t i c a l community i n which I l i v e , then I have 
two choices: t o submit to them, albeit grudgingly, or to leave. 
I f I do not or cannot leave, then I must abide by the rules. I f 
I do not abide by the rules, then I shall be coerced u n t i l I do. 
And my feelings about justice or fairness w i l l not matter in the 
smallest degree. This, I think, i s Hobbes's real position; and 
one cannot help feeling that i t i s a position which i s p r i o r t o 
rather than a result of his supposedly philosophical reflections 
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about p o l i t i c a l matters. I t might seem disingenuous to compose 
an allegedly scholarly and philosophical argument from which 
positions that you hold i n any case are purported t o flow; but, 
at least, Hobbes sins i n good company.) 
As arguments go, the four objections to the social contract 
theory of government which we have just noticed deserve to be 
taken seriously. There i s , I think, no doubt that they are 
f a t a l to any attempt to uphold a social compact as an h i s t o r i c a l 
o r i g i n of government; and t h i s i s true quite apart from the ease 
with which any such attempt could be f a l s i f i e d h i s t o r i c a l l y . 
Even such an apparent h i s t o r i c a l instance as the U.S.A. i s not, 
of course, an example of men moving from a 'state of nature' into 
a wholly new realm of p o l i t i c a l experience. I t i s a case of 
men replacing one p o l i t i c a l experience by another, and j u s t i f y i n g 
t h e i r acts i n philosophical terms which are bogus i n the sense 
mentioned a moment ago - i n the sense that the status quo would 
not r e a l l y be altered i f the philosophy were to be subtracted. Yet 
however much these four arguments may be canvassed as arguments 
s p e c i f i c a l l y against Hobbes, the fact of the matter i s that none 
of them damages the essential structure of his argument. This 
i s so f o r two reasons, which may be i d e n t i f i e d very readily. 
F i r s t , Hobbes's argument i s not an h i s t o r i c a l one; he does not 
i n v i t e us to believe that there once was an actual social compact 
which r e a l l y did deliver men from a p r e - p o l i t l c a l state of nature 
and by which p o l i t i c a l society as we now know i t was constituted. 
We might, i t i s true, readily f i n d forgiveness for experiencing 
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a certain amount of confusion i n th i s respect, because ffobbes's 
language i s frequently very ambiguous. He often speaks as 
though he intends us t o believe i n the h i s t o r i c i t y of the social 
compact. But he, l i k e every philosopher, i s often constrained 
by the conventions of language into saying something which does 
not quite catch what he means; and he i s , I suppose, as e n t i t l e d 
as anyone else to a sympathetic and imaginative interpretation 
on the part of his readers. In a word, i t i s manifestly clear 
overall that Hobbes i s engaged i n a thought-experiment of the 
kind undertaken i n John Rawls's book, A Theory of Justice. He 
i s performing upon the commonwealth a piece of mental analysis 
comparable to that performed by Galileo upon projectiles moving 
through space; and his conclusions are as follows. Men are so 
constituted that they could not long enjoy peace and security 
without extrinsic regulation strong enough to overcome t h e i r 
i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c , and therefore (?) anti-social tendencies. Hobbes 
takes i t f o r granted that men do prefer peace to war and security 
t o danger, and that t h e i r desires and t h e i r rational natures 
combined are s u f f i c i e n t to show them how to achieve peace. Thus, 
submission to authority i s a rational necessity. I t i s not that 
there has been a covenant i n history. Rather, i t i s that men 
must behave as i f they were bound by such a covenant. I t i s 
manifestly i n t h e i r interests t o do so, because they are able 
to know by reason and experience the consequences for them of 
p o l i t i c a l disorders: they are able, as i t were, to sensed the 
•state of nature 1 l u r k i n g below - and not very far below - the 
surface of organised l i f e , even though such a state of nature 
has never generally obtained. Thus, a l l arguments against Hobbes 
which depend upon objections t o the social contract theory 
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l i t e r a l l y and h i s t o r i c a l l y conceived turn out to be beside the 
point; because Hobbes's theory i s not meant t o be l i t e r a l l y 
and h i s t o r i c a l l y construed. Hobbes i s not w r i t i n g history. 
As Michael Oakeshott has put i t , 
The Leviathan i s a myth, the transposition of an abstract 
argument i n t o the world of the imagination. In i t we are 
made aware at a glance of the fixed and simple centre of 
a universe of complex and changing relationships. The 
argument may not be the better for t h i s transposition, 
and what i t gains i n vividness i t may pay for i n i l l u s i o n . 
But i t i s an accomplishment of art that Hobbes, i n the 
history of p o l i t i c a l philosophy, shares only with Plato. 
Second, Hobbes stands i n a t r a d i t i o n of moral and p o l i t i c a l 
thought which has i t s origins i n the doctrines of St Augustine 
7 
of Hippo. This t r a d i t i o n conceives the State not, as i n the 
Aristotelian t r a d i t i o n , as an aid to or necessary condition of 
human f u l f i l m e n t , but as a remedy for man's destructive and 
self-destructive tendencies. P o l i t i c a l organisation i s necessary 
only because man i s , i n the main, a creature of selfishness and 
cupidity; and i t comes int o being precisely for the purpose 
of restraining those urges which would otherwise be his undoing. 
Much i s said about Hobbes's pessimistic theory of man; but we 
should do well to remember that Hobbes i s , i n fact, by no means 
hard on human nature when measured against contemporary opinion. 
None of his contemporaries believed that man, with or without 
society, i s essentially good. Man, according to seventeenth-
century theology, i s born e v i l , the inh e r i t o r of the or i g i n a l 
sin of Adam; and he can only obtain merit through the operation 
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of divine grace. Hobbes's pe c u l i a r i t y , and the reason underlying 
much of his condemnation as an 'atheist*, l i e s no% i n the fact 
that he proclaims the intense selfishness of man - t h i s proc-
lamation he has i n common with generations of theologians. I t 
l i e s i n his denial of man's essential wickedness. To Hobbes's 
mind, the proposition that man i s as he i s i s simply a matter 
of psychological fa c t . I t i s not an occasion f o r condemnation. 
As he puts i t , the desires and passions which men f e e l are not 
s i n f u l i n themselves: they only become so when they are stipulated 
as such by the law. I f a man wishes to recognise his destructive 
characteristics and take steps to mitigate them, the Leviathan 
i s there t o furnish his natural faculty of 'ratiocination' with 
a-helping hand. And i t i s clear from a l l t h i s that, no matter 
how many objections are urged against i t , the social compact 
theory i s i n any case not a necessary step towards Hobbes's 
conclusions. I f we were to remove from Hobbes's writings a l l 
mention of a social compact, or i f we were to discover an 
absolutely watertight objection to i t , his p o l i t i c a l thdory 
would lose a great deal of i t s rhetoric, but very l i t t l e of i t s 
force. For Hobbes's p o l i t i c a l philosophy turns, not upon the 
social compact, but upon his account of psychology. I f men are 
as he says they are - egoistic, hedonistic, proud, short-sighted 
i n d i v i d u a l i s t s - then absolute government i s obviously the only 
help for them i f they wish to have peace. I t does not r e a l l y 
matter i n the slightest how t h i s government comes into being, 
provided only that i t does come int o being. In short, no 
attempt to launch an attack on Hobbes by way of his doctrine of 
the social compact w i l l reach the heart of the matter. The heart 
of the matter i s not r e a l l y human agreement, hypothetical or actual, 
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but human psychology. I f Hobbes's psychology i s true, his 
p o l i t i c a l recommendations clearly have much to be said for them. 
Indeed, Hobbes would r e a l l y l i k e us to conclude that these 
recommendations are something l i k e l o g i c a l necessities - 'a 
true and certain measure of r i g h t ' . But i s his psychology t r u e ? — 
I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t enough that Hobbes himself does not even allow 
t h i s question t o arise. I f we comb his works looking for evid-
ence to support his contention that a l l men are egoists, we 
shall do so i n vain - because there is n ' t any. For the most 
part, Hobbes simply takes i t as axiomatic that men are as he 
says they are, and does not bother with discussion. Yet we 
noticed i n chapter three that his view i s that a l l statements 
purporting to be 'about the world' must be supported and 
confirmed by empirical evidence. The most that Hobbes has to 
offer i s the suggestion tha t , i f we look in t o ourselves, we shall 
see that we are as he says we are;^ but such an i n v i t a t i o n t o 
introspection i s hardly empirical evidence. Moreover, the 
suggestion that anyone who looks in t o his heart w i l l f i n d there 
nothing but egoistic hedonism i s one which i t i s open to anyone 
not t o accept - as Butler pointed out i n his critique of Hobbes. 
And t h i s paucity - indeed, t o t a l absence - of anything which 
might be called evidence seems to. bear out the suggestions of 
Professor Popper to which I referred e a r l i e r . What could possibly 
count as evidence f o r a general, purportedly s c i e n t i f i c , account 
of human psychology, given the diversity and unpredictability of 
human behaviour, the impossibility of controlled experiment, 
the impossibility of accurately predicting the future, and so on? 
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Indeed, i n asking whether Hobbes's psychology i s true, we are 
only raising the corner of a much larger question - namely, 
the question of whether a psychology i s the kind of thing which 
i s capable of being true. A psychology i s a theory of the 
human mind formulated by human mindsj and t h i s raises what 
might be called the 'electron microscope1 or 'radio astronomy' 
d i f f i c u l t y . Waen we look through an electron microscope, or 
l i s t e n t o the radio waves collected by a radio telescope, 
how can we know that our apparatus is giving us true information? 
How can we know that i t i s evidence, and how can we know what 
i t i s evidence for? The only way of arriving at the evidence 
i n question i s by using the electron microscope. I f , therefore, 
we wish t o test the-hypothesis that the microscope i s a reliable 
piece of apparatus i n that i t gives us accurate information 
about that part of the universe too small t o be seen, we shall 
f i n d ourselves i n a jam. Because we cannot test the hypothesis 
without presupposing i t s t r u t h - without using the electron 
microscope. So, surely, i t i s with psychology. A theory of 
the human mind devised by a human mind must apply as much to 
the mind that devised i t as to any other. The theory cannot, 
therefore, be tested without presupposing i t s own t r u t h . 
Suppose we ask whether or not the account which Hobbes gives 
of human motivation and a c t i v i t y coincides with observed facts 
as we know them. Straight o f f , of course, there i s the objection 
t h a t , i f Hobbes were r i g h t , no-one would bother to ask t h i s 
question, since a moment's re f l e c t i v e introspection would be 
enough to convince us that there i s such a correspondence 
between theory and r e a l i t y . So we begin to smell a r a t at 
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once. Quite apart from t h i s , however, our immediate impulse, 
of course, i s to r e t o r t that Hobbes's psychology i s obviously 
false - that every martyrdom, every act of self-denial, every 
display of courage or s e l f - s a c r i f i c e f a l s i f i e s Hobbes's pyschol-
ogical egoistic hedonism. Unfortunately, however, t h i s l i n e of 
argument.gets us exactly anowhere. I t leads only to a tighten-
ing of the l o g i c a l knot, because i t i s an objection which i s 
easily answered from the Hobbesian side. The exponent of 
Hobbesian psychology can perfectly well claim that the martyr 
chooses death because he desires the rewards of heaven which w i l l 
follow i t more than he fears the pains of martyrdom i t s e l f j or 
that the s e l f - s a c r i f i c i n g hero finds the attraction of posterity's 
adulation more powerful than the repulsion of the prospect of 
s e l f - s a c r i f i c e . I t may be implausible t o t r y to explain the 
l i v e s of Christ or Socrates or Gautama i n terms of purely s e l f -
ish hopes and fearsj but i t i s certainly not a l o g i c a l absurd-
i t y . In short, i t i s quite open to the Hobbesian psychologist 
t o maintain, i n respect of every case that we may care to c i t e , 
that men necessarily and inevitably seek t h e i r own g r a t i f i c a t i o n , 
even though some men seem to f i n d g r a t i f y i n g what others f i n d 
repulsive. And there would be no way i n which we could refute 
such a claim, because the claim i s now taken t o be true by 
d e f i n i t i o n , and i s , as such, placed beyond the reach of refutation 
by any empirical evidence. We could no more refute such a claim 
than we could refute the claim that the sum of the angles of a 
tria n g l e i s 180 degrees. 
But although i t might be possible to establish such a claim as 
true by d e f i n i t i o n , i t i s s t i l l not thereby established as true 
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by correspondence. I t has not, i n other words, been shown to 
be true i n the sense of mirroring the way things actually are; 
and t h i s i s precisely what Hobbes must show i f his psychology, 
and therefore his p o l i t i c a l and social philosophy^ are to hold 
water. I wish now to make one or two b r i e f remarks about 'the 
way things actually are' which do, i t seems to me, t e l l against 
Hobbes's psychological claims. I would stress, however, that 
these are only 'brief remarks' - i t would obviously be impossible, 
in a work of t h i s kind, to attempt a point-by-point refutation. 
F i r s t , even i f we concede that men do, i n fac t , always act i n 
such a way as w i l l g r a t i f y t h e i r own desires, i t i s a long, and 
by no means a necessary, step from here to the conclusion that 
t h i s impulse w i l l , unless severely checked, always have the 
t e r r i b l e consequences which Hobbes anticipates. The chief 
trouble with the statement that ' a l l men seek always t o g r a t i f y 
t h e i r own desires' i s that, even i f i t i s supposed to be true 
by d e f i n i t i o n , i t t e l l s us nothing about what these desires 
actually are. Indeed, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see how one could 
specify i n advance a l l the possible desires that a man i s 
l i k e l y to have, since (to alter a phrase of Wittgenstein),'}'in 
order to draw a l i m i t t o desiring, we should have to desire 
9 
both sides of t h i s l i m i t ' . But, i n any case, there seems to 
be no reason to assume from the outset that the g r a t i f i c a t i o n 
of these desires w i l l inevitably have destructive and a n t i -
social results unless restrained by a strong coercive power. 
Hobbes recognises that men desire peace; yet he holds (with-
out even an attempt at substantiation) that t h i s desire i s too 
weak to survive temptation to se l f i s h and peace-destroying 
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behaviour; end he thinks that t h i s conclusion follows with 
luminous c l a r i t y from a study of human motivation. Yet suppose 
that , by way of reply, I were t o suggest that the desire for 
peace and happiness and what Bentham called the 'pleasures of 
benevolence1 are man's overriding passions, and that wars are 
regrettable and avoidable occasions rather than the continual 
and inevitable nature of things. Now, i f Hobbes's position 
were indeed self-evident, as he holds that i t i s , then such 
a suggestion would strike the hearer as dangerous madness, or 
as a piece of incomprehensible nonsense. Yet t h i s i s precisely 
the kind of thing that Locke said i n the Second Treatise; and 
no-one suggests that Locke was a p o l i t i c a l or philosophical 
nincompoop. Indeed, the Second Treatise has been i n f i n i t e l y 
more i n f l u e n t i a l i n practice than any of the recommendations of 
the Leviathan. I t seems to me that Hobbes's position perfectly 
exemplifies the remark of Benn and Peters that 'self-evidence 
i s more an index of our habituation t o an assumption than of 
10 
i t s t r u t h ' . In a word, i f you are as passionately committ-
ed i n advance as Hobbes was to a particular conclusion, you 
w i l l ensure that your preliminary arguments are not disfigured 
by anything that i s inconsistent with that conclusion. I f , as 
with Hobbes, your conclusion favours absolute government, then 
you w i l l argue that men's unchecked desires are such as w i l l 
obviously make t h e i r l i v e s a misery u n t i l absolute government 
i s established. And you w i l l certainly disallow any claim that 
men i n the main experience the kind of desires which allow them 
to l i v e under very mild government, or even under no government 
at a l l . There i s , i n short, a very strong temptation to 
conclude that Hobbes's psychology is ready-made to f i t i n with 
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certain p o l i t i c a l convictions arrivecUat i n advance and by 
quite other means. Hobbes wished to create a world safe enough 
for himself to l i v e i n j and, consciously or unconsciously, he 
was not above rigging appearances to enable himself to do so. 
Some years ago, an American sociologist wrote a paper called 
11 
'Queue Culture: The Waiting Line as a Social System' - a 
paper which has more relevance for us than may be immediately 
apparent. Consider a queue which has formed for the purpose of 
buying t i c k e t s t o a f o o t b a l l match. I f the queue i s not t o break 
up i n disorder, the established convention of ' f i r s t come f i r s t 
served' must be recognised by a l l , or, at least, by the great 
majority, of i t s members. People mijst not jump the queue. Yet 
everyone desires a t i c k e t ; and waiting for the g r a t i f i c a t i o n 
of his desire i s presumably painful for everyone present -
p a r t i c u l a r l y since there i s a r i s k (especially acute for those 
at the far end of the queue) that the tic k e t s w i l l s e l l out 
before everyone has been accommodated. But common sense and 
experience t e l l us that queues do not inevitably break out 
i n t o skirmishes which result i n the strongest or best-armed 
or most cunning getting served f i r s t - which i s , presumably, 
what would happen i f Hobbes were correct i n his exposition of 
the factors which govern human behaviour. Indeed, experience 
t e l l s us that f i g h t s i n queues are the exception rather than 
the r u le. I f t h i s were not so, then i t would be impossible 
t o speak meaningfully about 'queues' at a l l . Or, better, the 
word 'queue' might come to be used only t o name an extraordinary 
occurrence which we occasionally see by way of r e l i e f from the 
usual round of fi g h t s and duels of cunning which normally occur 
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whenever we are t r y i n g to obtain ajshare i n some scarce resource. 
Now, i t i s true that the coercive power of the law - of the 
'sovereign' - i s ultimately present, since queues form within 
established commonwealths. But the point i s that, as a member 
of a queue, I do not think, ' I mustn't jump the queue. I f I 
do there w i l l be an argument, then there w i l l be a f i g h t , and 
then the black Maria w i l l come and i t w i l l be the worse for 
me.' I do not even necessarily fear the physical blows which 
the man i n front of me i s capable of dealing i f I t r y to get 
i n front of him - and i n any case, i s i t r e a l l y our normal 
expectation t o suffer physical assault i f we jump a queue? Are 
not f o o t b a l l hooligans and the l i k e newsworthy precisely because 
t h e i r behaviour i s exceptional rather than the rule? More 
generally, i s there not a case to be made for saying that we 
condemn violence precisely because i t i s exceptional rather 
than normal behaviour? The feelings which dissuade me, as a 
rul e , from jumping queues are not just primitive hopes and 
fears of the kind described by Hobbes'a egoistic psychology. 
What I fear i s the disapprobation of my peers i f I break a 
convention which i s , i n f a c t , purely informal. By the same 
token, what I respect i s a mode of behaviour which i s neither 
created nor ( i n any direct sense) enforced by the law and i t s 
coercive power. My behaviour i s controlled informally; and, 
what i s more, the tendency to obey the convention of queueing 
i s not d i r e c t l y imposed upon me from without (there i s not 
usually a bunch of toughs waiting to spot queue-jumpers). I t 
arises from within as a matter of my own rational deliberation. 
In a word, there seem to exist rational and informal checks which 
operate upon human behaviour quite independently of the fact that 
formal coercive sanctions exist i n the background; and which 
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are therefore, presumably, also capable of existing i n the 
state of nature. 
Further examples are provided by those social anthropologists 
who have called attention t o numerous pre-industrial societies 
which exist perfectly peacefully without coercive - or, indeed, 
any - government. These so-called 'stateless societies' are 
very numerous, and t h e i r ways of l i f e have been very well 
documented. They have no courts, no executive machinery, 
no legislature - no formal i n s t i t u t i o n s of government at a l l . 
They exist by custom, by co-operation, by leaving decisions 
to the old and wise, but not through any kind of formally-
mobilised p o l i t i c a l power. The Kalingas, the Tlv, the Sirionos, 
12 
the Nuer, and many other 'stateless societies' can and do exist; 
and l i f e within them certainly does not seem to be 'a war of 
every man with every man'. I t i s certainly true that such a 
form of social organisation would not be appropriate to any very 
sophisticated mode of social production. I t would certainly 
13 
not do for a 'possessive market society'. But i t i s clearly 
not impossible or inconceivable, as Hobbes would i n v i t e us to 
conclude. 
Hobbes seems to have believed that only the most spectacularly 
bad consequences w i l l dissuade me from t r y i n g to satisfy a personal 
desire of any strength. More accurately, he seems to have i n 
mind some kind of unreal, Benthamite f e l i c i f i c calculus which 
demands that a given desire f o r pleasure can be countermanded 
by a pain which i s as acute as, or more acute than, the pleasure 
i t s e l f . But at least three plausible points arise out of the 
remarks which I have just been making. F i r s t , i t i s not, i n 
f a c t , obvious that men cannot l i v e together without coercion; 
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and t h i s point i s i n no way impaired by the obvious fact that 
they sometimes do need to be coerced. Second, our rational 
experience of mankind, as manifested i n the study of stateless 
societies or in p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n queues or similar situations, 
suggests to us that the faculty of self control i s much more 
highly developed than Hobbes would wish us to believe. Third, 
i n his insistence upon the concepts of coercion, law, command, 
and so f o r t h , as formal checks upon man's destructive tendencies, 
Hobbes gives f a r too l i t t l e recognition to informal, extra-legal 
or pre-legal social controls which are, i n fact, very powerful: 
approval, disapproval, respect, d i s l i k e , and so on. 
I f a l l t h i s i s so, then Hobbes's empirical psychology begins 
to look implausible. His depiction of man as a complex pleasure-
seeking and pain-avoiding mechanism driven by extrinsic and 
necessary causes p l a i n l y does not explain enough. And i f Hobbes's 
psychology i s wanting i n sophistication, then his insistence 
upon absolute government to control the impulses of mankind no 
longer looks so impressive. I t i s , i n f a c t , revealing to note 
the extent to which Hobbes's own l i f e belied his account of 
human motivation. He quite straightforwardly i d e n t i f i e d human 
v o l i t i o n with animal desires of a f a i r l y basic and uncomplicated 
kind - pleasure, power, glory. From t h i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , he 
i s forced to pass to the conclusion that the p o l i t i c a l order 
can never furnish, mankind with any new objects of v o l i t i o n . At 
the l a s t analysis, c i v i l society can do only two things. F i r s t , 
i t can increase i t s members' chances of satisfying desires which, 
in themselves, remain no more than the desires of the hypothetical 
savage i n the state of nature. Second, i t can furnish new motives 
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strong enough to impede the satisfaction of destructive desires. 
On t h i s account, a l l that distinguishes the c i t i z e n from the 
savage i s the fact that the c i t i z e n i s better informed as to 
the l i k e l y outcome of an attempt to satisfy a particular desire 
i n p a r t i c u l a r circumstances. Also, he i s able to contrive 
a r t i f i c i a l consequences of an unpleasant kind to attach to 
attempts t o g r a t i f y desires of a certain kind. C i v i l society, 
i n short, i s only the state of nature suppressed and controlled: 
the act of becoming a p o l i t i c a l man does not transform the 
individual's human nature. And i f this were true, then attempts 
on the part of any one man to achieve a rat i o n a l understanding 
of human l i f e would presumably be impossible - simply because 
the desire for such a ra t i o n a l understanding i s one which, i n 
the very nature of the case, the 'natural' man, concerned only 
with himself, could not formulate. And the implication of t h i s 
i s that, i f Hobbes were r i g h t about human psychology, he himself 
could not have l i v e d as he did; and neither could those of his 
contemporaries whom he most l i k e d , admired and feared. 
But, t o Hobbes's mind, l i v i n g as he did pinched between 
alarming p o l i t i c a l circumstances and a preternaturally timid 
disposition, the men of his generation needed, above a l l things, 
self-awareness - awareness of what he took to be t h e i r own 
natural, l i m i t l e s s , and, i n i t s e l f , blameless capacity for 
self-destruction and self-defeat. They needed a 'true and certain 
r u l e ' f o r t h e i r actions. And Hobbes thought that he could supply 
such a ru l e , derived from the newly-emergent mechanical conception 
of nature which he found so conveniently ready to hand, and 
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reinforced by the rigour of geometrical method. I f , t o our 
eyes-, the attempt i s more important than the achievement, t h i s 
does not much diminish his significance i n the history of ideas. 
From our point of view, i t i s as a social scientist that Hobbes 
continues to occupy a place of eminence. He i s convinced that 
s c i e n t i f i c method, as he understands i t , i s capable of being 
systematically applied not only to physics, astronomy, physiology, 
and the l i k e , but also to psychology, ethics, sociology and 
p o l i t i c s . And he i s convinced that i t i s only by so doing that 
men can save themselves from the horrors of uncertainty and war. 
Hobbes has a long l i n e of successors whose thought has followed 
essentially similar lines; and i t i s i n t h i s respect that he 
s t i l l has a certain kind of contemporary relevance. Odd as so 
much of what he had to say may now seem, very many of the questions 
which concerned him i n the f i e l d of s o c i a l - s c i e n t i f i c explanation 
are s t i l l open. Social scientists continue to debate the poverty 
or otherwise of historicism; continue (at least i n many cases) 
to t r y i l l e g i t i m a t e l y to derive 'ought' from ' i s ' ; and so 
continue to f a l l into the glaring equivocation between 'laws' 
which describe the re g u l a r i t i e s of nature and 'laws' which 
prescribe what men ought to do. From the point of view of modem 
exponents - p a r t i c u l a r l y those who lack a sense of history - Hobbes's 
contribution to the method and practice of the social sciences 
i s s t i l l worthy of a close look. I t may well be that the outcome 
of such a look i s refutation. But Hobbes i s very well worth 
refuting; and no-one, I suppose, needs to be reminded that 
refutation i s a process of growth. 
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NOTES. 
1. K.R. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism. esp. chs. I I & IV. 
Vide also 'Postscript: After Twenty Years', i n Popper, 
The Logic of Sc i e n t i f i c Discovery. Popper's book i s 
(avowedly) a diatribe against Fascism and Communism, and 
he does not name Hobbes. The question i s , then, i s Hobbes 
a theorist who claims to be able to predict the future 
by formulating ' s c i e n t i f i c ' laws allegedly l i k e the laws 
of physics? I think that, without too great a distor-
t i o n of Professor Popper's meaning, he may be considered 
as such a th e o r i s t . His claim i s , i n effect, that by 
considering men i n a state of nature - admittedly a 
hypothetical state of nature - we might, by n a t u r a l i s t i c 
means, predict what t h e i r future might be. I concede, 
however, that Hobbes's standing as an ' h i s t o r i c i s t ' i s 
a l i t t l e unsteady. I do not want to labour the point -
which i s why I have banished Professor Popper to a foot-
note. 
Professor Popper's arguments can be summarised as 
follows. Historicism claims to be able to predict the 
future course of history. But history i t s e l f w i l l be 
much influenced by changes i n human knowledge. I t i s 
obviously impossible for us to predict, by n a t u r a l i s t i c 
or non-naturalistic means, what changes i n human knowledge 
w i l l occur. We could not say what men w i l l know i n the 
future unless we knew i t already. Thus, a theoretical 
and predictive history resembling theoretical physics i n 
the scope and character of what i t can do, i s impossible -
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we cannot predict the future course of history, and 
p o l i t i c a l philosophies which rest upon a claim to be able 
to do so are n u l l i f i e d . 
This i s only a pale shadow of what Professor Popper 
actually says; but since I do not intend to rel y very 
much on him, there i s no need t o carry the discussion 
further. 
2. A History of P o l i t i c a l Theory. p£395. 
3. Vide W.von Leyden?s freply (Philosophical Quarterly. 1973) 
to G. Parry, 'Performative Utterances and Obligation i n 
'Hobbes,' Philosophical Qjarterly. 1967. 
4. Second Treatise. V I I I , 119. 
5. Vide Of the Original Contract, pp.221^222. As Hume puts 
i t , 
Can we seriously say that a poor peasant or artisan 
has a free choice to leave his country, when he knows 
no foreign language or manners, and lives from day 
to day by the small wages which he acquires? We may 
as well assert that a man, by remaining i n a vessel, 
f r e e l y consents t o the dominion of the master, though 
he was carried on board while asleep, and must leap 
i n t o the ocean and perish the moment he leaves her. 
Hobbes and Locke, as exponents of 'possessive individualism', 
were not, of course, much concerned with poor peasants and 
artisans; but tha t , perhaps, only goes t o strengthen 
HumeIs point. 
6. Leviathan, Introduction, p . x v i i i . 
220. 
7. This, of course, i s not s t r i c t l y true - i t s has i t s 
origins i n certain of the Sophists of fifth-century 
Athens. But i t was a t r a d i t i o n which dominated 
Medieval p o l i t i c a l thought u n t i l the time of Aquinas, 
and which remained very potent thereafter; and, t o t h i s 
extent, i t was consciously taken from Augustines's De 
Givitate Dei, without reference to his forebears. 
8» Leviathan. E.W. Vol.3,pp.xi-xii. 
9. Wittgenstein's actual words are, 'in order to draw a l i m i t 
to thinking, we should have to think both sides of t h i s 
l i m i t . ' (Tractatus Logico-Philosophious. Preface.) 
10. Social Principles and the Democratic State, p.39. 
11. Leon Mann, i n the American Journal of Sociology. 1969. 
12. For a general survey, see the a r t i c l e on 'Stateless 
Societies' i n the International Encyclopaedia of the 
Social Sciences. Vol . 1 5 . 
13. G.B. MacPherson, The P o l i t i c a l Theory of Possessive 
Individualism. pp.53ff. 
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